WILLIAMS v. FOLINO et al

Filing 28

ORDER denying 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on June 19, 2013. (kcc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RODGER E. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOUIS FOLINO, MARK CAPOZZA,
SERGEANT FERRIER,
CORRECTION OFFICER
WILLIAMS, CORRECITON
OFFICER J.S. THOMPSON,
CORRECTION OFFICER
GREENWALT, CARLA SWARTZ,
KAREN GRISKIN,

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Civil Action No. 12 – 507

Chief Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan

ECF No. 19

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by all Defendants, employees of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution at Greene
(hereinafter referred to as “SCI-Greene”). For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied.
I.

Nature and Posture of Case
This action was initiated on April 17, 2012, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The

Complaint, which is the subject of the pending Motion to Dismiss, alleges that Defendants failed
to provide Plaintiff, a transgendered inmate, with mental health treatment by way of admittance
into SCI-Greene’s Therapeutic Recreational Program, and also denied him job opportunities
because of his gender. As a result, Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I) and treated him
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differently than other similarly situated inmates who were not transgender in violation of his
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II). Defendants, who are sued
only in their individual capacities, move to dismiss all claims against Defendants Folino,
Capozza, Swartz, Williams, Ferrier and Greenwalt and also move to dismiss Count I against all
Defendants in its entirety.
II.

Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).
A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
554, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.1937, 1949 (May 18, 2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme
Court further explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2009), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

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515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) (construing Twombly in a civil rights context), and
described how the Rule 12(b)(6) standard had changed in light of Twombly and Iqbal as follows:
After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or “bare-bones” allegations
will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: “threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. To prevent
dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1948. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must
show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible.
See Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
Thereafter, in light of Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), set forth the following two-prong test
to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated.
The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949]. Second, a District Court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the
Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
III.

Discussion
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Viewed in the light of the foregoing liberal pleading standards, this Court finds that the
allegations of the Complaint, when taken as true, allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference
that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged, and that the Complaint meets the standards
as enunciated in Twombly and Iqbal.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite level of personal
involvement necessary for liability in a civil rights action against Defendants Folino, Capozza,
Swartz, Williams, Ferrier and Greenwalt, and that Plaintiff is unable to state a deliberate
indifference to medical needs claim against any Defendant. Plaintiff does not dispute that
liability in a civil rights action cannot be predicated on the operation of respondeat superior. See
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 537 n.3 (1981)). However, as the Third Circuit has acknowledged, personal involvement
can be demonstrated by means other than directly acting, or not acting, in the wrongdoing which
deprived Plaintiff of his rights.

See Argueta v. United States Immigration & Customs

Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 72 (3d Cir. 2011). These means are aptly set forth in Defendants’
Motion and Plaintiff’s response in opposition thereto, and, therefore, will not be reiterated
herein. While, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff may not be able to demonstrate liability
on the part of any Defendant due to their lack of personal involvement under any theory, the
Complaint, as it stands, contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its
face against these Defendants and all Defendants as to both Counts. As such, Defendants’
Motion will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 19th day of June, 2013;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) is
DENIED.
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_________________________
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Counsel of Record
Via ECF Electronic Mail

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