GRIMM v. ASTRUE

Filing 12

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 1/2/2013. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHARON R. GRIMM,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

Civil Action No. 11-447

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE ,
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)

Defendant.

)

o

R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of January, 2013, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Securi ty's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under subchapter
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §401, et seq., and denying
plaintiff1s claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq.,
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.s. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d
114,117 (3dCir. 1995); Williamsv. Sullivan, 970 F.2dl178, 1182 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. , 507U.S. 924 (1993); Brownv. Bowen,
845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
1

See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738

F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence,
the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may
neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have
decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1

The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's argument that the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding her to be not
disabled. Issues I, 2, 4, and 5 raised by Plaintiff were adequately
discussed by the ALJ in his decision, and substantial evidence supports
his findings.
Issue 3 requires further discussion. Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination was
insufficient because it did not expressly include a statement that she
is moderately limited in her ability to maintain concentration,
persistence, and pace, citing Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d
Cir. 2004). However, that case is inapposite. First, in Ramirez, the
ALJ had found that the claimant "often" suffered from deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace, resulting in a failure to complete
tasks in a timely manner, and the Third Circuit held that the ALJ's
RFC determination that the claimant was limited to simple, repetitive
one or two-step tasks did not sufficiently take the claimant's
deficiencies into account. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.
Plaintiff is correct that the Social Security regulations pertaining
to mental impairments were revised, and the evaluation of
concentration, persistence, and pace was changed from a five-point
scale based on the frequency of the deficiencies to the current
five-point severity scale, and both "often" and "moderate" occupy the
middle position in their respective scales. See Reynolds v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 3273522, at *13 (W. D. Pa. July 29
2011). Nonetheless, recent Third Circuit decisions have
distinguished Ramirez based on the difference between "often"
suffering from these deficiencies and being "moderately" limited in
those areas. See McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941, 946-47 (3d
Cir. 2008) (noting that the ALJ properly accounted for his finding that
the claimant had moderate limitations in concentration by limiting him
to simple, routine tasks). See also Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx.
I

2

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.8) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

410, 412 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Having previously acknowledged that [the
claimant] suffered moderate limitations in concentration, persistence
and pace, the ALJ [properly] accounted for these mental limitations
in the hypothetical question by restricting the type of work to 'simple
routine tasks.'").
More importantly, in Ramirez, the ALJ had limited the claimant
to simple, repetitive one or two-step tasks. Here, the mental
limitations found by the ALJ in the RFC were far more extensive and
specific. Plaintiff was limited not only to routine, repetitive tasks,
she was also limited to work not performed at a production rate pace
or with quotas, to work that involved no more than simple work-related
decisions and relatively few changes in her work setting, and to work
requiring no more than occasional interaction with supervisors,
co-workers, or the public. These limitations go far beyond a
limitation to simple, repetitive one or two-step tasks and clearly
account for Plaintiff's deficiencies in concentration, persistence,
and pace.
3