FORD v. ASTRUE
Filing
13
OPINION AND ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 6/18/12. (hmg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PEN:.'lSYL VANIA
Tristine Ford,
Plaintiff,
v.
Michael J. Astrue,
Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 11-591
AMBROSE, U.S. Senior District Judge
OPINION
AND
ORDER
I.
Synopsis
Plaintiff Tristine Ford filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3),
seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act") [42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(1. The matter is now before the
Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. [8] (Plaintiff) and [10]
(Defendant)). Both parties filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (Docket Nos. [9] (Plaintiff)
and [12] (Defendant)). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based
on my Opinion set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
II.
Background
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on April 7, 2008 alleg:ing disability beginning
August 15,2004. R. 193. Plaintiffs application was administratively denied on August 5, 2008.
1
R. 87-91. Plaintiff responded by filing a written request for an administrative hearing on
September 12,2008. R. 95-97. On December 2,2009, a hearing was held in Morgantown, West
Virginia before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). R. 32-77. Plaintiff, who was represented
by counsel, appeared and testified. Id Testimony was also taken from an impartial vocational
expert ("VE"). Id In a decision dated March 8, 2010, the ALJ ddermined that Plaintiff is not
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act. R. 8-31. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff s
request for review on March 31, 2011, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of
the Commissioner in this case. R. 1-5. Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 4, 2011,
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. Docket No. [1]. The parties' cross
motions for summary judgment are the subject of this Opinion.
III.
Legal Analysis
A. Standard ofReview
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as "[m]ore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.''' Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900,901 (3dCir.1995),quotingRichardsonv. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971). Additionally,
the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.c. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403,406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review ofthe Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court
would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,360 (3d
2
Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the
district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for supplemental security income ("SSI")" a plaintiff must demonstrate that
she cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Commissioner has provided the ALl with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 41.920. The ALl must determine:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether
the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a s,evere impairment, whether it
meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the impairment
does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent him
from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is Incapable of performing his
past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national
economy, in light of his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920. A Claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence
that he is unable to return to his previous employment (Steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at
406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (Step 5).
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may afl1nn, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F .2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
3
B. The AU'sfindings as to Plaintiff's asthma, obesity, and sleep related breathing
disorders
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff's impairments did not
medically equal the listed impairments of3.03-Asthma and 3.l0-Sleep-related Breathing
Disorders because the ALJ's analysis did not adequately
accow~lt
for Plaintiffs obesity. See
Docket No. [9] at p. 3 & 18. Defendant argues that the ALJ was not required to analyze the
effects of an obesity-related respiratory impairment at Step 3 because Plaintiff had not put forth
evidence to allow the ALJ to make a finding that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of asthma at
Step 2. Docket No. [12] at p. 18-19.
Defendant also submits that even if Plaintiffs asthma was
a severe impairment, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff failed to establish that the impairment
caused significant limitations that have lasted or could be expected to last for a continuous period
of twelve consecutive months. Id. at 19. I agree.
A claimant will not be found disabled if he does "not have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment [or a combination of such impairments] that meets
the duration requirement." 20 C.F .R. § 416.920(c).
The mere existence of an impairment does
not mean that the impairment is severe-the alleged impairment must be medically
determinable. 20 C.F.R. § 416.908 ("A physical or mental impairment must be established by
medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your
statement of symptoms."). A symptom not supported by a medically determinable impairment
cannot be considered to cause any functional restrictions. 20 U.S.C. § 416.929(d); SSR 96-4p.
An ALJ may consider a claimant's asserted limitations that lack objective medical support but
may also reject such limitations if the record reflects conflicting evidence. Rutherford v.
Barnhard, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005).
4
I find that the ALJ appropriately considered all evidence submitted by Plaintiff as to her
asthma. There is substantial evidence to support the ALl's conclusion that Plaintiff is not
disabled notwithstanding her complaints of respiratory problems because there is no evidence in
the record of any pulmonary function testing to establish a severe respiratory impairment. While
Plaintiff sometimes complained of difficulty breathing, just as often, Plaintiff often reported no
shortness of breath or chest pains. R. 546-603. Plaintiff also told her primary care physician that
she did not have "bad lungs" but was losing her voice because she had been fighting with her
fiance. R. 579. When Plaintiff had difficulty breathing and wheezing, her symptoms improved
after her primary physician administered a breathing treatment. R.582. Despite Plaintiffs
continued tobacco use, a chest x-ray administered in June 2009 found "no evidence of an acute
pulmonary process." R. 523. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's
conclusion that Plaintiff does not have a severe respiratory impainnent.
