CLEMENS v. LOCKETT et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 33 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on December 4, 2012. (kcc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES E. CLEMENS,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MR. LOCKETT, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 11 – 1482
Chief Magistrate Judge Lenihan
ECF No. 33
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants. For the reasons
set forth below, the motion will be denied.
James E. Clemens (“Plaintiff”) is a Pennsylvania state inmate who was incarcerated at the
State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh (“SCI-Pittsburgh”) during the relevant times the
alleged violations in this action occurred. He initiated this action on November 21, 2011, by
submitting a prisoner civil rights complaint (ECF No. 3) pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
1871, later amended and codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint on April 9, 2012 (ECF No. 27). Plaintiff names as Defendants Jeffrey A.
Beard (former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections); Melvin Lockett
(former Superintendent of SCI-Pittsburgh); CO Robert Roche; CO Shawn Lacich; CO Kevin
Friess; and CO Frank Bayer.1
He alleges numerous constitutional and other violations in
connection with his confinement at SCI-Pittsburgh from November, 2009 to February, 2010.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 33) along with a brief in support thereof (ECF No. 32), and
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Plaintiff incorrectly identifies this Defendant as CO Bear.
Plaintiff has filed two responses in opposition (ECF Nos. 34, 40). Defendants’ motion is now
ripe for review.
A. Legal Standards
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).
A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
554, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.1937, 1949 (May 18, 2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme
Court further explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2009), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) (construing Twombly in a civil rights context), and
described how the Rule 12(b)(6) standard had changed in light of Twombly and Iqbal as follows:
After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or “bare-bones” allegations
will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: “threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. To prevent
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dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1948. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must
show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible.
See Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
Thereafter, in light of Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), set forth the following two-prong test
to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated.
The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949]. Second, a District Court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the
Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other
matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the
complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County Intermediate Unit v.
Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court may also consider
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indisputably authentic documents. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension
Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Golden v.
Cook, 293 F. Supp.2d 546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[C]ourts are permitted to consider matters of
which they may take judicial notice, including records and reports of administrative bodies, and
publically available records and transcripts from judicial proceedings ‘in related or underlying
cases which have a direct relation to the matters at issue.’”) (citations omitted).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings
than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and
draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v.
Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a section 1983 action, the court must “apply the
applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d
244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this
is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently
alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at
688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc.,
296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).
B. Discussion
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint on the basis that he has failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any of his claims as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). In this regard,
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through the PLRA, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to prohibit prisoners from bringing
an action with respect to prison conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law,
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. Specifically, the act provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required under this provision regardless of the type of relief
sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In addition, the exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating
to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner’s sentence, including those that
involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. See Porter v. Nussle, 524 U.S. 516,
532 (2002). Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all
the available remedies prior to filing the action. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.
2000) (by using language “no action shall be brought,” Congress has “clearly required
exhaustion”).
The PLRA also mandates that inmates “properly” exhaust administrative remedies before
filing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no
adjunctive system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Such requirements “eliminate unwarranted federalcourt interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seek[] to ‘affor[d] corrections
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a
federal case.’”
Id. at 93 (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525).
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Importantly, the exhaustion
requirement may not be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective . . .
appeal.” Id. at 83; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (utilizing a
procedural default analysis to reach the same conclusion). Courts have concluded that inmates
who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process are barred from subsequently
litigating claims in federal courts. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000);
Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F. App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App’x 178 (3d Cir.
2006).
This broad rule favoring full exhaustion admits of one, narrowly defined exception. If
the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate’s procedural default on a grievance, the
inmate will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (Section 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust
such administrative remedies “as are available”).
However, case law recognizes a clear
“reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate’s] failure to exhaust as the statute
requires.” Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App’x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate’s failure to
exhaust will only be excused “under certain limited circumstances,” Harris v. Armstrong, 149 F.
App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005), and an inmate can defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by
showing “he was misled or that there was some extraordinary reason he was prevented from
complying with the statutory mandate.” Davis, 49 F. App’x at 368; see also Brown v. Croak,
312 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (assuming that prisoner with failure to protect claim is entitled
to rely on instruction by prison officials to wait for outcome of internal security investigation
before filing grievance); Camp, 219 F.3d at 281 (exhaustion requirement met where Office of
Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional
officers impeded filing of grievance).
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In the absence of competent proof that an inmate was misled by corrections officials, or
some other extraordinary circumstances, inmate requests to excuse a failure to exhaust are
frequently rebuffed by the courts. Thus, an inmate cannot excuse a failure to timely comply with
these grievance procedures by simply claiming that his efforts constituted “substantial
compliance” with this statutory exhaustion requirement. Harris, 149 F. App’x at 59. Nor can an
inmate avoid this exhaustion requirement by merely alleging that the Department of Corrections
policies were not clearly explained to him. Davis, 49 F. App’x at 368. Thus, an inmate’s
confusion regarding these grievances procedures does not, standing alone, excuse a failure to
exhaust. Casey v. Smith, 71 F. App’x 916 (3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, an inmate cannot cite to
alleged staff impediments to grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to exhaust, if it
also appears that the prisoner did not pursue a proper grievance once those impediments were
removed. Oliver v. Moore, 145 F. App’x 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure to exhaust not excused if,
after staff allegedly ceased efforts to impede grievance, prisoner failed to follow through on
grievance).
Defendants have submitted the Declaration of Tracy Williams from the Secretary’s
Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). (ECF No. 33-1.) Williams states that
Plaintiff has filed a total of thirteen grievances, none of which have been exhausted through all
three levels of the prison’s grievance system. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Specifically, twelve of the grievances
were not appealed to SOIGA for final review, and although Plaintiff sent a letter to SOIGA
regarding the thirteenth grievance, it was returned to him with a “without action” letter informing
him that he had failed to appeal the initial review decision to the Superintendent and he could not
appeal to SOIGA until he had done so. (Id.)
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Throughout his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges his administrative remedies were
unavailable. He alleges that he tried to resolve his issues through the prison grievance system
but that he never received responses to his grievances, appeals, and letters to staff members
inquiring into the status of grievances and appeals he had filed. He claims that he was unable to
comply with the mandatory exhaustion requirement because, among other reasons, his
grievances and appeals were not delivered, inappropriately disposed of by prison officials, or not
processed.
The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the Defendant. A
prisoner/plaintiff need not plead and prove compliance with the exhaustion requirement in his
complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir.
2002). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Camp, inmates “need only exhaust such
administrative remedies as ‘are available,’” 219 F.3d at 281 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)), and
“[a]ffirmative misconduct by prison officials designed to impede or prevent an inmate’s attempts
to exhaust may render administrative remedies unavailable.” Beaton v. Tennis, No. 07-1526,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67393, at *11 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2010).
On review of a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in
the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Doing so in this
instance, the Court cannot conclude that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted on the
basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because Plaintiff alleges such
affirmative misconduct by prison officials that rendered his administrative remedies
“unavailable” – i.e. that prison officials failed to file and/or respond to his grievances and/or
appeals.2 See Camp, 219 F.3d at 290-81 (finding that administrative remedies were unavailable
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Discovery may reveal that this allegation is untrue and the Court stresses that Defendants are not barred by
reasserting this defense in a later filed motion for summary judgment.
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where prison officials refused to file plaintiff’s grievances regarding their coworkers). As such,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied.
AND NOW this 4th day of December, 2012;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) is
DENIED.
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
James E. Clemens
FH 0750
SCI Forest
P.O. Box 945
Marienville, PA 16239
Via U.S. Postal Mail
Counsel of Record
Via Electronic Mail
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