MIMS v. ASTRUE

Filing 13

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/26/2012. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON R. MIMS,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 11-55

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o

R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of March, 2012, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final dec

ion, denying

plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq.,
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g) i Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d
114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995)

i

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182

(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993)
Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
738 F. Supp. 942, 94·4

(W.D. Pa. 1990)

i

Brown v.

See also Berryv. Sullivan,

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
1

court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

As stated above, substantial record evidence supports the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ/I) that Plaintiff is
not disabled under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Plaintiff's
primary argument is that the ALJ erred by rej ecting Dr. Cutlip's opinion
that he had marked limitations in his activities of daily living ("ADL")
and in maintaining social functioning. The Court disagrees.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ did not reject this
treating physician's opinion outright; she explicitly stated that
while she found Dr. Cutlip's opinion of marked limitations to be
inconsistent with Plaintiff's testimony and unsupported by the medical
evidence of record, she did incorporate into her residual functional
capacity ("RFC") determination his opinion that Plaintiff had
"deficiencies in concentration, persistence and pace that could result
in his failure to complete tasks in a timely manner.
(R. 18). She
explained her reasons for discounting the weight of Dr. Cutlip's
opinion, citing the fact that his progress report and assessment did
not include a mental status examination and that he did not assess
Plaintiff's functional work limitations.
Id. at 17). She summarized
the objective medical evidence in the record as well as the testimony
from the hearing and concluded that "[Plaintiff's mental condition]
improved after being diagnosed and treated, and "after he moved into
the assisted living residential program in May 2008./1 (Id. at 18).
She also found that any deterioration experienced by Plaintiff as
determined by Dr. Cutlip, "was, at most, only for a limited period
particularly in light of [Plaintiff] 's prior reports and testimony
regarding his activities./I (Id.).
It is well-settled that a "treating physician's opinion on the
nature and severity of an impairment will be given controlling weight
only where it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record./I
les v Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
229 Fed. Appx. 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court finds that the ALJ
sufficiently explained her reasoning for affording less weight to Dr.
Cutlip's opinion in accordance with Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
706-07 (3d Cir. 1981), and that substantial record evidence supports
her decision to do so.
II

II

2

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.8) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

The Court also notes that the ALJ' s RFC determination is supported
by Plaintiff's own testimony, where he testified that he was unlimited
in his ability to sit so long as he was able to shift his weight and
was able to lift 50 pounds occasionally and 30 pounds frequently.
(Doc.
No. 6-2 at 65-66). Indeed, the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt by restricting him to lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally
and 10 pounds frequently.
(R. 13). While Plaintiff testified to
limitations in his ability to stand and walk, the ALJ properly found
that his limitations were "not supported by obj ective medical evidence
and the record as a whole.
(Id. at 15). She noted that although he
"complained of pain in his joints in August 2006 . . . there [wa]s
no objective medical evidence [in the record] prior to September 2006,"
and that a September 2006 x-ray of his cervical spine revealed "normal
findings except for some degenerative changes.
Id. ). She further
noted that during Plaintiff's September 2006 hospitalization, "his
records show[ed] that he had no problems with mobility and was able
to take frequent walks.
(Id. ). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the ALJ properly analyzed the medical evidence of record and
incorporated all of Plaintiff's credibly established limitations into
her RFC determination. The Court also finds that her determination
is supported by substantial record evidence.
II

II

II

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(