MCGINNIS et al v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. After due consideration to defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint [ECF No. 17], and plaintiffs' response thereto [ECF No. 24], IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' common law claim for negligence only; otherwise the motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice to defendants raising the issues set forth therein in a motion for summary judgment at the appropriate time following discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 2/07/12. (mjl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DENISE McGINNIS,
in her own right as administratrix of the
Estate of DAVID W. McGINNIS, and as
parent and natural guardian of,
DUSTIN J. McGINNIS,
a minor, and
DAVID L. McGINNIS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WESTMORELAND COUNTY,
NAPHCARE, INC., and
JOHN R. WALTON,
Warden of Westmoreland County Prison,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 11-1194
Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The McGinnis plaintiffs have brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of the
Estate of David McGinnis, deceased, who tragically committed suicide on June 15, 2010, while
incarcerated in the Westmoreland County Prison. Defendants are Westmoreland County,
Naphcare, Inc., an Alabama corporation under contract with Westmoreland County to provide
services at the prison, and John R. Walton, Westmoreland County Prison Warden.
The Complaint [ECF No. 1] avers that decedent’s history and behaviors, as well as being
advised by federal agents that David McGinnis should be placed on suicide watch, subjectively
and objectively indicated that he was particularly vulnerable and at increased risk for suicide,
and that defendants’ failure to properly train and supervise employees and agents of the
Westmoreland County Prison and Naphcare in the proper recognition of suicide signs and factors
exhibited deliberate indifference to decedent’s vulnerability, and contributed to his wrongful
death. The Complaint purports to arise under section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and “any state law
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claims form part of the same case or controversy as the § 1983 claims.” Complaint, [ECF No. 1,
at ¶ 1] Count I states a claim for deprivation of civil rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments; Count II states a state common law negligence claim; and Count III states a claim
for wrongful death.
Naphcare has filed an answer [ECF No. 20] and Westmoreland County and Warden
Walton filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 17]
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) allowed dismissal of a claim only if “no set of facts” could support it,
under Twombly, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), a claim for relief
under Rule 12(b)(6) now “requires more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
at 1950.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that a claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the misconduct
alleged. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. The plausibility standard in Iqbal “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. While wellpleaded factual content is accepted as true for purposes of whether the complaint states a
plausible claim for relief, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or “[t]hreadbare
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recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not
entitled to an assumption of truth. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. at 1949. “Where the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged- but it has not ‘show[n]’- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 566
U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy the requirement of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) that a plaintiff include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” a plaintiff must aver sufficient factual allegations which
“nudge” its claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009):
. . . The Supreme Court's opinion in Iqbal extends the reach of Twombly,
instructing that all civil complaints must contain “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Therefore, after Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must
accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court
instructed in Iqbal, . . . [the] “plausibility” determination will be “a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts all of the plaintiff's allegations as
true and construes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Umland v.
Planco Fin. Servs., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452
F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)). However, a court will not accept bald assertions, unwarranted
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inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See In re
Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002); Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1997). A court is not required to consider
legal conclusions; rather, it should determine whether the plaintiff should be permitted to offer
evidence in support of the allegations. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000).
Therefore, a plaintiff must put forth sufficient facts that, when taken as true, suggest the
required elements of a particular legal theory. See Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch.,
Inc., 522 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 224). However, this standard does
not impose a heightened burden on the claimant above that already required by Rule 8, but
instead calls for fair notice of the factual basis of a claim while “rais[ing] a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Weaver v. UPMC,
2008 WL 2942139, *3 (W.D.Pa. July 30, 2008) (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; and Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments impose upon prison officials a duty to address
the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee, including psychiatric needs. Colburn v. Upper
Darby Township (Colburn I), 838 F.2d 663, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1988). If prison officials know of a
particular detainee's vulnerability to suicide, they may not be deliberately indifferent to that
vulnerability. See Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064 (3d Cir. 1991);
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989).
A local government entity may be held liable under section 1983 only when the plaintiff
demonstrates that the government entity itself caused the plaintiff's injury through the
implementation of a policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A policy is an official proclamation or edict of a municipality while a custom is a practice that is
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so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d
966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must also show that “there is a direct
causal link between [the] municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). It must be the policymaker's actions that “directly caused
constitutional harm.” Gottlieb ex. rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 175
(3d Cir. 2001).
To succeed on a claim against supervisors in their individual capacities based on prison
policy or practices, plaintiffs must identify a specific policy or practice that the supervisors failed
to employ and show that: (1) the existing policy or practice created an unreasonable risk of
Eighth Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable risk was created;
(3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or
practice. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). In the context of prison
suicides, the Third Circuit has explained that a plaintiff must: (1) identify specific training not
provided that could reasonably be expected to prevent the suicide that occurred; and (2)
demonstrate that the risk reduction associated with the proposed training is so great and so
obvious that the failure of those responsible for the content of the training program to provide it
can reasonably be attributed to a deliberate indifference to whether the detainees succeed in
taking their lives. Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1030.
Viewed in light of the forgoing liberal pleading standards, this Court finds that, with one
exception, the allegations of the complaint, when taken as true, allows the Court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged, and that the
complaint meets the plausibility and fair notice standards enunciated in Twombly and Iqbal. See
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also, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d at 210, quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. (“To
prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that
the claim is facially plausible. This then ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.’”). The Complaint is certainly not “threadbare,”
but to the contrary, has fleshed out the parameters of the claims and of defendants’ conduct with
sufficient detail as to put defendants on fair notice of the claims against them. Therefore, the
Court will deny the motion to dismiss for the most part.
The one exception is Plaintiffs’ common law claim for negligence which, Plaintiffs
concede, is foreclosed by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 8541 et seq. This claim will be dismissed.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
AND NOW, this 8th day of February, 2012, after due consideration to defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint [ECF No. 17], and plaintiff's response thereto [ECF No. 24], IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ common
law claim for negligence only; otherwise the motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice to
defendants raising the issues set forth therein in a motion for summary judgment at the
appropriate time following discovery.
By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all counsel of ECF record
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