GAFFNEY v. ASTRUE
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; Motion is denied in part, insofar as it seeks an award of benefits, but granted in part, as it seeks a vacation of the Commissioner's "final decision"; Decision of the Commissioner is vacated and the instant case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further consideration of plaintiff's application for supplemental security income benefits. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 3/11/13. (map)
IN THE UNITED STJ.,TES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DIS':~RICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CYNTHIA M. GAFFNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 1 ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
OPINIO~tiI
MEMORANDUM
Civil Action No. 12-714
Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster
AND ORDER OF COURT
Gary L. Lancaster
Chief Judge
I.
March
_1_1_,
2013
~rings
this action
Introduction
Plaintiff Cynthia M. Gaffney ("Gaffney")
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
405(g) and 1383(c) (3), seeking judicial
§§
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security ("Commissioner
ll
)
denying her application for
supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act ("Act")
[42 U.S.C.
§§
1381-1383f].
The
matter is presently before the Court on cross-motions for
summary judgment filed by the pc3.rt
of Civil Procedure 56.
pursuant to Federal Rule
(ECF Nos. 10 & 14).
For the reasons
I Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
February 14, 2013, succeeding former Commissioner Michael J. Astrue.
Social
Security History-Social Security Commissioners,
~:.:-~~~c...:..:..:':"':":"::"::'::=-=..2..::'~===.::-'-:'.I...!.-===~::.:.:..:::=-=:..::..:ch:..::t:.::.m:::::l (as visited on March 4, 2013).
Consequently, Acting
is now the off:,cial-capacity
defendant in this action.
Hafer v. MEllo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116
L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) i FED. R. CIV. P. 25 (ell.
1
that follow,
the Commissioner's "11otion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 14) will be denied, and Gaffney's motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 10) will be denied to the extent that it
requests an award of benefits but granted to the extent that it
seeks a vacation of the Commissioner's administrative decision,
and a remand for further proceedings.
The Comnissioner's
decision will be vacated, and the case will be remanded for
further consideration of Gaffney's application for SSI benefits.
II.
Procedural History
Gaffney protectively applie:d for SSI benej.:i ts on January
29, 2009, alleging that she had become "disabled" on February
27, 2007.
(R. at 13, 107).
Pennsylvania's
Bu~eau
of Disability
Determination ("Bureau") denied the application on September 9,
2009.
(R. at 53, 59).
Gaffney responded on October 20, 2009,
by filing a timely request for
at 65-68).
2m
administrati'Te hearing.
(R.
On November 23, 2010, a hearing wa:3 held in Seven
Fields, Pennsylvania, before Adtr.inistrative La'.'" Judge ("ALJ")
Paula Fow.
(R. at 26).
Gaffne'y, who was assiated by a non-
attorney representative,2 appeared and testified at the hearing.
(R. at 29-45).
Karen Krull ("Krull"), an impartial vocational
expert, also testified at the hearing.
(R. at 45-48).
In a
decision dated January 28, 2011, the ALJ deternined that Gaffney
2 The Act permits non-attorneys to represent claimants in Social Security
disability proceedings conducted before the Commissioner.
42 U.S.C. §
406 (a) (1) .
2
was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act.
(R. at 10
21) .
On February 8, 2011, Gaffney sought administrative review
of the ALJ's decision by filing a request for
Appeals Council.
(R. at 7-9).
J~eview
with the
The Appeals Council denied the
request for review on March 30, 2012, thereby making the ALJ's
decision the "final decision" ot: the Commissioner in this case.
(R. at 1).
Gaffney commenced this action on May 30, 2012,
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision.
Nos. 1 & 3).
(ECF
Gaffney and the Commissioner filed motions for
summary judgment on November 2, 2012, and December 31, 2012,
respectively.
(ECF Nos. 10 & 14).
These motions are the
subject of this memorandum opinion.
III. Standard of Review
This Court's review is pleLary with respect to all
questions of law.
Schaudeck v. Commi
oner of Social Security
Administration, 181 F.3d 429, 4]1 (3d Cir. 1999).
to factual issues, judicial review is limited
~o
With respect
determining
whether the Commissioner's decision is "suppor:ed by substantial
evidence."
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43,
46 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Court mC:LY not undertakl:= a de novo review
of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record.
Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190
1191 (3d Cir. 1986).
Congress has clearly expressed its
3
intention that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.
§
405(g).