Moreover, I find that the ALJ adequately considered Plainhffs obesity. Even where a
claimant's obesity is found to be a "severe impairment," an ALJ slm must consider the impact of
the claimant's obesity in combination with her other impairments at Step 3 and at every
subsequent step thereafter. SSR 02-1p; Diaz v. Comm'r o/Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500 (3d Cir.
2009). While "obesity may increase the severity of coexisting or related impairments to the
extent that the combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing," the ALJ is not
required to "make assumptions about the severity" of obesity and "[0 ]besity in combination with
another impairment mayor may not increase the severity" of the impairment. SSR 02-1p. Here,
the ALJ found obesity to be one of Plaintiffs "severe impairments'" and, as required at Step 3,
considered the effect of Plaintiffs obesity in combination with her other impairments. R. 15.
5
I find that there is substantial evidence to support the AL], s conclusion that the effects of
Plaintiffs obesity, when considered in combination with her other impairments, do not satisfy
the impairments listed in Appendix 1. Id The ALl fully addressed Plaintiffs obesity, noting
her weight, both at her consultative examination and at the time of her testimony, as well the fact
that her Body Mass Index (BMI) fell within the Level III "extreme" obesity range, signaling that
Plaintiff is among those with the greatest risk for developing obesity-related impairments. Id
However, as the ALl noted, the record does not reflect that Plaintiff received "any treatment for
chronic diseases of the cardiovascular or endocrine systems commonly associated with obesity
during the period in question." Id
In support of her argument, Plaintiff submits that this Court also should consider
evidence of her sleep apnea, submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council. Docket No. [9]
at p. 17. Although the Appeals Court accepted and considered this new information, it denied
Plaintiffs request for review. Id In the Third Circuit, it is well settled that a district court does
not have jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's decision to deny review nor can it weigh
new evidence submitted to an Appeals Court using the substantial evidence standard in its review
ofthe ALl's decision. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001). However, if a
claimant has shown good cause for why the new material was not presented to the ALl, a district
court may remand the case to the Commissioner. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to submit a "good cause" reason 1hr why the new evidence was
not previously submitted to the ALl. She merely argues that the: idormation is relevant when
viewed in combination with her obesity, demonstrating disability. See Docket No. [9] at p. 17.
It may be that Plaintiff is arguing that she has shown "good cause" because the sleep study
leading to her diagnosis with sleep apnea occurred after her ALl hearing and the ALl's
6
decision. I Still, in order to obtain a remand, in addition to good cause, a claimant also must
demonstrate that the new evidence is material. Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (citing Szubak v. Sec y
ofHHS, 745 F.2d 831 (3d Cir. 1984». "Material evidence" means that the evidence is "relevant
and probative" and that there is "a reasonable possibility that th.;~ new evidence would have
changed the outcome of the Secretary's determination." Szubak, 745 F.2d at 833.
While the sleep study results were not available until after the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff has
not adequately demonstrated that this new evidence would have changed the outcome of her SSI
determination. Implicit in the materiality requirement for "good cause" is the requirement that
that the new evidence "relate to the time period for which benefits were denied, and that it not
concern evidence of a later-acquired disability or of the subsequent deterioration of the
previously non-disabling condition." Id. Plaintiff first applied for SSI in April 2008, alleging
disability since August 15,2004. Docket No. [9] at p. 1. During Plaintiff's physical Residual
Functional Capacity ("RFC") Assessment conducted in August 2008, which found her to be
morbidly obese, Plaintiff did not complain of sleeping difficulties. R. 445-450. The first
evidence of Plaintiff's sleep problems surfaced around April 2009 when Plaintiff's primary care
physician-the doctor ordering the sleep study-noted Plaintiffs sleeping problems in his
progress notes. See R. 581 ("[Plaintiff] is having problem [sic] today with sleep again."). On
January 19,2010, Dr. Rasheed's notes indicate that he "would like to schedule her for a sleep
study," but that Plaintiff's sleep improved when he adjusted her medication ("She states she is
sleeping much better since we increased her Elavil ...."). R.570-71. Then, on March 1,2010,
Dr. Rasheed noted that Plaintiff was "not returning phone calls to have a sleep study done." R.
570. It seems that while this difficulty was one of many ailments afflicting Plaintiff, it was not
I The sleep study was conducted on May 13,2010 and June 10,2010; the ALJ hearing was December 2,2009 and
the ALJ issued his opinion on March 8, 2010. See R. 27,34, & 529-533.
