KELLY v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 8/16/11. (mh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN J. KELLY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
)
)
) 2:11-cv-00193
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the court is DEFENDANT UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (Document
No. 13), with brief in support (Document No. 14). Plaintiff John J. Kelly (“Kelly”) has filed a
brief in opposition to the motion (Document No. 22) and has attached an exhibit thereto
(Document No. 22-1). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition.
Factual and Procedural History
In essence, Kelly claims that he was discharged from his employment by United States
Steel (“Defendant”) due to his age. On August 12, 2010, he filed a formal charge of age
discrimination against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). The charge was cross-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(the “PHRC” or “Commission”) on August 25, 2010. Kelly received a letter from the PHRC on
November 18, 2010, which notified him of the cross-filing. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit A (Document
No. 22-1). Furthermore, the letter provided that under the Work Sharing Agreement between the
EEOC and PHRC, the “PHRC waived the opportunity to investigate the complaint back to the
EEOC.” The PHRC, however, made clear that it “reserve[d] the right to docket, serve and
require an answer at some future date.”
On February 11, 2011, Kelly initiated the instant action, claiming that he was discharged
because of his age (he was fifty-two (52) years of age at the time of his discharge) in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 957, et seq. (“PHRA”). Defendant filed an
Answer on April 15, 2011 (Document No. 6).
In the pending motion, filed on June 20, 2011, Defendant contends that Kelly’s PHRA
claim should be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the
PHRC. Specifically, Defendant argues that because Kelly filed suit in this Court only six (6)
months after filing his administrative charge, he infringed upon the PHRC’s one-year period of
exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, Defendant seeks dismissal of Kelly’s claim for
compensatory and punitive damages under the ADEA, arguing that such damages are not
available under the act.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides as follows: “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
A Rule 12(c) motion is reviewed in the same manner as a motion to dismiss a complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court will grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings only if the movant establishes that there are no material
issues of fact and, therefore, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Shelly v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 798 F.2d 93, 97 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1986). All reasonable inferences must be
drawn in favor of the non-moving party, which in this case is Kelly.
2
Legal Analysis
A. PHRA Claim
Defendant argues that Kelly’s PHRA claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because
he brought suit in this Court less than a year after filing his charge with the PHRC and thus failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly established
that the PHRA requires a plaintiff to file an administrative complaint with the PHRC before he
may file a lawsuit alleging a PHRA violation. See Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications,
Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 920 (Pa. 1988). The complaint must be filed with the PHRC within 180 days
after the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred. See 43 P.S. § 962(h). The PHRC retains
exclusive jurisdiction over such a complaint for a period of one year “to conduct an investigation
of the charges and, if possible, conciliate the matter.” Clay, 559 A.2d at 920. However, if the
Commission dismisses the complaint or has not entered into a conciliation agreement prior to
one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with PHRC, a complainant is permitted to resort to
judicial remedies as provided by the act. See id. (quoting 43 P.S. § 962(c)).
In this case, the cross-filing of Kelly’s EEOC complaint with the PHRC on August 25,
2010, satisfied the PHRA’s 180-day filing requirement. Kelly’s February 11, 2011, filing of the
instant action, however, came only six (6) months after the filing of his complaint with the
PHRC, i.e. approximately six (6) months before the expiration of the PHRC’s period of
exclusive jurisdiction. Kelly acknowledges that he failed to wait a full year prior to the filing of
his PHRA claim with this Court. Nonetheless, he urges the Court to find that he has exhausted
his administrative remedies because the PHRC informed him in a letter dated November 18,
2010, that it had waived the opportunity to investigate his complaint back to the EEOC. He
3
suggests that such waiver, along with the PHRC’s failure to take action on his claim in the eleven
and one-half months the claim had been before the Commission, effectively constitutes a
dismissal of his complaint, giving him the right to file suit in this Court. The Court finds that
Kelly has misconstrued the PHRC’s letter, for nothing in the letter indicates that the PHRC was
actually dismissing Kelly’s complaint. Indeed, the Commission expressly noted that it retained
the right to docket the case. Accordingly, Kelly has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
under the PHRA by prematurely filing suit in this Court.