Substantial evidence
"does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as: a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion./I
Pierce'T.
U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490
quotation marks omitted).
Underwood,
487
(1988) (internal
As long as the Comm:i_ssioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be set
aside even if this Court "would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.
1999).
Hartranft v.
/I
ApfE:l,
"Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a
deferential standard of review.
SOl,
503
181 F. 3d 3513, 360 (3d Cir.
Jones v.
1/
Bar1hart,
364 F. 3d
(3d Cir. 2004).
In order to establish a disability under the Act, a
claimant must demonstrate a "medically
impairment that prevents him [or her]
determi~able
basis for an
from eng,:tging in any
'substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month
period./I
Stunkard v.
Secretary of Health & HU.nan Services,
F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988)
i
(3d Cir. 1987)
§§
i
42 U.S.C.
Kanqas v.
Bowen,
841
823 F.2d 775, 777
42:: (d) (1) (A), 1382c (a) (3) (A).
A
claimant is considered to be uTIC:,ble to engage in substantial
gainful activity "only if his
[or her] physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or she]
4
is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work but cannot,
considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy."
42 U.S.C.
423 (d) (2) (A),
§§
1382c (a) (3) (B) .
To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative
law judge must do more than simply state factual conclusions.
Stewart v.
He or she must make specific findings of fact.
Secretary
Health, Education c; Welfare,
Cir. 1983).
The administrative law judge must consider all
714 :<'.2d 287, 290 (3d
medical evidence contained in tl"l,e record and p:covide adequate
explanations for disregarding
Behalf
01:'
rej ecting evidence.
Weir on
Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984) i
Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705
The Social Security
(3d Cir. 1981).
Admini~:;tration
("SSA 11
)
,
acting pursuant
to its legislatively-delegated rulemaking authority, has
promulgated a five-step sequent:l.al evaluation I)rocess for the
purpose of determining whether c;, claimant is ":::lisabled" within
the meaning of the Act.
The united States Supreme Court
recently summarized this process by stating as follows:
If at any step a finding o~ disability or non
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the
claim further.
At the first step, the agency will
find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he
is not working at a "substantial gainful activity."
[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) . .~t step two,
5
the SSA will find non-disability unless the claimant
shows that he has a "severe impairment l defined as
"any impairment or combinat.ion of impairments which
significantly limits [the claimantls] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
§§
404.1520(c)
416.920(c). At step three the agency
determines whether the impairment which enabled the
claimant to survive step two is on the lint of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one
disabledi if SOl the claimant qualif
§§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
If the claimant's impairment
is not on the list l the inquiry proceeds to step four,
at which the SSA assesses whether the cla:.mant can do
his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he
determined not to be diE:abled.
If the claimant
survives the fourth stage, the fifthl and final l step
requires the SSA to considE!r so-called "vocational
factors" (the claimantls age, education l and past work
experience), and to determine whether the claimant is
capable of performing other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
§§
404.1520 (f), 404.1560 (c), 416.920 (f), 416.960 (c) .
ll
1I
I
I
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20
1
24-25, 124 S.Ct. 376 1 157
L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
Factual findings
pertaining to all steps of the sequential evaluation process are
subject to judicial review under the "substantial evidence"
standard.
McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Se:::urity, 370 F.3d
357, 360-361 (3d Cir. 2004).
In an action in which reviE:w of an adminiatrative
determination is sought, the ag€ : ncy's
decision cannot be
affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the
agency in making its decision.
Commission v. Chenery Corp.
I
In Securities & Exchange
33::. U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91
L.Ed. 1995 (1947)1 the Supreme Court explained:
6
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple
but fundamental rule of administrative lav'l.
That rule
is to the effect that a reviewing court, ::.n dealing
with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make,
must judge the propriety of such action solely by the
grounds invoked by the agency.
If those 9rounds are
inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to
affirm the administrative a.ction by subst:Ltuting what
it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.
To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the
administrative agency.
332 U.S. at 196.
Chenery Corp.,
The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ha.s recognized the applicability
of this rule in the Social Security disability context.
Fargnoli v. Massana
,247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7 (3d Cir. 2001).
Thus, the Court's review is limited to the fom::- corners of the
ALJ/s decision.
Cefalu v.
Barnl:art,
387 F.Supp.2d 486,491
(W.D.Pa. 2005).
IV.
The ALJ's Decision
In her decision, the ALJ determined tha.t Gaffney had not
engaged in substantial gainful activi ty subseq.. lent to the date
of her application.
