SMITH v. ASTRUE

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 2/18/13. (kw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REGINA L. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 11-1380
MICHAEL J. AS TRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND

NOW,

this

of

February,

2013,

upon

due

consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the
Commissioner

of

application

for

Social

Security

disability

("Commissioner" )

insurance

benefits

denying

her

( "DIB" )

and

supplemental security income ("SS1") under Ti tIe II and Title XVI,
respectively, of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 12) be,
and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment (Document No. 10) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may rej ect

or discount

reasons for doing so.
Cir. 1999).
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(Rev. 8/82)

substantial

any evidence

if

Plummer v. Apfel,

the ALJ explains

the

186 F.3d 422,

(3d

429

Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,

a

reviewing

court

is

bound

by

those

findings,

even

differently.
2001).

if

it

would have

Fargnoli v.

Moreover,

it

is

decided

Massanari,
well

the

factual

247 F.3d 34,

settled

that

determined merely by the presence of

38

inquiry
(3d Cir.

disability

impairments,

is

not

but by the

effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
125,

129

(3d

Cir.

1991).

These

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d
well-established principles

preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because
the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ IS
findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on March 25,
2008, alleging disability beginning on July 31, 2007, due to back
problems and hypertension.

Plaintiff's applications were denied.

At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on February 4, 2010.
On

March

11,

2010,

the

plaintiff is not disabled.

ALJ

issued

a

decision

finding

that

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's

request for review on August 26, 2011, making the ALJ's decision
the

final

decision

of

the

Commissioner.

The

instant

action

followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 48 years old
when the ALJ issued his decision and is classified as a younger
individual
416.963 (c) .

under

the

regulations.

20

C.F.R.

§§404.1563(c),

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a

dietary clerk, housekeeper, nurse's aide and secretary, but she
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since
her alleged onset date of disability.
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After

reviewing

plaintiff's

medical

records

and

hearing

testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the

ALJ

concluded

meaning of the Act.

that

plaintiff

is

not

disabled within the

Although the medical evidence established

that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative
disc

disease,

spondylolisthesis,

hypertension,

depression and

anxiety, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet
or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth
in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix
111) •

The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform light work with the additional limitations
that she requires a sit/stand option at her discretion, and she is
restricted to working in a low stress environment that does not
require interaction with the general public

(collectively,

the

"RFC Finding").
As a result of these limitations,

the ALJ determined that

plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony,

However,

the ALJ concluded

that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience and
residual functional capacity enable her to perform other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a
hand packer,

sorter/grader and assembler.

Accordingly,

the ALJ

found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
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substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.

42 U. S. C. §§423 (d) (I) (A), 1382c (a) (3) (A) .

The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant
\\ is

not

only

unable

considering [her]

to

age,

do

[her]

previous

work

but

education and work experience

I

cannot

I

engage in

any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy .... 11

42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A)

I

1382c(a) (3) (B).

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.

The ALJ must determine:

(1) whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;

(3)

if

SOl

whether

her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)

if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from

performing her past relevant work;

and

(5)

if so,

whether the

claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,

in

light of

residual

functional

416.920(a) (4).

her age,

education,

capacity. 1

20

work experience and

C.F.R.

§§404.1520(a) (4),

If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled

at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary.

Id.

In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5

lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still
is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments.
20 C.F.R.
§§404.1545(a) (1), 416.945(a) (1); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40.
In assessing a
claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (4), 416.945(a) (4).
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4 ­

of the sequential evaluation process because:
evaluated plaintiff's

credibilitYi

and

(2)

(1)

he improperly

he gave

inadequate

weight to the opinion of a consultative physician who examined
her.

The court finds that these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ did not properly assess

her subjective complaints of pain.

After reviewing the record,

the court concludes that the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff's
credibility in accordance with the regulations.
A claimant's subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms
must be supported by objective medical and other evidence.
C.F.R.
358 1

§§404.1529(cL

362

(3d Cir.

416.929(c);

1999).

Hartranft v.