The remaining issue is whether Kelly’s premature PHRA claim should be dismissed, in
light of the fact that the period required for PHRA exhaustion has expired during the pendency of
this litigation. A number of courts within the Third Circuit, when faced with this issue, have
permitted a plaintiff to amend his complaint to assert a PHRA claim once the PHRC’s period of
exclusive jurisdiction has expired. See, e.g., Santi v. Business Records Management, L.L.C,
2010 WL 3120047, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2010) (collecting cases and granting leave to amend
complaint following the completion of the administrative process); McGovern v. Jack D’s, Inc.,
2004 WL 228667, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2004) (same); Reilly v. Upper Darby Twp., 2010 WL
55296, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2010) (same); Troendle v. Yellow Freight, Inc., 1999 WL 89747, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1999) (concluding “that [plaintiff] constructively exhausted her
administrative remedies before the PHRC” when the one-year period elapsed during pendency of
litigation). Furthermore, in Violanti v. Emery Worldwide A-CF Co., 847 F.Supp.1257, 1258
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (involving the same situation), the court reasoned that the premature filing of
the PHRA claim was curable by the passage of time. Rather than dismissing the plaintiff’s claim
due to a technical defect, the court simply denied the defendant’s motion. See id.
Importantly, U.S. Steel has not shown that the PHRC truncated its investigation in
4
response to Kelly’s filing of this lawsuit. Thus, Kelly would be permitted to assert a PHRA
claim upon exhaustion of the one-year period of administrative jurisdiction. The result in
Violanti – rather than putting the parties through the time and expense of dismissal without
prejudice, followed by additional pleadings – is consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s PHRA claim will be DENIED.
B. Compensatory Damages Claim
The pending motion also seeks dismissal of Kelly’s claim for compensatory damages and
loss of consortium under the ADEA, arguing that such damages are not available under the act.
It is well established that compensatory damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. See
C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995) (“[t]he Courts of Appeals have unanimously held . . .
that the ADEA does not permit a separate recovery of compensatory damages for pain and
suffering or emotional distress”). Our appellate court is included among those barring such
recovery. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977)
(holding that “damages for ‘pain and suffering’ or emotional distress cannot properly be awarded
in ADEA cases”), rev'd on other grounds in Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 584 F.2d 1231
(3d Cir. 1978). Similarly, it is well-established that a loss of consortium claim is not available
under the ADEA. Acevedo v. Monsignor Donovan High School, 420 F.Supp.2d 337, 347-48
(D.N.J. 2006). Kelly does not contest this issue. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for
compensatory damages and loss of consortium under the ADEA will be DISMISSED.
C. Punitive Damages Claim
Defendant likewise contends that Kelly may not recover punitive damages under the
5
ADEA. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed this
issue, all of the courts of appeals which have done so have denied claims for punitive damages in
ADEA cases. See Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966-67 (10th Cir. 1987) (collecting
cases from other circuits). Several members of this Court and a number of our sister courts
within the Third Circuit have denied claims for punitive damages under the ADEA as well. See,
e.g., Zurik v. Woodruff Family Services, 2009 WL 4348826, at *1 (2009 W.D.Pa. Dec. 1, 2009);
Baldwin v. Peake, 2009 WL 1911040, at *3 (2009 W.D.Pa. July 1, 2009); Steward v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 312 F.Supp.2d 719, 730 (E.D.Pa. 2004). The Court finds those decisions
persuasive and agrees that the ADEA does not authorize claims for punitive damages.
Therefore, Kelly’s claim for punitive damages under the ADEA will be DISMISSED.1
Conclusion
In summary, Defendants' Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings will be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
An appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
1
As Defendant correctly points out, punitive damages are also not available under the PHRA.
See Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 749 (Pa. 1998) ( “[w]hile punitive damages also serve to
deter, simply put, we do not consider punitive damages to be consistent with the remedial nature
of the Act”). Thus to the extent that Plaintiff has asserted a claim for punitive damages under the
PHRA, such a claim will be DISMISSED.
6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN J. KELLY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
)
)
) 2:11-cv-00193
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER OF THE COURT
AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2011, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (Document No. 13) filed by
United States Steel Corporation is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART as follows:
(1) Denied as to Plaintiff’s PHRA claim;
(2) Granted as to Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages and loss of consortium
under the ADEA; and
(3) Granted as to Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under the ADEA and the PHRA.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Court Judge
cc:
Bruce C. Fox, Esquire
Email: bruce.fox@obermayer.com
Mary Elizabeth Fischman, Esquire
Email: beth.fischman@obermayer.com
Anthony F. Jeselnik, Esquire
Email: afjeselnik@uss.com
Rodney M. Torbic, Esquire
Email: rmtorbic@uss.com
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?