(R. at 15).
suffering from asthma
I
Gaffney was found to be
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
sensorineural hearing loss, bipolar disorder, :nigraine
headaches, a personality disorder, and a stomach impairment.
(R. at 15).
"non-severe,
Although her stomach impairment was deemed to be
II
her remaining impairments were d'eemed to be
7
·severe" under the Commissioner's regulations.
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a) (4) (ii), 416.920(c).
(R. at 15); 20
The .ALJ concluded that
Gaffney's impairments did not meet or medically equal an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. :~'art 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(R. at 15 17).
In accordance with 20 C.F.H. § 416.945, the ALJ assessed
Gaffney's "residual functional capacity"3 as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to per:eorm light work as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with no more than occasional
postural maneuvers such as balancing, stooping,
kneeling.
[sic] Crouching, crawling, and climbing;
the claimant may not perform tasks requiring f
hearing capability, frequent telephone conmunication,
or the need to speak over excessive background noise;
the claimant is limited to simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks that are not performed in a fast
paced production environment and which require no more
than occasional interaction with supervisors,
coworkers, or members of the general public.
(R. at 17).
cashier.
Gaffney had "past relevant work"4 experience as a
(R. at 19, 46, 127).
Krull testified that, according
The term "residual functional capacity" is defined as 'that which an
individual is still able to do despitE~ the limitations ,~aused by his or her
impairments." Hartranft v.
, 181 F.3d 358, 359, n. 1 (3d Cir.
1999) (parentheses omitted), citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
The same
residual functional capacity assessment is used at the Eourth and fifth steps
of the sequential evaluation process.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a) (5) (i)-(ii),
416.945(a) (5) (i)-(ii).
4 "Past relevant work" is defined as "substantial gainful activity" performed
by a claimant within the last fifteen years that lasted long enough for him
or her to learn how to do it.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b} (1), 416.960(b} (I).
The Commissioner has promulgated compl:ehensive regulations governing the
determination as to whether a claimant's work activity :::onstitutes
"substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 '104.1576, 416.971
416.976.
3
8
to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, cashiers working in
the national economy typically performed "semi-skilled,,5 tasks at
the "light"6 level of exertion.
(R. at 46).
She further stated
that the duties of Gaffney's prior position had been performed
at the "medium,,7 level of exertion.
at 46).
(R.
Since Gaffney
was deemed to be capable of enga.ging in only "1.Lnskilled" 8 work
activities, it was determined tr..at she could not return to her
past relevant work.
(R. at 19 20, 47-48)
Gaffney was born on August 12, 1960, making her forty-eight
years old on the date of her application.
(R. at 20, 107).
At
that point, she was classified as a "younger person" under the
"Semi-skilled work is work which needa some skills but does not require doing
the more complex work duties.
Semi-skilled jobs may require alertness and
close attention to watching machine processes; or inspecting, testing or
otherwise looking for irregularities; or tending or guarding equipment,
property, materials, or persons against loss, damage or injury; or other
types of activities which are similarly less complex thc.n skilled work, but
more complex than unskilled work. A j,:::>b may be classif:.ed as semi-skilled
where coordination and dexterity are n=cessary, as when hands or feet must be
moved quickly to do repetitive tasks./I 20 C.F.R. §§ 40~L1568(b), 416.968(b).
6 "Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.
Even though the
weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this cate~Jory when it requires
a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the
time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controJs.
To be considered
capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, [a claimant1 must
have the ability to do substantially all of these activ:.ties.
20 C. F.R. §§
404.1567(b), 416.967{b).
7 "Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighir..g up to 25 pounds," 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567 (c), 416.967 (c) .
8 "Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties
that can be learned on the job in a short period of time. The job mayor may
not require considerable strength.
For example, [the Commissioner]
consider [sl jobs unskilled if the primary work duties a]~e handling feeding
and offbearing (that is, placing or removing materials from machines which
are automatic or operated by others), or machine tendinq, and a person can
usually learn to do the job in 30 daYE:, and little specific vocational
preparation and judgment are needed. A person does not gain work skills by
doing unskilled jobs./I 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a)
416.9058(a).
5
/I
I
I
9
Commissioner's regulations. 9
20 C.F.R.
§
416.963(c).
She became
a "person closely approaching advanced age" on August 12, 2010,
when she reached the age of fifty.