7
one that she found necessary to address right away. Dr. Rasheed had to remind Plaintiff again in
April 2010 to schedule a sleep study. R. 567. On the first day of her sleep study, Plaintiff also
saw Dr. Rasheed, who noted that he believed that her medication was helping her sleeping
pattern, and he advised her to continue to see a psychiatrist to assist with this issue. R. 565. Dr.
Rasheed's notes do not indicate that Plaintiffs sleeping problems caused her major disruption.
See R. 581-603. Additionally, after Plaintiffs sleep study and sleep apnea diagnosis, Plaintiffs
breathing improved with Bi-PAP and breathing treatments. R. 557 & 559. Given that the new
evidence does not relate to a significant portion of the time period for which she is seeking
benefits (2004-2009) nor does it demonstrate subsequent deterioration of a previously non
disabling condition (alone or in combination with other impairnlents), Plaintiff has failed to
establish that her new evidence is material for the purposes of re:mand.
C. The ALl's assessment ofPlaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC")
Plaintiff argues that the ALl's residual functional capacity assessment is not based on
substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to the opinions of Dr.
Rasheed, Dr. Detore, Dr. Groves, and Dawn Wilhelm, and failed to properly submit all of
Plaintiffs impairments to the vocational expert ("VE"). Docket No. [9] at p. 4.
"Residual functional capacity" ("RFC") is the work a claimant is able to do despite the
limitations caused by his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,
359 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1999). An ALJ must weigh all of the medical and non-medical evidence
available when conducting an RFC assessment. Burnett v. Comm'r ofSocial Sec. Admin., 220
F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). The limiting effect of all ofa claimant's impairments, even those
not found to be "severe," is used in determining RFC. § 404.1 545(e). Allegations of pain and
other subjective symptoms must be weighed against objective medical evidence. McDonald v.
8
Astrue, 293 Fed. App'x (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 42 V.S.c. § 423 which requires medical findings
to support symptoms as conclusive evidence of disability). In weighing medical evidence, an
ALl "is not free to employ her own expertise against that of a physician who presents competent
medical evidence" but may "choose whom to credit" when presented with conflicting evidence.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. An ALl is obligated
to explain when discounting evidence and may give a treating source's opinion controlling
weight. Plummer, 186 F .3d at 429; § 416.927(C)(2).
Here, there is substantial evidence that the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinions
submitted on behalf of Plaintiff when evaluating RFC. First, th;;: ALl gave Plaintiff s treating
physician, Dr. Rasheed, great weight to the extent that the ALl found his opinion to be supported
by medical evidence and consistent with other evidence in the record. R. 24. Reports by treating
physicians are entitled to greater weight when supported by the me:dical evidence of record
because such opinions reflect continued observations of a complainant over a span of time.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). In particular, the ALJ relied on the
objective medical evidence provided by Dr. Rasheed (specifically his progress notes) reflecting
"overall normal and stable findings, even though the claimant is obese." R.25. The ALJ also
greatly relied on Dr. Rasheed's documentation of changes in the Plaintiffs home life and her
failure to comply with Dr. Rasheed's treatment recommendations in assessing Plaintiffs
credibility. R. 24. For example, the ALJ points out that Dr. Rasheed referred Plaintiff for a
functional capacities evaluation (FCE) but Plaintiff never obtained one. R. 24. At one point, Dr.
Rasheed refused to refill Plaintiffs medication unless she obtained the blood work he had
previously requested. R. 20 & 583. This led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiffs symptoms
"may not have been as serious" as alleged. R. 21. Therefore, the ALJ gave less weight to Dr.
9
Rasheed's opinions where he completed forms for the purpose of entitling Plaintiff to receive
health insurance or other benefits. R. 24. The ALl noted that Dr. Rasheed may have had
"legitimate but somewhat secondary interests" when his assessments would entitle him to receive
payment for the additional services Plaintiff sought. !d. I find the ALl's reliance on Dr.
Rasheed's opinions to be supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, the ALl adequately explained why she discounted the findings of doctors
Detore, Groves, and Wilhelm. Plaintiff offered these medical opinions to establish disabling
functional limitations associated with her mental impairments. First, the ALl explained that Dr.
Detore's report received little weight because it was based on a ;'one-time evaluation ... [that
is], by necessity, based largely on the claimant's subjective allegations." R. 16; see also R. 345
354 & 418-426. Similarly, the ALl gave little credence to the findings of Dr. Groves and Ms.
