BYRD v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER granting 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. 405(g), the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 8/8/12. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VERTIE BYRD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11 175
MICHAEL J. AS TRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND
t~ay
this
NOW,
of
August,
2012,
upon
due
consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the
Commissioner
of
Social
Security
("Commissioner")
denying
her
application for supplemental security income ("SSr") under Title
XVI
of
the
Social
Security Act
("Act"),
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 10) be, and
the same hereby is,
summary judgment
denied.
granted,
and the Commissioner's motion for
(Document No. 12) be,
and the same hereby is,
The case will be remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings
consistent
with
this
Memorandum
Judgment
Order
pursuant to sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
When the
Commissioner determines
that
a
claimant
not
disabled within the meaning of the Act,
the findings leading to
such a
substantial
conclusion must
"Substantial
evidence
be
has
based upon
been defined
as
'more
evidence.
than a
mere
'l&AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)
scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate.
(3d Cir. 1999)
III
Plummer v. Apfel l 186 F.3d 4221 427
(citation omitted) .
Despite the deference to administrative decisions required by
this
standard l
reviewing
courts
\\, retain a
responsibility
to
scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the
[Commissionerls]
evidence.
decision
is
not
supported
by
substantial
Morales v. Apfel l 225 F.3d 310 1 317 (3d Cir. 2000)1
III
guoting l Smith v. Califano l 637 F.2d 968 1 970 (3d Cir. 1981).
evaluating
findings
I
whether
substantial
"'leniency
[should]
evidence
be
shown
supports
in
an
In
ALJ/s
establishing
the
claimantls disabilitYI and ... the [Commissionerls] responsibility
to rebut it
Barnhart
v.
I
[should]
be strictly construed.
I II
326 F.3d 376 1 379 (3d Cir. 2003)1 quoting
Califano l
606
F.2d 403 1 407
(3d Cir.
1979).
I
Reefer v.
Dobrowolsky
These well-
established principles dictate that the court remand this case to
the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed her application for SSI on December 141 2007 1
alleging disability beginning on August 28 1 2007 1 due to bipolar
disorder
denied.
151 2009.
that
and
vaginal
Plaintiff's
bleeding.
At plaintiffls request
I
application
was
an ALJ held a hearing on October
On November 19 1 2009, the ALJ issued a decision finding
plaintiff
is
not
disabled.
The Appeals
Council
denied
plaintiffls request for review on December 28 1 2010 1 making the
ALJ I s
decision
the
final
decision of
the
Commissioner.
The
instant action followed.
Plaintiff l who has an eighth grade education l was 50 years
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
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old when
she
filed
her
application
and
is
classified as
an
individual closely approaching advanced age under the regulations.
20 C.F.R. §416.963(d).
Plaintiff does not have any past relevant
work experience, and she has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity at any time since filing her application.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
medical
records
and
hearing
testimony from plaintiff at the hearing, the ALJ found that she
suffers
from
the
severe
impairments
substance addiction disorder.
of
bipolar disorder
and
However, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff's impairments, either alone or in combination, do not
meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set
forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R.,
subpart P,
Regulation No.4
("Appendix 1") .
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform work at all exertional levels,
limited by certain non-exertional
limitations.
but she is
Plaintiff
is
limited to working in a low stress environment, which requires the
performance of simple, routine and repetitive tasks.
In addition,
plaintiff is limited to no more than minimal contact with the
general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding") .
Based on testimony by a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded
that
plaintiff's
vocational
factors
and
residual
functional
capacity allow her to perform work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy,
such as a stock clerk, office
Accordingly,
cleaner or hotel/motel clerk.
the ALJ found that
plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
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3
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at
least
twelve
months.
42
U.S.C.
§1382c(a) (3) (A).
The
impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is
not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering
[her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy . .
"
42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (B).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.
The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3)
if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)
if not
l
whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
if so,
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,
in light of
her age,
residual functional capacity.
education,
work experience and
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (4).
If the
claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step,
further
inquiry is unnecessary.
Id.
Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision that she has
the residual functional capacity to perform work that exists in
the national economy on the following grounds:
(1) the ALJ failed
to consider dozens of GAF scores provided by her treating sources,
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which demonstrate that she has a serious impairment in her ability
to functionj and,
(2) as a result, the ALJ's RFC Finding did not
account for all of her mental health limitations.
After reviewing
the ALJ's decision and the record, the court finds that this case
must be remanded for consideration of plaintiff's GAF scores and
how, if at all, that evidence may affect the ALJ's assessment of
her residual functional capacity.
Plaintiff's primary complaint is that the ALJ did not fully
consider dozens of GAF scores provided by her treating sources.
The GAF scale, designed by the American psychiatric Association,
is used by
"mental health clinicians and doctors
to rate the
social, occupational and psychological functioning of adults."