20 C.F.R.
§
416.963(d).
Gaffney had the equivalent of a high school ed'llcation 10 and an
ability to communicate in English.
C.F.R.
§
416.964(b) (4)-(5).
(R. at 20, 29, 133)
i
20
Given the applicable residual
functional capacity and vocatior..al assessments,
the ALJ
concluded that Gaffney could work as a cleaner,
sorter or
packer.
(R. at 20).
Krull's testimony established that those
jobs existed in the national economy for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a) (3) (B).l1
V.
(R. at 47).
Discussion
Gaffney stopped working on March 30, 2005, in order to care
for her children.
(R. at 126).
When she applied for SSI
benefits, she listed February 27, 2007, as her alleged onset
date.
(R. at 13, 107).
SSI ber:.efits are not a.vailable for the
period of time preceding a claimant's applicatLon.
20 C.F.R. §
The regulations recognize that "younger persons" between the ages of forty
five and forty-nine are more limited in their ability to adjust to other work
20 C.F.R.
than are persons who have not yet attained the age of forty-five.
§§ 404.1563{c), 416.963{c).
IOGaffney obtained her General Educational Development ("GED/) certification
in 1978.
(R. at 29, 133). She later received training to work as a nurse's
aide.
(R. at 29-30, 133).
II At the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process,
"the Commissioner
bears the burden of proving that, considering the claimant's residual
functional capacity, age, education, "md past work experience, [he or] she
can perform work that exists in significant numbers in ':he regional or
national economy." Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2003).
This burden is commonly satisfied by means of vocational expert testimony.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 {3d Cir. 2005;.
9
10
416.335.
Therefore, the period of time relevant to this case
began on January 29, 2009, and ended on January 28, 2011. 12
(R.
at 21) .
Gaffney's husband suffered from throat and head cancer.
(R. at 31).
He died in 2008.
(R. at 31, 265, 379).
This event
apparently had a serious impact on Gaffney's mental state.
at 31, 265, 379).
"unable to eat."
five pounds.
Gaffney's grief periodically rendered her
(R. at 265)
She lost approximately sixty-
(R. at 265) .
Dr. Apolonia Sinu, a treating psychiatrist, f
Gaffney on March 21, 2008.
(R. at 179-183).
t evaluated
fney continued
to seek treatment from Dr. Sinu on an ongoing basis.
179-193).
(R.
(R. at
Dr. Sinu ultimately determined that Gaffney was
suffering from major depressive disorder.
(R. at 183).
Gaffney reported to the Heritage Valley Health System's
Sewickley Valley Hospital ("Sewickley") on June 28, 2009,
12 When the
Council denied Gaffney's request for review, the ALJ's
decision became the "final decision" of the Commissionel::- in this case.
Sims
v.
, 530 U.S. 103, 106-107, 120 a.Ct. 2080, 147 L.3d.2d 80 (2000).
The
Court has jurisdiction to review only the Commissioner' ,3 "final decision.
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108-109, 97 S.Ct. 980 . 51 L.Ed.2d 192
(1977); Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519-1521 (3d Cir. 1992). Nothing
in the Act authorizes judicial review of the
Council's decision
denying Gaffney's request for review. Matthews v.
L, 239 F.3d 589, 594
(3d Cir. 2001). Since Gaffney does not move for a rema:ld pursuant to the
sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court can con,;ider only the
evidence that was before the ALJ at the time of her decision.
Chandler v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) i Matthews,
239 F.3d at 592-595. Exhibits lA through 19F were admi-::ted into evidence at
the hearing.
(R. at 29). Exhibit 20F was submitted to the Appeals Council
in support of Gaffney's request for review.
(R. at 4 5). Given that Exhibit
20F was never presented to the ALJ, it cannot be considered for the purpose
of determining whether her decision is supported by subo3tantial evidence.
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 360i Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592 595.
/I
11
complaining of "severe abdominal pain."
(R. at 199).
Although
Dr. Sinu evaluated Gaffney on that occasion, Gaffney reported
that she was "psychiatrically stable," and that she \\d[id] not
want any psychotropic medication changes or ausrmentation."
at 202).
(R.
According to Gaffney, she needed treatment only for
her "abdominal pain."
(R. at 202).
At some point during the su.mmer of 2009, Gaffney was again
hospitalized at Sewickley for abdominal pain.
(R. at 315) .
After waking up in the middle of the night and \\freak[ing] out,"
Gaffney decided to leave the facility against medical advice.