Wilhelm. Given that Dr. Groves' opinion was based on a one-hour examination arranged by
Plaintiff s representative, the ALl discredited his opinion because Plaintiff had not been
hospitalized for her mental impairments, and the ALl found no objective evidence to support Dr.
Groves' assertion that Plaintiff had experienced four or more episodes of decompensation. R. 16
& 23. Additionally, the ALl gave little weight to Ms. Wilhelm's findings because the ALl found
that Ms. Wilhelm's own records did not support her opinion. The ALl found Ms. Wilhelm
unconvincing (i) because her report contained no work-related limitations (she merely had
evaluated Plaintiffs daily living, social functioning, concentration,. persistence and pace to
conclude that Plaintiff could not engage in employment on a "regular, sustained, competitive and
productive bases"), and (ii) because Ms. Wilhelm consistently rated Plaintiff at a level consistent
with moderate limitations while contradictorily opining that PlaLntiffs impairments were
"marked" such as to satisfy one of the impairment listings of Appendix 1. R. 16 & 23. Given
10
the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff exaggerated the nature and exte:nt of her impairments
(because she found the record lacked an objective basis for many of Plaintiff's alleged
limitations), it follows that the ALJ would give little weight to opinions that were largely based
on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. R. 24. In sum, the ALJ explained that she did not rely on
these medical source opinions because she found the accompanying evaluations limited in scope,
in conflict with the overall medical evidence on record, and inconsistent with the Plaintiff's
personal activities. Consequently, the ALJ concurred with the state agency assessments
conducted in association with Plaintiff's application concluding that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity to perform unskilled work requiring light exertion. R.25. I find substantial
evidence to support this conclusion.
Plaintiff further contests the ALl's RFC analysis because: she alleges that the ALJ failed
to properly submit all of Plaintiff's impairments to the vocational expert ("VE") when posing
hypothetical questions about Plaintiff's ability to engage in light and sedentary work. Docket
No. [9] at p. 3-4. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not ask about the Plaintiff's
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace. ld
As explained above, the ALJ correctly evaluated all ofPla:tntiff's alleged symptoms,
limitations, the medical opinions of her conditions, and the objective medical evidence on record
to conclude that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform work requiring light exertion with
modifications. I concur that the large majority of the medical evidence of record fails to support
the conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled and cannot perform light and sedentary work. I find the
ALl's discussion of the record as a whole demonstrates that the AU's RFC assessment
adequately addressed all of Plaintiff's credible limitations.
11
Therefore, it is immaterial whether the ALJ included all of Plaintiffs impairments in the
hypothetical questions posed to the VE. An ALJ merely must accurately account for the
appropriate degree of a claimant's limitations in formulating hypotheticals for a VE. See
McDonaldv. Astrue, 293 F. App'x 941, 946 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, the hypotheticals the ALJ
submitted to the VE adequately reflected all of Plaintiffs impaimlents that had support in the
record. 2 The ALl's questions accurately conveyed Plaintiffs moderate limitations as itemized,
work-related, functional restrictions. See R. 68 (asking the VE to assume Plaintiff could perform
light exertional work and limited mental limitations by listing examples).
Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff's contention, I find no eHor in the ALJ providing for a
sit/stand option in her RFC analysis. Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-12 advises that in
situations where the medical facts lead an ALJ to believe that a claimant can perform light or
sedentary work so long as she is able to alternate between periods of sitting and standing, it is
appropriate for the ALJ to consult a VE to ensure that there are occupations allowing for such an
option. See Ayers v. Astrue, 724 F. Supp. 2d 471 (D. Del. 2010). Because the ALJ asked the VE
a hypothetical incorporating the sit/stand option and the VE was able to identify jobs that could
accommodate the option, I find there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's inclusion of a
sit/stand option in the RFC analysis.
The ALJ also properly considered Plaintiffs age, education, past work experience, and
the VE's testimony that there a significant number ofjobs in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. Therefore, I find there is substantial evidence to support the.ALJ's conclusion
that Plaintiff has no impairment preventing her from performing all work activity.
The ALJ also asked the VE about Plaintiff's ability to work assuming, arguendo, that all of Plaintiff's alleged
symptoms and functional limitations were credible. R.74. Given that scenario, the VE concluded Plaintiff was
incapable of work. This hypothetical proved not to be informative as the ALJ discredited some of Plaintiff's alleged
functional limitations.
2
12
D. The AU's evaluation ofPlaintiff's fibromyalgia
Plaintiff also contends that the ALl improperly evaluated her fibromyalgia impairment by
requiring objective evidence. Docket No. [9] at p. 4 & 14.
