SCHUSTER et al v. TOWNSHIP OF NORTH SEWICKLEY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER RE: 34 and 36 Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss. Both 34 36 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Courts shall mark this CASE CLOSED. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 7/11/2012. (lcb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FREDERICK SCHUSTER and
SONJA M. BLAIR,
Plaintiffs,
12-cv-00333
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
v.
TOWNSHIP OF NORTH SEWICKLEY,
BRYAN LANDMAN, JEFFERY BECZE,
SCOTT BLAIR, and REBECCA BLAIR,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTIONS TO DISMISS
(DOC. NOS. 34 AND 36)
I. Introduction
Presently before this Court are two Motions to Dismiss. Defendants Scott and Rebecca
Blair (“Blair Defendants”) filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Frederick Schuster and
Sonja M. Blair’s (“Plaintiffs’”) Second Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 36. In addition, the
Township of North Sewickley and two of its police officers, Bryan Landman and Jeffery Becze
(“Township Defendants”) filed a separate Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 34.
Previously, on June 11, 2012, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion addressing both
the Blair Defendants’ and the Township Defendants’ prior Motions to Dismiss all three counts of
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.1 Doc. No. 28. In that Opinion, this Court granted Defendants’
Motions and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice. With leave of Court, Plaintiffs
subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 22, 2012, asserting the following two
claims, in addition to those set forth in the Amended Complaint: malicious prosecution under
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleged three counts: malicious prosecution under § 1983
(Count I), conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights under § 1985 (Count II), and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law (Count III). Doc. No. 5, ¶¶ 52-80.
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Pennsylvania State Common Law (Count II), and violation of First Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III).2 Doc. No. 33. The Defendants have since moved to dismiss all five
counts of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.3 For the reasons that follow, the Blair
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 36) and the Township Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 34) will be GRANTED.
II. Statement of Facts
As in the first Memorandum Opinion on the Blair Defendants’ and the Township
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs’ allegations are taken as true and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in their favor. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009). Although Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts two additional claims, the
substance of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint generally remains the same as the Amended
Complaint.4
The only substantive factual additions in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint that
differ from allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are as follows: (1) Defendants
conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights, motivated by both racial animus, stemming
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Although Plaintiffs did not enumerate a § 1983 civil rights claim in their Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs addressed their § 1985 claim solely under § 1983 in Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
Doc. No. 25.
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Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges five counts: malicious prosecution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania state common law (Count
II); violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights under § 1983 (Count III); conspiracy to interfere with
Plaintiffs’ civil rights under § 1985 (Count IV); and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(Count V).
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For a detailed description of Plaintiffs’ original statement of facts, see Doc. No. 28. The Court
incorporates its previous Memorandum Opinion and, where applicable, will refer to specific
sections.
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from Plaintiffs’ German ancestry, and class animus, because Plaintiffs “are not originally from
the Township of North Sewickley, and are viewed as outsiders by the Defendants to the point
that there is animus . . .” (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 73); and (2) as a result of Defendants’ alleged malicious
prosecution, Plaintiff Frederick Schuster (“Schuster”) incurred $26,280.00 in legal expenses and
costs, and is unable to freely associate with whom he wishes. Id., ¶ 66-97.
Additionally, Plaintiffs attempt to support their malicious prosecution claim by providing
more background information regarding the events that transpired between the parties. Id., ¶¶
19-78. Plaintiffs aver that Defendant Bryan Landman (“Landman”) repeatedly told Plaintiff
Schuster to stay away from Plaintiff Sonja Blair’s business property, and that if he did so, all
charges against Schuster would be dropped. Id., ¶¶ 77-78. Furthermore, Plaintiffs aver that they
“were not able to move about the Blair Nursing Home properties without fear of Schuster being
falsely charged with a crime.” Id., ¶ 70. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Schuster was afraid to
associate with Plaintiff Blair because he did not want to be falsely charged with additional
crimes (Id., ¶ 48); however, the following paragraphs outline the numerous ways in which
Plaintiffs, in fact, continue to associate. Id., ¶¶ 49-84.
Plaintiffs attempt to strengthen their conspiracy claims by stating that it is their belief that
Defendants met to conspire against Plaintiffs for the purpose of depriving their civil rights
because they observed Defendant Becze visiting Defendant Scott Blair’s property, where he
remained for hours. Id., ¶¶ 71-72. Plaintiffs also assert that the Blair Defendants and their
families, and Defendant Landman and his family, are involved in the municipal activities of the
Township of North Sewickley. Id., ¶ 118.
