CONLEY v. ASTRUE

Filing 23

ORDER denying 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 20 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/18/2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHANE LEE CONLEY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 11-1112

MICHAEL J. AS TRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o
AND

NOW,

this

R D E R

18th

day

of

2014,

March,

upon

consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,
the Court,
final

upon review of the Commissioner of Social Security's
denying

decision,

security

income

Securi ty

Act,

42

Commissioner's
and,

benefits

under

U.S.C.

findings

accordingly,

plaintiff's

affirms.

Subchapter

§1381,

are

claim

et

42

XVI

by

U.S.C.

supplemental

of

the

finds

seq. ,

supported
See

for

that

substantial
§405(g)

i

117

1182

(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,

Brown v.

(3d Cir.

Bowen,

1995) i

845

F.2d 1211,
738

supported

by

Williams

F.

substantial

Supp.

v.

1213

Sullivan,

evidence,

507 U.S.

(3d Cir.

942,944
the

970

Jesurum v.
48 F.3d

F.2d 1178,
924

1988).

(W.D.

the

evidence

Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
114,

Social

Pa.

Commissioner's

(1993)
See

1990)

i

also
(if

decision

must

be

evidence,

affirmed,

as

nor reverse,

claim differently)

a

federal

court may neither

reweigh

the

merely because it would have decided the
Cotter v.

Harris,

642 F.2d 700,

705

(3dCir.1981)).1

Plaintiff raises a number of arguments, but his primary
contention appears to be that the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") erred in her evaluation of the medical opinion evidence
because she "improperly disregarded the medical opinion of
plaintiff's treating and examining physicians.
Plaintiff's
Brief (Doc. No. 17 at 17).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred
by giving less weight to the opinions of Dr. McGuire, his
treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Eisler, a consultative examiner
hired by his attorney. As a result, he argues that the ALJ's
Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") determination and ensuing
hypothetical to the vocational expert ("VEil) lack the support of
substantial evidence. The Court disagrees and finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that
Plaintiff is not disabled.
First, the Court notes that the ALJ was not bound by any of
the medical opinions in the record.
Indeed, it is well­
established that" [t]he ALJ - not treating or examining
physicians or State agency consultants
must make the ultimate
disability and RFC determinations." Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) i Brown v. Astrue, 649
F.3d 193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2011) ("The law is clear ... that
the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the
issue of functional capacity. ") . A treating physician opinion
is only entitled to controlling weight if it is "well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record." Fargnoli y. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43
(3d Cir. 2001) i Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. Appx.
140, 148 (3d Cir. 2007) ("If, however, the treating physician's
opinion conflicts with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is
free to give that opinion less than controlling weight or even
reject it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains her reasons and
makes a clear record. ") .
After conducting its own careful and independent review of
the record, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ's assessment of the medical evidence as well as her
conclusion that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform work
consistent with her RFC finding.
Indeed, in making her RFC
II

2

determination, the ALJ: (i) discussed and analyzed all of the
relevant medical evidence in the record, (ii) addressed the
countervailing evidence which conflicted with her findings, and
(iii) provided logical and detailed justifications for why
certain conflicting evidence was given
ss weight or considered
to be unpersuasive.
(R. 22-39).
Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, the ALJ did not
violate the treating physician rule, because she found that Dr.
McGuire's opinion was unsupported by clinical findings and
contradicted by the record as a whole, thus rendering it less
persuasive. The ALJ reached that conclusion after she surveyed
the medical evidence and found that Dr. McGuire's opinion relied
too heavily on Plaintiff's subjective complaints and failed to
take into account other considerations, like his non-compliance
with his medication and the fact that it conflicted with her own
progress notes which showed benign clinical findings. (R. 31­
32). Furthermore, the ALJ explained in detail why she gave
little weight to Dr. Eisler's opinion that Plaintiff was
"unemployable" and the ALJ was also entitled to disregard (with
explanation) certain portions of the state agency consultative
examiner's opinion which she found was not fully supported by
the objective evidence of record. (R. 34-37).
The Court notes that Plaintiff is mistaken in his assertion
that the ALJ "made no mention whatsoever of the two earl
psychiatric evaluations performed by [Dr. McGuire on March 31,
2005 and August 17, 2005]."
(Doc. No. 17 at 19). The ALJ
d
consider Dr. McGuire's March 2005 evaluation because she
summarized the report (R. 25) and then later discussed why she
gave little weight to the "initially assigned (March 2005) GAF
of 35." (R. 36). Whi
the ALJ may not have made mention of Dr.
McGuire's August 2005 evaluation wherein she assigned a GAF of
40, the ALJ is not required to discuss every single piece of
relevant evidence in the record. See Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed.
Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004) ("There is no requirement that the
ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence included in
the record."). Given the ALJ's discussion of the March 2005 and
November 2007 evaluations, and the fact that the March 2005
evaluation contained a lower GAF score, the Court is satisfied
that the ALJ considered the August 2005 evaluation when she
analyzed the record and any failure on her part to specifically
refer to that evaluation was harmless since she clearly was
aware that Dr. McGuire assigned low GAF scores.
Furthermore, the Court notes that the ALJ recognized the
fact that Dr. Eisler's opinion and Dr. McGuire's opinion
appeared to support each other, but the ALJ explained why
neither of those opinions was entitled to great weight.
(R.
3

Therefore,
for Summary Judgment

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion
(document No.

16)

is DENIED and defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (document No. 20)

is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

34). The Court finds that substantial evidence supports that
assessment.
Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ discharged her duty of
clearly articulating the reasoning underlying her findings. In
giving less weight to the opinions of Dr. McGuire and Dr.
Eisler, the Court notes that the ALJ did not rely on her own
amorphous impressions gleaned from the record, but rather the
objective medical evidence as a whole.
The Court also finds
that the ALJ incorporated into her RFC finding only those
limitations which she found were credibly established by the
objective medical evidence in the record.
See Salles, 229 Fed.
Appx. at 147 ("to the extent that he found some of Salles's
alleged limitations less than credible, the ALJ properly
excluded them from the RFC") .
Plaintiff essentially invites this Court to re-weigh the
evidence, and substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ,
which it clearly is not permitted to do under a "substantial
evidence" standard of review.
See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399
F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In the process of reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, we may not 'weigh the evidence
or substitute [our own] conclusions for those of the fact­
finder. "') (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,1182
(3d Cir.1992)). The Court also notes that Plaintiff, without
asking for a new evidence remand, attached numerous medical
records that are wholly irrelevant and not subject to
consideration because they post date the ALJ's decision and were
not part of the record before the ALJ. See
s v. Sullivan,
954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir.1991) (noting that evidence not
presented to the ALJ "cannot be used to argue that the ALJ's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence").

4