Irizarry v. Barnhart, 233 Fed. Appx. 189, 190, n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).
The
GAF
scale
considers
these
areas
of
functioning
hypothetical continuum of mental health to illness.
psychiatric Association,
on
a
See American
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
(2000).
The highest possible score
is 100 and the lowest is 1.
The medical evidence of record indicates that plaintiff was
admitted to UPMC McKeesport hospital
suicidal
ideation.
{R.
ISS}.
in February 2008 due
to
After examining plaintiff and
taking her history, the admitting physician assessed plaintiff's
GAF
score
at
25,
which
indicates
""Aon
(Rev, 8/82)
- 5
that
one's
behavior
is
considerably
156) .
40,
influenced by delusions
or
hallucinations. 1
(R.
The discharging physician rated plaintiff's GAF score at
which
indicates
some
impairment
in
reality
testing
or
communication or a major impairment in several areas. 2 (R. 153).
Subsequently,
in
March
2008,
plaintiff
was
admitted
to
Jefferson Regional Medical Center because she was hearing voices
that were telling her to cut herself.
(R. 160).
At that time,
the admitting physician rated plaintiff's GAF score at 30.
(R.
160) .
Following those two hospital admissions, plaintiff attended
treatment sessions at Mercy Heritage of Hope during 2008 and 2009.
The progress notes from Mercy contain approximately 50 GAF score
ratings, ranging from a low of 40 to a high of 50.
(R. 183, 186,
194, 196, 206, 208, 218, 227, 229, 234, 238, 240, 243, 246, 252,
254, 257, 260, 262, 265, 268, 270, 272, 275, 277, 279, 281, 283,
289, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 3 OS, 307, 309, 311, 313, 315,
318,
320,
322,
324,
326,
331,
335,
337,
344) .
At
best,
1A GAF score of 21-30 indicates that an individual's behavior is
considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations or serious
impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent,
acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation), or indicates an
inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day,
no job, home or friends).
2A GAF score of 31-40 indicates that an individual has some
impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times
illogical, obscure or irrelevant) or major impairment in several areas,
such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking or mood
(e.g., depressed adult avoids friends, neglects family and is unable to
work) .
I
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plaintiff's highest GAF score of 50 indicates serious symptoms. 3
As the Commissioner correctly notes, GAF scores do not have
a direct correlation to the severity requirements of the Social
Security mental disorder listings, and therefore a low GAF score
is not conclusive evidence of a mental disability.
Astrue, 351 Fed. Appx. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 2009).
See Gilroy v.
Nevertheless, GAF
scores are considered to be medical evidence that may inform the
ALJ's judgment of whether a claimant is disabled.
See Irizarry,
223 Fed. Appx. at 192; Rios v. Commissioner of Social Security,
444 Fed. Appx.
532,
535
(3d Cir.
2011); Colon v. Barnhart; 424
F.SUpp.2d 80S, 814 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
addressed
by
an
ALJ
claimant's disability."
in
making
As such, GAF scores "must be
a
determination
regarding
a
Colon, 424 F.Supp.2d at 812; see also,
Wiggers v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1904015, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2010).
Although an ALJ must address GAF scores, like any other evidence
in a social security case, he may discount those scores or give
them little weight if they are inconsistent with the record as a
whole, so long as he explains his decision in that regard.
Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994)
See
(stating that an
ALJ "may properly accept some parts of the medical evidence and
reject other parts, but she must consider all the evidence and
give some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects").
In this case, although plaintiff's treatment providers rated
,,",Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
3A GAF score of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal
ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting), or any
serious impairment in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g.,
no friends, unable to keep a job) .
-
7
her GAF score at least 50 times, the ALJ did not even mention, let
alone address, plaintiff's GAF scores that indicated serious, and
on two occasions major,
impairment in social,
psychological functioning.
occupational and
Because the ALJ did not consider all
of the relevant medical evidence, his decision is not supported by
substantial
evidence,
and
additional proceedings.
this
case
must
be
remanded
for
See Irizarry, 223 Fed. Appx. at 192-93.
On remand, the ALJ must specifically consider plaintiff's GAF
scores and indicate whether he accepts that evidence or explain
why he rejects it.
In addition, the ALJ must discuss what impact,
if any, plaintiff's GAF scores have upon the assessment of her
residual functional capacity.
For the foregoing reasons,
plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment will be granted,
the Commissioner's motion for summary
judgment will be denied,
and this case will be remanded to the
Commissioner
for
further
proceedings
consistent
with
Memorandum Judgment Order.
/
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
cc: Lindsay Fulton Osterhout, Esq.
521 Cedar Way
Suite 200
Oakmont, PA 15139
Paul Kovac
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
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this
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