In order to support the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Schuster
alleges unbearable stress and reoccurring panic attacks, requiring him to meet with a counselor
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on a weekly basis. Id., ¶ 134 Further, both Plaintiffs experienced instances of insomnia. Id., ¶
135. Defendants’ harassment of Plaintiffs continues to date. Id., ¶¶ 80-84.
III. Standard of Review
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Courts require notice pleading, as
opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only “‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds on which it rests.’” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957).
Building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Third,
“whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.” This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1)
identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the Complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of
the Complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of
the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
The third step of the sequential evaluation requires this Court to consider the specific
nature of the claims presented and to determine whether the facts pled to substantiate the claims
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are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. “While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. at 210-11; see also Malleus, 641 F.3d at 560.
This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely because it appears unlikely or
improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, n.8. Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 556.
Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides adequate facts to establish “how, when, and
where” will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 212; see also Guirguis v. Movers
Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 Fed. App’x. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009).
In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could,
if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, n.8.
IV. Discussion
A. Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim (Count I)
Plaintiffs’ new factual averments, which mainly provide further details regarding the
events that transpired between the parties, again fail to demonstrate a deprivation of liberty
consistent with a Fourth Amendment seizure, as required by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in order to support a claim for a Section 1983 malicious prosecution.
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that prosecution
alone, without arrest or significant pretrial restrictions, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
government seizure for purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution action).
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint appears to allege two additional bases in an
attempt to establish a Fourth Amendment seizure. First, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants’ alleged
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malicious prosecution discouraged them from associating with each other, restricting their
movements. However, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint details numerous ways in which
Plaintiffs, in fact, continue to associate, demonstrating no significant restriction of their liberty.
Doc. No. 33, ¶¶ 49-84. Second, Plaintiffs assert that Schuster has incurred legal fees and costs
in the amount of $26,280.00 as a result of fighting the charges against him. However, such
expenses do not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty. See Barber v.
Pennsylvania Dept. of Agric., 2010 WL 1816760, 5 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2010) (Ambrose, J.)
(finding no Fourth Amendment seizure when Plaintiffs received citations by mail, incurred legal
fees and expenses, and were deprived of personal property); see also, Crawford v. Miller, 2005
WL 2030478 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2005) (rejecting a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim where
Plaintiff claimed only a deprivation of personal property because such deprivation did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521
(3d Cir. 2003)). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution
under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Count I of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
will be dismissed. The Court incorporates its previous analysis of this claim found in Doc. No.
28, 3-4.
B. First Amendment Claim (Count III)
Count III of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges a claim for violation of
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to freely associate with each other.5 In order to establish a
retaliation claim pursuant to the First Amendment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) that they
engaged in a protected activity; (2) that Defendants responded with retaliation; and (3) that the
Plaintiffs characterize Count III of their Second Amended Complaint as a First Amendment
retaliation claim in their Brief in Opposition. Doc. No. 43, 15. Therefore, the Court addresses
this claim accordingly.
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protected activity was the cause of the retaliation. Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 512. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that the First Amendment guarantees two
types of protected associations: “(1) associations founded on intimate human relationships in
which freedom of association is protected as a fundamental element of liberty, and (2)
associations formed for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment,
such as the exercise of speech, assembly, and religion.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1204 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that mere social relationships, such as those between extended
family members, or friends, are not protected under the First Amendments’ guarantee of freedom
of association).
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation of their right to freely associate because they
do not allege that Plaintiffs’ rights of “intimate association” were plausibly impaired by
Defendants as a result of retaliation. Because Plaintiffs’ association is not formed for the
purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, Plaintiffs must allege an
interference with association founded on an “intimate human relationship” to sufficiently plead a
§ 1983 First Amendment Claim. Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendants interfered with their
social relationship, they fail to allege the requisite interference with an “intimate human
relationship.” Doc. No. 33, ¶ 112.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not established that their right to intimately associate was the
impetus for Defendants’ alleged retaliation. Plaintiffs argue that “it is clear that the Defendants
knew and intended that the effects of their actions would infringe upon Plaintiffs’ rights to
associate . . . .” Doc. No. 43, 17. Plaintiffs’ additional factual averments include two statements
by Landman warning Schuster to stay away from Plaintiff Blair’s business properties. Doc. No.
