WATSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/18/13. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHERYL WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 12-552
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW,
If~
s
of the parties'
of September, 2013, upon consideration
cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to
plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security ("Commissioner")
denying her application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social
Security Act,
IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for
summary judgment
(Document No.
12)
be,
and the same hereby is,
granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
10) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may
rej ect
or discount
reasons for doing so.
Cir.
1999).
substantial
'IlhAOn
(Rev. 8/82)
findings,
any
evidence
if
Plummer v. Apfel,
the
ALJ explains
186 F.3d 422,
429
the
(3d
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,
even
if
it
a
reviewing
would
have
court
is
bound
by
decided
the
factual
those
inquiry
differently.
2001).
Fargnoli v.
Moreover,
it
is
Massanari,
well
247 F.3d 34,
settled
determined merely by the presence of
that
38
(3d Cir.
disability
impairments,
is
not
but by the
effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
125,
129
(3d
Cir.
1991).
These
Jones v. 8ullivan, 954 F.2d
well-established principles
preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because
the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ I s
findings and conclusions.
In November 2004, plaintiff filed applications for both DIB
and
supplemental
security
beginning on April 1, 2002.
income
("88I")
alleging
disability
Plaintiff's applications were denied.
At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on October 31, 2005,
at which she appeared represented by counsel.
2005,
On December 6,
the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not
disabled.
On April 6,
2007,
the Appeals Council vacated that
decision and remanded the matter back to the ALJ for additional
proceedings.
After
several
postponements,
the
administrative hearing on April 16, 2008.
ALJ
held
a
second
On June 23, 2008, the
ALJ issued a decision again finding plaintiff not disabled for
both DIB and 881 purposes.
Plaintiff submitted new evidence to
the Appeals Council and requested review of the ALJ's decision.
On April 21, 2009, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff's request
for review based on the new evidence she submitted, vacated the
ALJ's decision with respect to her 881 claim and remanded the
~A072
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matter to the ALJ for further proceedings.
On remand, plaintiff
was awarded SSI benefits.
With respect to plaintiff's DIB claim,
the Appeals Council
denied her request for review of the ALJ's June 23, 2008, decision
denying her DIB benefits because the new evidence she submitted
related to the time period after her insured status expired on
June 30,
2005.
As a result,
the ALJ's June 23/
2008,
decision
denying plaintiff's DIB claim became the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review.
The instant action
challenges that decision. 1
For purposes of this court's review of the ALJ's decision
denying plaintiff DIB benefits,
issue is discrete.
the relevant period of time at
Plaintiff filed a prior application which was
denied on September 15,
(R.
2004.
464-71,
525).
Plaintiff's
request for Appeals Council review of that decision was denied and
(R.
no further appeal was taken.
472-74,
525).
As such,
res
judicata applies to plaintiff's disability status as of September
15, 2004.
20 C.F.R. §§404.955, 404.957(c) (1).
Further, plaintiff
was insured for DIB purposes through June 30, 2005,
(R. 832-33),
thus she must establish that she became disabled on or before that
date.
20 C.F.R.
§§404.101(a),
Bowen, 926 F.2d 240/ 244 (3d
404.131(a) i
. 1990)
see also Matullo v.
(observing that a claimant
lAccording to plaintiff's counsel, he became involved in this case
in April 2009 and attempted to obtain her file from the Appeals Council
on numerous occasions before eventually recelvlng a copy of the
requested records in April 2012.
As a result, the Appeals Council
granted plaintiff an extension of time in which to file a civil action.
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 3
is required to establish that she became disabled prior to the
expiration of her insured status).
Accordingly, the relevant time
period in this case is September 15, 2004, until June 30, 2005
(hereinafter, "the relevant period").
Plaintiff,
during
the
individual
who has a
relevant
under
the
limited education,
period,
and
is
regulations.
was 48 years old
classified
20
C.F.R.
as
a
younger
§404.1563(c).
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a
barmaid and
stocker, but she did not engage in substantial gainful activity at
any time during the relevant period.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
medical
records
and
hearing
testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act during the relevant period.
