HAYS v. ASTRUE

Filing 13

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 1/2/2013. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI RAE HAYS,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 11 408

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o

R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of January, 2013, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq.,
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g)

i

Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d
114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995)

i

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182

(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993) i Brown v.
Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
738 F. Supp. 942, 944

(W.D. Pa. 1990)

See also Berry v. Sullivan,

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal

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court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ "improperly rej ected" the opinion
of Dr. Berschling - a consultative examiner - who found that Plaintiff
had "marked limitations" in her ability to understand, remember, and
carry out instructions and in her ability to respond appropriately
to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting. See
(Doc. No. 6 -7) at 70. Plaintiff also argues that the failure to afford
proper weight to his opinion led to an inaccurate Residual Functional
Capacity ("RFC") and an inaccurate hypothetical to the Vocational
Expert ("VE"). The Court disagrees and finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision to afford less weight to Dr.
Berschling's opinion.
Plaintiff's contentions are completely devoid of merit.
Contrary to her repeated assertions to the contrary, the ALJ did not
reject the opinion of Dr. Berschling, but instead gave it little
probative weight in light of several factors. See (Doc. No. 6-2) at
15-16. Specifically, the ALJ chose to credit treating source records
which extend over a period of time over a one time examination conducted
by a psychiatrist who lacks a treatment relationship with Plaintiff.
The ALJ specifically found that his opinion was inconsistent with
Plaintiff's longitudinal record which shows consistent GAF scores of
60, indicating moderate limitations at best. (Id.) at 15. The ALJ also
considered the context of the examination, which took place after the
hearing and at the ALJ's direction. Id. The ALJ had left the record
open so that counsel could obtain a statement from Plaintiff's doctors
setting forth her functional limitations; however, no such report was
obtained so the ALJ arranged for Plaintiff to undergo a consultative
mental status examination with Dr. Berschling. The ALJ considered
Plaintiff's motivation to exaggerate her symptoms during this
examination as it was being conducted in support of her disability
claim. (Id.) at 15 -16. The ALJ expl i tly stated tha t "her motivation
in this context may have been quite different from that involved in
her treatment sessions, where she is seen for the purpose of treating
and decreasing her symptoms." Id. at 15. The ALJ found that Dr.
Berschling's report contained many symptoms which were "rarely
reported" in the longitudinal record and that many of his findings
conflicted with the results of Plaintiff's mental status examinations
which had been "generally benign." Id. at 15. In light of the
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.8) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

inconsistency between Dr. Berschling's opinion and Plaintiff's
longitudinal record, the ALJ found that his opinion over-relied on
Plaintiff's subjective complaints and that he "stated what the
[Plaintiff] actually does rather than his professional opinion of what
she can do." (Id.) at 15. In this regard, the Court notes that
over-reliance on Plaintiff's subjective complaints is but one of many
factors the ALJ considered in giving less weight to his opinion. The
Court also notes that despite Dr. Berschling's findings of marked
limitations, he checked "no" in response to the questions of whether
Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, and carry out
instructions is affected by her impairments and whether her impairments
limit her ability to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers,
and work pressures in a work setting. See (Doc. No. 6-7) at 70.
Interestingly, his report shows that he originally denoted Plaintiff
as having "moderate" limitations in both these categories; however,
the findings of moderate limitations were scratched out and replaced
with findings of marked limitations in these categories. See (id.).
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. The Court further finds
that the ALJ thoroughly explained his reasoning for why he chose to
give more weight to Plaintiff's treatment records and that substantial
evidence also supports his decision to give less weight to the opinion
of Dr. Berschling. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir.
2001). As a result, the ALJ's RFC determination is supported by
substantial evidence because it accounts for all of Plaintiff's
credibly established limitations. See Covone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
142 Fed. Appx. 585, 587 (3d Cir. 2005).

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