HATTEN v. BAY VALLEY FOODS, LLC
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION that Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 8 ) will be granted and Plaintiffs request for leave to amend will be denied. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 04/17/2012. (jmb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID HATTEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAY VALLEY FOODS, LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 11-1122
Chief Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
Re: ECF No. 8
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion will be granted and Plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend will be denied.
RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff David Hatten (“Plaintiff”), filed his Complaint in the
above-captioned case against Defendant Bay Valley Foods, LLC (“Defendant”), alleging that
Defendant terminated him from his employment because of his race. Plaintiff alleges that he was
terminated on February 13, 2009. Plaintiff further alleges that he satisfied all procedural and
administrative prerequisites to suit under Title VII in that “[h]e filed a timely Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 5,
2009 alleging race discrimination and retaliation and cross filed with the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (“PHRC”).” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3(a)). Count IV of the
Complaint is a claim for violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et
seq. (“PHRA”).
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556
(2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.1937, 1949 (May 18, 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555-57). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court further
explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2009), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) (construing Twombly in a civil rights context), and
described how the Rule 12(b)(6) standard had changed in light of Twombly and Iqbal as follows:
After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or “bare-bones” allegations
will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: “threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. To prevent
dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out “sufficient factual
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matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1948. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must
show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible. See
Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
Thereafter, In light of Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), set forth the following two-prong test
to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated.
The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal,129
S. Ct. at 1949]. Second, a District Court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the
Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Generally, if a court considers matters outside the complaint in deciding a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), the court must convert the motion to one for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The court may, however, look beyond the
complaint to exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and undisputedly
authentic documents that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
documents are essential to Plaintiff’s claim, without converting the motion to dismiss into a
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motion for summary judgment. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, administrative filings, such as the record of the case
before the EEOC, may be considered, and the court may dispose of the matter pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6). See id. at 1196-97.
Here, Defendant argues that the allegations of the Complaint demonstrate that Plaintiff
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his PHRA claim because
Plaintiff failed to file a charge with the PHRC within 180 days after the termination of his
employment. Plaintiff responds that although the allegations of the Complaint are deficient, he
properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to the PHRA when he completed and
submitted an EEOC questionnaire on June 24, 20091, well within the required 180-day
administrative time frame; Plaintiff therefore requests an opportunity to amend Count IV so that
he may cure this deficiency.
ANALYSIS
Whether a charge under the PHRA has been filed with the PHRC is a matter of state law.
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997). In order to bring a civil action
under the PHRA, a claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the PHRC within
180 days of the alleged discriminatory action. 43 Pa. Stat. § 959(a), (h). Here, Plaintiff does not
allege that he filed an administrative complaint with the PHRC. Instead, he contends that
because he signed the EEOC Intake Questionnaire within 180 days of his termination, and
indicated his intention to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, he has met the
requirements of the PHRA. Plaintiff advances this argument even though the EEOC formal
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Plaintiff attaches the EEOC questionnaire to his Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at ECF No.
11, and to his Proposed Amended Complaint also attached at ECF No. 11.
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charge indicating his intention to dual file with the PHRC, was not filed until well after the 180day deadline.
“[T]he filing of an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC is simply not sufficient to
constitute the filing of a charge with the PHRC. The PHRC had no notice of Plaintiff’s claims
until Plaintiff elected to dual file the formal charge of discrimination [with the EEOC].” Colbert
v. Mercy Behavioral Health, No. 2:11-cv-1195, 2012 WL 113705, *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2012)
Here, the formal EEOC charge indicating an intention to dual file with the PHRC was not filed
until October 5, 2009, well after the 180-day limitations period for filing a claim pursuant to the
PHRA.