The ALJ found that
plaintiff's severe impairments included degenerative disc disease
of the lumbar spine, status post lumbar laminectomy and fusion,
history of
a
fractured spine,
degenerative disc disease of
fibromyalgia,
the cervical spine,
j oint disease of the right knee,
surgery,
mitral valve prolapse,
anxiety
disorder.
The
ALJ
disc bulging and
degenerative
status post bilateral bunion
major depressive disorder and
further
found
that
plaintiff's
impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal the
criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1
of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4
The
ALJ
determined
that
plaintiff
functional capacity to perform a
~A072
(Rev, 8/82)
4
("Appendix 1").
retains
the
residual
range of light work but she
requires a sit/stand option, she is limited to performing postural
movements only occasionally, and she cannot climb ladders, ropes,
scaffolds,
stairs or ramps.
In addition,
exposure to extremes of heat,
dust,
cold,
plaintiff must avoid
wetness,
gases and other respiratory irritants,
humidity,
fumes,
and she also must
avoid exposure to workplace hazards such as heights or dangerous
machinery.
pressure
Further,
and
low
plaintiff
stress
work
is
limited
that
to
does
not
performing
involve
low
close
concentration or attention to detail for extended periods.
also
She
restricted to work that does not involve detailed or
complex instructions, making significant workplace decisions or
setting workplace goals, fast pace or assembly line work or close
interaction with supervisors or the general public.
Finally,
plaintiff must be able to miss one day of work per month
(collectively, the "RFC Finding") .
As a result of these limitations,
the ALJ determined that
plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony,
that
plaintiff's
vocational
capacity permitted her
factors
and
tender
or
laundry
the ALJ concluded
residual
to perform other work
significant numbers in the national economy,
folder.
Accordingly,
However,
that
functional
exists
in
such as a machine
the
ALJ
found
that
plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during
the relevant period.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 5
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A).
The impairment
or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only
unable to do
age,
[her]
previous work but cannot,
education and work experience,
considering
[her]
engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....
II
42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.
The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the
claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3)
if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)
if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
if so,
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,
in
light
of
her age,
residual functional capacity.2
education,
work
experience and
20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4).
claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step,
inquiry is unnecessary.
If the
further
Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5
because:
(1)
he
improperly discounted plaintiff's
fibromyalgia
2 Res idual
functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1).
In assessing a claimant's
residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of
work.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4).
'Q.AO 72
(Rev 8/82)
- 6
based pain;
(2)
he
improperly weighed the opinions of
plaintiff's treating physicians;
RFC Finding a
two of
(3) he failed to include in the
restriction to account
for plaintiff's moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence and pace; and (4)
his
hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not accurately
describe plaintiff's impairments and limitations.
The court finds
that each of these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her
fibromyalgia based pain.
almost
no
time
acknowledge
According to plaintiff, the ALJ
discussing
that
her
[her]
doctors
fibromyalgia
diagnosed
other
In
it."
~spent
than
to
addition,
plaintiff claims that the ALJ incorrectly relied on the lack of
objective
evidence
as
the
fibromyalgia based pain.
primary
basis
for
rejecting
her
She further contends that the ALJ did
not evaluate her fibromyalgia consistent with the requirements of
Social Security Ruling (USSR") 99-2p, which she claims applies to
her case.
Contrary
to
plaintiff's
assertion,
the
ALJ
thoroughly
discussed her fibromyalgia and other severe impairments before,
during and after
correctly
relevant period.
determined
that
(R.
plaintiff's
840-46).
severe
The ALJ
impairments,
including fibromyalgia, caused pain and other limitations, which
he accounted for in the RFC Finding,
but plaintiff's claim of
total debilitating pain was not entirely credible.
Plaintiff
also
is
incorrect
that
the
ALJ
(R. 840, 845).
ected
her
testimony regarding fibromyalgia pain based on a lack of objective
\\i>,AO 72
(Rev 8/82)
- 7
evidence
documenting
entirely credible,
her
symptoms.
the ALJ
In
finding plaintiff
referenced the
"obj ective
not
findings
detailed above," (R. 845), which referred not only to plaintiff's
fibromyalgia, but rather to all of her severe impairments that he
discussed and analyzed.