33, ¶ 77-78. However, these averments are insufficient to establish any plausible basis from
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which it can be demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ “intimate human relationship” was the impetus for
Defendants’ alleged retaliation. Importantly, Schuster was found guilty of one of three charges
Plaintiffs claim to be unfounded, and this Court has determined that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution action, as discussed in Section III. A.
Again, Plaintiffs have only asserted vague complaints regarding the actions of both the
Township Defendants and the Blair Defendants, without specificity regarding how the Township
Defendants and the Blair Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to associate. For
example, Plaintiffs allege that on October 18, 2010, “Schuster was afraid to go around Rebecca
Blair because he did not want to be falsely charged with additional crimes.” Id., ¶ 48. However,
the following paragraph discusses Sonja Blair and Schuster traveling together to conduct
maintenance on the Blair Nursing Home Property. Id., ¶ 49. Furthermore, despite Plaintiffs’
claims that Defendants’ actions have discouraged their association, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint outlines numerous ways in which Plaintiffs continue to associate, as further discussed
in Section III. A. As a result, this Court will dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint.
C. Conspiracy Claim (Count IV)
Plaintiffs again fail to plead sufficient facts to support a § 1983 Civil Conspiracy claim.
This Court agrees with the Township Defendants that there are no facts which support
allegations of a conspiracy as Plaintiffs continue to cite only vague claims of social and business
relationships between Township Defendants and Blair Defendants. Doc. No. 35. Among
Plaintiffs’ new factual averments is an allegation that Defendant Becze drove his personal
vehicle to Defendant Blair’s personal lake property, where he remained for hours. Doc. No. 33,
¶ 72. Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege that Defendant Blair was even present at the property.
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Plaintiffs also add that “Landman, and his family, and the Blairs, and their family, are involved
in the municipal activities of the Township of North Sewickley.” Id., ¶ 118. However, Plaintiffs
fail to assert that this alleged relationship resulted in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their
civil rights or that they suffered any adverse actions as a result of the mutual involvement by
these families in Township activities. These additional vague and imprecise averments fail to
demonstrate a plausible claim under Iqbal, as this Court discussed in its prior Memorandum
Opinion. Doc. No. 28. Moreover, this Court determined that Defendants’ alleged malicious
prosecution did not constitute a violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights, as discussed in Section III. B.
Without such a violation, a claim for conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights cannot proceed.
As a result, this Court will dismiss Count IV of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.6 The
Court incorporates its previous analysis of this claim found in Doc. No. 28, 4.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count V)
Plaintiffs’ new factual averments are not sufficient to demonstrate a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Decisively, the core of a sufficiently-plead IIED claim
is an averment of outrageous conduct on the part of the tort-feasor. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint attempts to plead additional facts aimed to demonstrate that the consequences of their
emotional distress were unbearable and severe. However, Plaintiffs again fail to aver any
behavior that could be considered so extreme in nature as to be atrocious or utterly intolerable in
a civilized society. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the conduct of both the Township
Defendants and the Blair Defendants are the same in the Second Amended Complaint as in the
Amended Complaint. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claim for IIED necessarily fails. The Court
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Because Plaintiffs’ have not plead sufficient facts to support a § 1983 civil conspiracy, it is
unnecessary for this Court to discuss Plaintiffs’ additional averments regarding racial/class
animus.
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incorporates its previous analysis of this claim, as found in Doc. No. 28, 4-5, and will dismiss
Count V of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
E. Pennsylvania State Common Law Malicious Prosecution (Count II)
Because Plaintiffs’ only remaining claim is a state common law based claim of Malicious
Prosecution and Malicious Abuse of Process, this Court may relinquish jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II, the remaining state
common law claim. The state courts are intimately familiar and regularly adjudicate such
claims. Accordingly, said state law claim will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),
albeit without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to re-file these claims in state court. Also, the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claim should not work to Plaintiffs’ disadvantage. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing for at least a thirty-day tolling of any applicable statute of limitation
after the claim is dismissed so as to allow Plaintiff time to re-file her state law claims in state
court).
V. Order
And now, this 11th day of July, 2012, for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum
Order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) The Blair Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 36) is GRANTED;
(2) The Township Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss (Doc. No. 34) is GRANTED;
(3) Counts I-V of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; and
(4) The Clerk of Court shall mark this CASE CLOSED.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc:
All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties
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