Under Pennsylvania law, a charge of discrimination that has been forwarded by the
EEOC to the PHRC pursuant to the work-share agreement2 has been deemed sufficient to satisfy
the complaint requirements of the PHRA. Lantz v. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., Civ.A. No. 96-2671,
1996 WL 442795, *3 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1996) (citing Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 419
A.2d 431, 452 (Pa. Super. 1980) (other citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a claimant may not rely
on the work-share agreement to satisfy all of the requirements of the PHRA to be entitled to the
available relief under the PHRA. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 927 (citing Fye v. Central Transp. Inc.,
409 A.2d 2 (Pa. 1979) (“EEOC procedures are not a sufficient surrogate for PHRC remedies”)).
2. This Court has previously discussed the work-share agreement as follows:
In a deferral state such as Pennsylvania that provides an administrative remedy for employment
discrimination claims, a claimant cannot file a charge with the EEOC unless that charge has first
been filed with the PHRC and either (1) 60 days have transpired or (2) the PHRC has terminated
its proceedings. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 926. However, the PHRC and the EEOC have entered into
a work-share agreement whereby each agency waives its right to initially review claims that are
first filed with the other agency. Id. at 925-26. Thus, under this agreement, a claim that is first
filed with the EEOC, as in the case at bar, may be processed by the EEOC without being
investigated initially by the PHRC, as the PHRC has effectively waived its statutory right to
initially process discrimination claims. Id. at 926. Accordingly, the work-share agreement
operates to “terminate” the PHRC proceedings where the complaint is filed initially with the
EEOC.
Zahavi v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 07-cv-376, 2007 WL 3053090, *4 n.11 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2007).
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Consequently, a claimant cannot rely on the work-share agreement alone to show that the PHRC
received his or her claim, but rather, must show a request to dual file with the PHRC within the
180 day mandatory filing period. Seybert v. Int’l Grp. Inc., Civil Action No. 07-3333, 2009 WL
722291, at *17 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 2009). See Yeager v. UPMC Horizon, 698 F. Supp.2d 523,
536-39 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (PHRA charge of discrimination was untimely where no election to dual
file was indicated within the 180-day statutory period). See also Rhoades v. Young Women’s
Christian Ass’n of Greater Pittsburgh, Civil Action No. 09-1548, 2010 WL 4668469, *5 (W.D.
Pa. November 9, 2010) (“Courts in this Circuit interpreting the worksharing arrangement have
held that where a plaintiff timely files a complaint with one agency, either the EEOC or the
PHRC, coupled with a request for dual filing, then the complaint is deemed filed with both
agencies as of that date.”).
In the case at bar, in order for the PHRA claim to be timely, the Plaintiff would have to
show that the EEOC charge indicated an intention to dual file with the PHRC by August 18,
2009, i.e. 180 days after Plaintiff’s employment termination. Here, Plaintiff argues that the June
24, 2009 EEOC Questionnaire operates as an EEOC charge and thereby satisfies the
requirements of the PHRA. The Court agrees that “documents other than a formal charge may
satisfy the charge requirement.” Waites v. Kirkbride Center, Civil Action No. 10-cv-1487, 2011
WL 2036689, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2011); Joseph v. Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 06-4916,
2009 WL 1012464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 15, 2009). The EEOC Questionnaire, however, does
not indicate a dual filing with the PHRC. Although Plaintiff argues that he indicated dual filing
with the PHRC of the October 2009 formal charge filed beyond the 180-day mandatory filing
period, there is nothing in the text of the June 2009 Questionnaire to suggest that Plaintiff
requested dual filing with the PHRC. Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert that equitable tolling
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should apply, nor do the factual allegations in the Complaint suggest that any of the reasons for
applying equitable tolling are implicated here.3 Consequently, Plaintiff’s PHRA charge of
discrimination was not timely filed and Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint
will be granted and Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend will be denied. An appropriate Order
will follow.
BY THE COURT:
________________________
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: April 17, 2012
cc: All counsel of record
Via Electronic Filing
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Pennsylvania’s Administrative Code provides for equitable tolling of the 180-day PHRA filing period. 16 Pa.
Code § 42.14 (a). Equitable tolling may be appropriate in three situations: “(1) where the defendant has actively
misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has
been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Cunningham v. Freedom Ford Sales, Inc., Civil Action No. 03:2006-205, 2007
WL 2404739, * 5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2007) (citing Epps v. City of Pittsburgh, 33 F. Supp.2d 409, 413 (W.D. Pa.
1998)).
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