Thus, the ALJ did not apply an incorrect
legal standard by considering objective medical evidence because
plaintiff
addition
Social
suffered
to
from
numerous
fibromyalgia.
security,
296
Fed.
other
severe
See Trauterman v.
Appx.
218,
impairments
in
Commissioner of
220-21
(3d
Cir.
2008)
(holding that the ALJ did not apply incorrect legal standard by
considering objective medical evidence, even though the plaintiff
suffered from fibromyalgia, where she also suffered from cervical
disc
herniation,
lumbar degenerative
joint disease and carpal
tunnel syndrome).
Finally, there is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the
ALJ
was
required
requirements
to
evaluate
SSR 99-2p,
her
its
title
suggests,
involving chronic
271569.
a
is
based
on
the
which is entitled "Evaluating Cases
Involving Chronic Fatigue Syndrome."
as
fibromyalgia
The purpose of that ruling,
to help evaluate disability claims
1999 WL
igue syndrome, not fibromyalgia.
The only mention of fibromyalgia in SSR 99-2p appears
footnote in which it is noted that fibromyalgia shares many
symptoms
with
chronic
fatigue
syndrome.
Id.
at
*8,
n.3.
Accordingly, SSR 99-2p is not relevant to the ALJ's evaluation of
plaintiff's fibromyalgia.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly assessed the
~A072
(Rev. 8182)
- 8
opinions
of
Dr.
Plat to
and Dr.
Karpen,
who
were
two
of
her
treating physicians, because he failed to indicate the amount of
weight he gave their opinions.
Although plaintiff now
the ALJ's assessment of the medical evidence,
tiques
she has failed to
identify any specific medical records containing opinions of Dr.
Platto and Dr. Karpen that she claims the ALJ failed to consider.
Putting
aside
plaintiff's
failure
to
identify
any
such
medical opinion the ALJ supposedly ignored, her claim is unfounded
for two reasons.
First, the record does not contain any medical
evidence or opinion from Dr. Plat to during the relevant period.
Second, while the record includes treatment notes from Dr. Karpen
during
the
relevant
period,
(R.
361-63,
400-04,
406-08),
Dr.
Karpen did not offer an opinion identifying any functional workrelated limitations that affected plaintiff during that time.
20 C.F.R.
See
§404.1527(a) (2) (explaining that medical opinions are
statements that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of
a
claimant's
prognosis,
impairment,
including
symptoms,
diagnosis
and
what a claimant still can do despite the impairment,
and physical or mental restrictions).
Accordingly, the ALJ could
not have improperly weighed the opinion of either Dr. Platto or
Dr. Karpen because neither doctor provided one during the relevant
period.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's RFC Finding did not
adequately account for her moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence and pace.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that a limitation to simple, rout
"«.A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 9
tasks sufficiently
accounts for a claimant's moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence and pace.
946 (3d Cir. 2008)
Cir. 2008)
i
McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941,
Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx. 410, 412 (3d
(restriction to simple, routine tasks accounted for the
claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and
pace) .
Here,
the RFC Finding limited plaintiff,
, to
inter
low pressure and low stress work that does not involve any of the
following: close concentration or attention to detail for extended
periods;
detailed or
workplace
decisions
complex
or
instructions i
setting workplace
making
goals i
significant
fast
pace or
assembly line worki or close interaction with supervisors or the
general public.
Thus,
the ALJ crafted a detailed RFC Finding
which adequately accommodated plaintiff's moderate limitations in
concentration, persistence and pace.
Plaintiff's final
argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical
question to the vocational expert did not accurately describe and
account for all of the limitations caused by her impairments.
An
ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the
claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the medical
evidence.
1987) .
Chrupcala v.
Here,
the
Heckler,
ALJ's
829 F.2d 1269,
hypothetical
1276
incorporated
(3d Cir.
all
of
plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record
supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the
RFC Finding.
vocational
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the
expert's
testimony
to
conclude
that
plaintiff
perform other work that exists in the national economy.
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
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can
In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering
all of the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during the relevant
period.
The ALJ's
findings
and conclusions are
supported by
substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.
Therefore,
the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
~Dia~
United States District Judge
cc: Karl E. Osterhout, Esq.
521 Cedar Way
Suite 200
Oakmont, PA 15139
Paul Kovac
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
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