JONES v. ASTRUE

Filing 13

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 1/2/2013. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TINA M. JONES t
Plaintiff t
vs.

Civil Action No. 11-654

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE t
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY t
Defendant.

o R D E R
AND NOW t this 2nd day of JanuarYt 2013 t upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgmentt the Court t upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision t denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under Subchapter
II of the Social Security Act t 42 U.S.C. §401 t et seg. t and denying
plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act t 42 U.S.C. §1381 t et seg. t
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and t accordinglYt affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g) i Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services t 48 F.3d

114 t 117 (3d Cir. 1995)
(3d Cir. 1992)

t

i

Williams v. Sullivant 970 F.2d 1178, 1182

cert. denied sub nom.

t

507 U.S. 924 (1993)

Bowen t 845 F.2d 1211t 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
1

i

Brown v.

See also Berry v. Sullivant

738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

Plaintiff raises several arguments as to why she believes the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding her to be not disabled.
However, her contentions have no merit, and the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling
weight to the December 9, 2009 opinion of Dr. Robert Davoli, one of her treating
physicians, who found that she had disabling limitations. (R. 409-11). As
Plaintiff correctly asserts, when assessing a claimant's application for
benefits, the opinion of the claimant's treating physician is to be afforded
significant weight. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir.
2001); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). In fact, the
regulations provide that a treating physician's opinion is to be given
"controlling weight" so long as the opinion is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c) (2), 416.927(c) (2) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43; Plummer, 186 F.3d
at 429. As a result, the Commissioner may
ect a treating physician's
opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence, and
not on the basis of the Commissioner's own judgment or speculation, although
he may afford a treating physician's opinion more or less weight depending
upon the extent to which supporting explanations are provided. See Plummer,
186 F.3d at 429. Nonetheless, contrary to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ
failed to explain adequately what contradictory medical evidence supported
his decision to afford only minimal weight to Dr. Davoli's December 9 opinion,
the ALJ did, in fact, rely on contradictory medical evidence and adequately
explained his rationale for doing so. First and foremost, the ALJ pointed
out that Dr. Davoli himself, on October 21, 2008, had opined that Plaintiff
was employable with medications. (R. 336-37). Dr. Davoli did not explain
any basis for changing his opinion just over a year later, and the record
does not demonstrate any significant change in Plaintiff's condition over
that time. Moreover, the ALJ explained that Dr. Davoli's opinion was
contradicted by his own objective findings, which did not support the
limitations to which he opined on December 9 in response to Plaintiff's
counsel's interrogatories; the opinion of the state agency adjudicator that
Plaintiff was not so limited; the findings of the other medical professionals
2

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.8) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

with whom Plaintiff treated, which were minimalj Plaintiff's very
conservative course of treatment, which belied her alleged disabling
conditionsi and her daily activities, which were significant. Substantial
evidence, therefore, supports the weight given to Dr. Davoli's opinion by
the ALJ.
Plaintiff's remaining arguments fare no better. Contrary to
Plaintiff's contentions, the ALJ properly considered all of the relevant
factors, including medical evidence, in evaluating her statements regarding
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. Plaintiff
is incorrect that the ALJ could not rely on her daily activities in making
this determinationj in considering Plaintiff's subjective claims of
limitations and complaints of pain, Plaintiff's daily activities were one
factor the ALJ could consider. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) (3),
416.929(c) (3); S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (S.S.A.) (July 2,1996) j Seaman
v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 321 Fed. Appx. 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, as in
Seaman, the ALJ relied not only on Plaintiff's daily activities, but also,
as discussed above, contrary medical evidence in evaluating the credibility
of Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, while Plaintiff is correct that "sporadic
and transitory activities cannot be used to show an ability to engage in
substantial gainful activity," Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40 n.5, the activities
upon which the ALJ relied were not sporadic or transitory.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the finding that Plaintiff
is not disabled.

3