ALJ may

An

Apfel,

rej ect

the

20

181 F.3d
claimant 1 s

subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he
explains his reasons for doing so.
Social SecuritYI

181 F. 3d 429

Schaudeck v. Commissioner of

433

1

(3d Cir.

Here,

1999).

in

assessing plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ considered all of the
relevant evidence in the record, including the medical evidence,
plaintiff's
treatment,

activities

of

plaintiff's

own

daily

living,

statements

the

about

extent

her

of

her

symptoms

and

reports by plaintiff's treatment providers about her symptoms and
how

they

affect

her.

See

20

C. F . R .

§ §404

. 1529 (c) (1) - (3) ,
The ALJ then

419.929(c) (1)-(3); Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
determined

that

plaintiff's

conditions

could

be

expected

to

produce some of the pain and other symptoms she alleged, but her
subjective
symptoms

complaints
were

not

regarding

credible

to

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(Rev. 8/82)

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the

limiting

the

extent

effect
that

of

they

her
were

inconsistent with the RFC Finding.

(R.

18).

This court finds

that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility
determination (R. 19-20), and is satisfied that such determination
is supported by substantial evidence.
Related to plaintiff's credibility argument, she also argues
that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the opinion of
Dr. John Love, who performed a one-time consultative examination
of plaintiff.

According to the regulations, the ALJ will give an

opinion the weight he deems appropriate based on such factors as
whether the physician treated or examined the claimant, whether
the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings
and whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(c) (1)-(4)
of these

factors,

i

416.927(c) (1)-(4).

In light

the ALJ properly determined that Dr.

opinion should be given only limited weight.

Love's

19).

(R.

Dr. Love filled out a form on which he assessed plaintiff's
physical capabilities and found that she could sit for six hours
during an eight-hour workday and she only could stand for one hour
or less.

(R. 287).

Plaintiff relies on this assessment to argue

that she is unable to perform even sedentary work.
As the ALJ explained in his opinion, Dr. Love's assessment of
plaintiff's

capabilities

examination,

which

is

reflected

contradicted
generally

by

normal

his

physical

findings.

Dr.

Love's examination of plaintiff's cervical spine was within normal
limits, as was her shoulder motion and grip strength, but he found
that plaintiff had some lumbosacral tenderness and muscle spasm.
'IIlbAon
(Rev. 8/82)

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(R.

Dr.

285-86).

Love's

examination

of

plaintiff's

lower

extremities was essentially normal, and she had good strength in
both legs.

(R.

286).

Dr. Love's restrictive assessment of plaintiff's functional
ability was not only contradicted by his own examination findings,
but also by those of other physicians who treated her.
Baraff,

a

neurologist,

found

that

plaintiff

strain, but she was neurologically stable.

had

Dr. Robert
lumbosacral

(R. 242-43).

Dr. AIda

Gonzaga also noted plaintiff's lumbar tenderness, but her physical
examinations were otherwise within normal limits.
Dr.

404) .

386,

392,

Gongaza also noted that plaintiff's back pain was

adequately controlled by her medication.
In sum,

(R.

although the

various

(R 402) .

physicians

who

treated and

examined plaintiff confirmed her complaints of some back pain,
their otherwise unremarkable examination findings were consistent
with the RFC Finding fashioned by the ALJ.

For this reason, the

ALJ properly found that Dr. Love's more restrictive assessment of
plaintiff's physical capabilities was entitled to only limited
weight.

(R. 19).

The court notes, however, that the ALJ included

in the RFC Finding a sit/stand option at plaintiff's discretion,
which

accounts

for

Dr.

Love's

assessment

that

she

has

some

limitation in her ability to sit and stand during the workday.
In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering
all of the medical evidence of record,

the ALJ determined that

plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
ALJ's

findings

and

conclusions

are

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supported

by

The

substantial

evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.

Therefore, the decision

of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

~~

/ Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc: Kelie C. Schneider, Esq.

420 Pearl street

Pittsburgh, PA 15224

Paul Kovac

Assistant U.S. Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

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