MITCHELL et al v. PLASMACARE INC.
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 4 MOTION to Dismiss filed by PLASMACARE INC. Signed by Judge William L. Standish on 6/2/2011. (md)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RHONDA MITCHELL and
JOHN C. STUBBS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-430
PLASMACARE, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by PlasmaCare, Inc.
("PlasmaCare"),
seeking an Order of Court dismissing Plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)
("Mot. Dis.," Doc. No.4.)
For the reasons that follow,
Defendant's motion is denied without prejudice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A.
Factual Historyl
PlasmaCare
centers,
one
Pennsylvania.
of
is
which
a
nationwide
is
located
(Mot. Dis., n. 1.)
chain
in
of
plasma
downtown
donation
Pittsburgh,
A few days before Christmas 2009,
Plaintiffs Rhonda Mitchell and her uncle, John C. Stubbs, planned
to donate plasma to get extra money to cover the cost of Mr. Stubbs'
Christmas dinner.
They decided to go to
PlasmaCare after Ms.
Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section are taken from the
Complaint and construed in favor of Plaintiffs.
Mitchell graduated from a parenting skills program on December 22,
2009.
When Plaintif
went to the PlasmaCare facility, Ms. Mitchell
was dressed as an elf since the graduation ceremony was combined wi th
a Christmas party.
leggings.
plasma.
At
The lower part of her costume consisted of whi te
PlasmaCare,
both Plaintiffs signed in to donate
Ms . Mitchell then went back outside to establish a time for
her jitney driver to pick them up later.
While Ms. Mitchell was gone,
two employees of PlasmaCare began making comments to other employees
and clients that Ms. Mitchell was a "ho, " since "only a ho would dress
like that."
manager,
(Complaint,' 5.)
identified only as
After a few minutes, the facility
Bill,
came out
and
overheard the
derogatory remarks, but made no effort to stop "the shenanigans."
Although Ms. Mitchell was outside at the time, Mr. Stubbs was
in the waiting room and endured several minutes of PlasmaCare workers
using the word "ho" and several other derogatory terms.
He then
"shouted out for everyone to back off" and informed them that Ms.
Mitchell was his niece.
(Complaint, '6.)
The comments continued,
however, and in fact became even more insulting, suggesting that
Plaintiffs
were
committing
incest.
At
that
point,
another
PlasmaCare employee, Karen Rose, told her co-workers such comments
were unprofessional and they stopped.
When Ms. Mitchell came back into the facility, Ms. Rose told
2
her about the comments that had been made and politely asked her to
put on a pair of shorts or a skirt if she "wanted to donate and to
avoid
the
ignorance
co-workers."
of
(Complaint,
[Ms.
~
Rose's]
7.)
PlasmaCare
Although Ms.
Pittsburgh
Mitchell complied
with the request, she and Mr. Stubbs left without donating.
Ms. Mitchell claims that several times since the December 2009
incident, she has been approached by men requesting sexual services.
She has also spoken wi th a former PlasmaCare worker who told her that
employees make jokes and comments about the incident.
Similarly,
Mr. Stubbs has gotten into a physical altercation with an unknown
man who commented to him about his niece and their relationship.
As a result of these "malicious, untrue and ridiculous lies,
jokes and comments" perpetrated by Defendant's staff,
Plaintiffs
have been "subject to daily bouts of anxiety, anger, headaches and
acute defensiveness whenever they are out and about in Pittsburgh."
They also suffer "periodic sleeplessness when thinking about the
disrespect
and
1
s."
This
disrespect
also
"infringes
on
Plaintiffs' liberty to donate plasma, receive compensation[], and
do a community service."
B.
(Complaint,
~~
11-13.)
Procedural History
Acting pro se, Plaintiffs filed sui t on December 14, 2010,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441, Defendant timely removed the case to this Court on
3
March 31, 2011,2 based on complete diversity of the parties 3 and an
amount
in
controversy
greater
than
the
statutory
minimum.
Plaintiffs did not object to removal.
In their Complaint,
Plaintiffs state that their allegations
against PlasmaCare "are squarely rooted upon defamation and slander
under the laws of Pennsylvania."
seek compensatory damages
for
(Complaint,
losses
~
to their
14.)
Plaintiffs
"social dignity,
volunteer compensations, and extreme emotional and mental duress by
defamatory innuendos and gossip of incest between Plaintiffs" by
PlasmaCare employees.
(Id., Section IV, Relief.)
They also seek
punitive and exemplary damages for PlasmaCare' s extraordinary breach
of standards, ethics, supervision, discipline, and training of its
employees.
The Court assumes Plaintiffs are seeking an injunction
in that they request "an independent court-directed investigation
into the allegations of wide-spread unpro
ssional, unethical and
derogatory behaviors" of PlasmaCare employees and an order of Court
"directing supervision, di sciplinary actions and re-training (s)" at
the PlasmaCare facili ty in order to assure "equi table safety, dignity
and respect" for Defendant's employees and clients.
(Id.
2
The case was apparently allowed to lapse but Plaintiffs filed a praecipe
to reinstate the complaint on March 1, 2011.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs are citizens of Pennsylvania.
Defendant, a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business in
Cincinnati, Ohio.
(Notice of Removal, 11 7-10.)
4
3
C.
Jurisdiction and Venue
As noted above,
this Court has
jurisdiction based on
complete diversity of the parties and, according to the Complaint,
an amount in controversy totaling at least $3 million.
§
§
1332 (a) - (c).
See 28 U. S. C.
Venue is appropriate in this distr ict under 28 U. S. C.
1391 (a) .
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the aftermath of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
u.s.
(2007), Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009), and the interpretation of those two cases by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals,
the pleading standards which allow a
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6)
have taken on slightly new parameters.
The standard is now whether
the complaint includes "sufficient factual matter to show that the
claim is facially plausible."
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203,210 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, holding
that a complaint which of
rs only "labels and conclusions" or "a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do."
The Fowler court further directed that in considering a motion
to dismiss, the district court should undertake a two-part analysis:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should
be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
5
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim
for relief. In other words, a complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
A
complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts.
As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[w]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibili ty of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is
entitl
to relief. u
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211
(quotations and citations omitted.)
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual
content
that
allows
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
u
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009), and Mayer v. Belichick,
605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
"Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific
task that requires the
experience
and
common
reviewing court to draw on its
sense.
In
U
re
Ins.
judicial
Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 361 (3d Cir. 2010), quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1950.
A complaint should not be dismissed even if it seems
unlikely the plaintiff can prove the facts alleged in the complaint
or will ultimately prevail on the merits.
The Twombly pleading
standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
element."
McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636,646 (3d Cir. 2009)
6
(internal quotations omitted.)
III. ANALYSIS
Inasmuch as Ms. Mitchell and Mr. Stubbs are acting pro se, this
Court will liberally interpret their pleadings as required by the
Uni ted States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of this Circuit.
See Dasilva v. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 10-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
1095, *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972)
"to
ss
stringent
(holding the allegations of a pro se complaint
standards
than
formal
pleadings
drafted by
lawyers.")
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable
cause of action for defamation, more specifically slander, because
the statements made by its employees were "nothing more than opinions
and name-calling."
(Mot.
Dis.,
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?