DIXON et al v. OSA GLOBAL SECURITY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 09/05/2012. (bsc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEONARD DIXON and
DECEMBER L. DIXON,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Plaintiffs,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF PENN HILLS,
Defendant.
02: 11-CV-1654
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Presently before the Court is the MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, with
brief in support, filed by Defendant Municipality of Penn Hill (Document Nos. 19 and 20). By Text
Order of August 10, 2012, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to respond to the Motion by August 31,
2012; however, to date, Plaintiffs have not filed a response.
Background
This lawsuit is brought pursuant to a complaint filed by pro se plaintiffs, Leonard Dixon
and December L. Dixon. The factual allegations made in the Complaint are vague and difficult to
comprehend.
Plaintiffs are attempting to plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and contend that
Defendant violated their constitutional rights (1) to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures;
(2) “to not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence (sic), compelled to be witness against
oneself, deprived of liberty or property, without due process of law, without just compensation;”
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and (3) to “compulsory process.” Complaint at 4. Named as defendants are OSA Global Security,
Penn Hills School District, and the Municipality of Penn Hills.
On March 2, 2012, Defendant Municipality of Penn Hills filed its Affirmative Defenses and
Answer to the Complaint. By Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 12, 2012, the Court
dismissed defendant OSA Global Security pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m); and
granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Penn Hills School District.
The instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is filed only on behalf of the remaining
defendant, Municipality of Penn Hills.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits motions for judgment on the pleadings after
pleadings are closed and “within such time as not to delay the trial.” Judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate where the movant shows “that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d
Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Undertaking this analysis, courts view
the facts in the pleadings and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Court will construe the Complaint liberally, as Plaintiffs bring this action pro se. See
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Discussion
Generally, 42 U.S.C. §1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy
for a violation of rights created by federal law or the Constitution of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
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§1983; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Title 42, United States Code, Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress….
To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged deprivation [violation of a
right] was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
For a municipality such as Penn Hills to be held liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the municipality caused a deprivation of his or her constitutional rights through
an official policy, practice, or custom. Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
A municipal custom can be demonstrated either by reference to an express, codified policy or by
evidence that a particular practice, although not authorized by law, is so permanent and well
settled that it constitutes law. Beck v. Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Municipality of Penn Hills argues that the claims against it in the Complaint should be
dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to assert any factual allegations which would entitle them
to relief. In order to have a claim for relief, Plaintiffs have an “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of [their] ‘entitle[ment] to relief,” and that requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). As explained above, the Court must first separate the factual
and legal elements of the claim. Fowler 578 F.3d at 210. Although the Court “must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, [it] may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-211.
Second, the Court “must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.”
Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint against the Municipality of Penn Hills appear to stem
from incidents which occurred on March 28, 2011. However, the Complaint sets forth only a mere
cursory overview of the event.
The Complaint states that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated as a result of an
arrest and probable cause hearing on March 28, 2011. Plaintiffs allege that police officer A. Green,
of the Municipality of Penn Hills “effectuated the arrest of student Dixon.” Complaint at 6.
According to the Complaint, Magistrate Hromyak of the Municipality of Penn Hills
“effectuated a warrant for the arrest of student Dixon” and then allegedly held a Probable Cause
hearing and charged student Dixon with a violation of “a Statute.” Id.
There are no facts in the Complaint which explain why student Dixon was arrested, what
was in the warrant, what occurred during the hearing, what statute student Dixon was charged with
violating, or how Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated. Moreover, and most significantly
for the purpose of this Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiffs do not allege that any official policy,
practice or custom of the Municipality of Penn Hills caused a deprivation of their constitutional
rights. Without additional facts in the Complaint, and in the absence of anything more than
unsupported conclusions, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be granted.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the
Municipality of Penn Hills will be GRANTED.
An appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEONARD DIXON and
DECEMBER L. DIXON,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF PENN HILLS,
Defendant.
02: 11-CV-1654
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 5th day of September, 2012, in accordance with the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Municipality of Penn Hills is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court shall docket this case closed.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Court Judge
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cc:
Leonard Dixon
December L. Dixon
2430 Atlas Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15235
(via U.S. Postal Service and
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested)
Edmond R. Joyal, Jr., Esquire
Law Office of Joseph S. Weimer
Email: ejoyal@travelers.com
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