In evaluating fibromyalgia, courts acknowledge that symptoms of the disease are entirely
subjective and medical testing may not be able to assess the severity of fibromyalgia. Singleton
v. Astrue, 542 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (D. Del. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Apfel, 1999 WL 993723, *1,
n.l (E.D. Pa. 1999».
Still, a claimant who has been diagnosed with fibromyalgia will not
automatically be classified disabled under the Social Security Act. ld An impairment still will
not be found severe unless it medically determinable. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 520(a)(4)(ii). "Even in
fibromyalgia cases, the ALI must compare the objective eviden..::e and the subjective complaints
and is permitted to reject plaintiff's subjective testimony so long as he provides a sufficient
explanation for doing so." Nocks v. Astrue, 626 F. Supp. 2d 43],446 (D. Del. 2009). Symptoms
alone, no matter how genuine, cannot be the basis for a finding of disability without medical
signs or laboratory findings to support a determinable physical or mental impairment. SSR 96
4p. In fact, because of the subjectivity of the symptoms offibromyalgia, the credibility ofa
claimant's testimony is paramount when evaluating whether a claimant's fibromyalgia
impairment is disabling. Singleton, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
\Vhen assessing a complainant's
symptoms, an ALl may consider whether the record reveals clinical documentation of the
complainant's symptoms and whether diagnosing physicians reported on the severity of the
condition. ld
I find that the ALI properly evaluated Plaintiff's fibromyalgia. The ALl did not find
Plaintiff's fibromyalgia to be medically determinable because the record contains no objective
testing to support Plaintiff's alleged symptoms or her primary physician's impressions. R. 14 &
13
19. I find no error in this assessment because there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
conclusion. First, the ALJ noted that the record does not contain any of the medically recognized
trigger points for fibromyalgia: "[T]he record contains no finding of 11 of 18 tender points as
required by the American College of Rheumatology for a diagnosis of fibromyalgia." R. 14 &
19. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff's medical tests assessing symptoms typical of fibromyalgia
carne back normal. R. 14 & 264 (Plaintiff's rheumatoid factor, c-reactive protein, and
erythrocyte sedimentation rates were normal). The ALJ explained that nowhere in the record is
there evidence that Plaintiff visited a rheumatologist, even though her treating physician
recommended it. R. 14. Similarly, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff never pursued physical or
occupational therapy and, at her hearing, could provide no explanation for refusing to seek such
treatment. R. 14 & 62. The ALJ also detailed how multiple x-rays of Plaintiff were normal and
revealed no fractures, dislocations or other significant bone or joint abnormalities and only
"minimal marginal osteophytes." R. 14 & 270-71. Physical examinations showed Plaintiff
mostly had a normal range of motion and "no limitation of function for sitting, bending,
standing, walking, lifting and grasping." R. 14 & 375. The ALI noted that Plaintiff's primary
care physician (Dr. Rasheed) "was 'pretty sure' that she had a history offibromyalgia" but found
little evidence to support the doctor's impressions because Plaintilf continued to report that she
was overall stable and failed to complete requested laboratory work until she was told that her
pain medications would not be refilled. R. 20 & 583.
Because fibromyalgia symptoms are subjective, it is significant that the ALJ made a
credibility determination as to Plaintiff's alleged symptoms, finding that Plaintiff "has
exaggerated the nature and extent of her impairments." R. 23-24. I find there is substantial
support for this conclusion given that there is no medical evidence of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia and
14
Plaintiffs self-described daily activities since the alleged disability onset date involved activities
"which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling
symptoms and limitations." R. 24 (Plaintiffs daily activities included, inter alia, cleaning, doing
laundry, caring for her sick mother and children, and crocheting). R. 24. The ALJ
acknowledged that Plaintiff's daily activities were "fairly limited" following Plaintiffs most
recent evaluation before her hearing, but the ALJ concluded that the most recent limitations were
"outweighed by the other factors discussed in [the ALl's] decisioll." Id.
IV.
Conclusion
In conclusion, based on the evidence of record and th{: briefs filed in support thereof, I
find there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
As a result, ] DENY Plaintiffs motion for
Summary Judgment, and I GRANT Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment.
15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Tristine Ford,
Plaintiff,
v.
Michael J. Astrue,
Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 11-591
AMBROSE, Senior U.S. District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this
/
gVJay of June, 2012, after careful -consideration of the
submissions of the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order,
it is ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (DQ(:ket No. [8]) is DENIED and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. [10]) is GRANTED. In accordance
with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is
hereby AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
~II.~
Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. Senior District Judges
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?