(R. at 315).
When Gaffney's relatives and friends refused to
pick her up, hospital personnel arranged to have her transported
home in a taxicab.
(R. at 266).
Dr. Kerry Brace, a psycholcgical consultant for the Bureau,
reviewed Gaffney's medical records in connection with her
application for SSI benefits.
(R. at 256).
0:1 September 3,
2009, Dr. Brace reported that Gaffney was "able to meet the
basic mental demands of competitive work on a sustained basis
despite the limitations resulting from her imp.:iirment.
243).
II
(R. at
He specifically observed that Gaffney h:l.d never been
hospitalized because of her mental condition.
(R. at 243).
the narrative portion of his consultative report, Dr. Brace
stated as follows:
12
In
The claimant can perform si~ple, routine, repetitive
work in a stable environment.
She can understand,
retain, and follow simple job instructions, i.e.,
perform one and two step tasks.
She is cClpable of
working within a schedule and at a consistent pace.
She would be able to maintain regular attendance and
be punctual. Moreover, she would not require special
supervision in order to sustain a work routine.
She
is capable of making simple decisions and accepting
instruction. Additionally, she can funct:.. on in
production oriented jobs requiring little independent
decision making. Review of the medical evidence
reveals that the claimant retains the abilities to
manage the mental demands of many types oj: jobs not
requiring complicated tasks:.
(R. at 243).
Dr. Juan B. Mari-IVlayans, a non-examining medical
consultant, opined on September 8, 2009, that Gaffney was
physically capable of performinSI an unlimited '-ange of "light"
work.
(R. at 258-264).
The Bureau denied Gaf:J:ney's application
for benefits on September 9, 2009.
(R. at 53, 59).
Dr. Eileen P. Neely is Gafi:ney's primary c:are physician.
(R. at 35-36).
In a letter to the Bureau dated September 10,
2009, Dr. Neely stated that Gaffney "ha[d] not been able to hold
gainful employment" subsequent to her husband'3 death. 13
265).
(R. at
Dr. Neely described Gaffney's "psychiatric disease" as
"the real underlying impairment that [was] proi:1ibiting her from
holding employment."
(R. at 266).
It was suggested that
13 On August 3, 2009, Dr. Neely received written correspondence from the Bureau
relating to Gaffney's application for SSI benefits.
(R. at 265).
She
evidently failed to respond until the day after the application was denied.
(R. at 265).
It is not clear from the record whether the denial triggered
Dr. Neely's letter, or whether the timing of these two events was
coincidental.
13
Gaffney was suffering from bipolar disorder.
(R. at 266).
In
her letter, Dr. Neely went on to state as follows:
The patient has presented within the past year with
complaints of diffuse join::: pains and claims she could
not walk.
Her presentation was quite histrionic and
the findings on physical exam were not proportionate
to her complaints.
In examining her and taking a
history, it is very difficult to objectively sort out
the potential true symptoms and pathology from the
embellished description.
I do think, however, this
behavior is part of a true underling [sic] psychiatric
disorder and that is our responsibility as physicians
to try to sort this out and provide appropriate care
for both the physical and the psychiatric disorders,
which she may have.
(R. at 266).
On a "medical source statement" form provided by
the Bureau, Dr. Neely indicated that Gaffney ha.d no physical
limitations.
(R. at 269-270) .
Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA")
STAT.
§
[50 PA.
7101 et seq.] provides for the involuntary
hospitalization of those who,
"as a result of mental illness,"
pose a "clear and present danger of harm to others" or to
themselves.
50 PA. STAT.
§
7301 (a).
Under circumstances
described in the MHPA, involuntary treatment may be authorized
by a physician for a period not to exceed 120:J.ours.
§
7302.
50 PA. STAT.
Any additional periods of involuntary treatment must be
authorized by a judge or a mental health review officer after a
hearing conducted for the purpm::e of determini:1g whether the
14
patient in question satisfies the relevant statutory criteria.
50 PA. STAT.
§§
7303-7305.
On December 8, 2009, Gaffney was involuntarily committed to
Sewickley's psychiatric unit.
(R. at 379-381) .
This action was
triggered by a petition alleging' that Gaffney had dropped lit
cigarettes on the floor of her apartment, chokE!d her roommate,
and expressed a desire to "die t,o be with her dead husband."
(R. at 379).
Since Gaffney was deemed to be in need of
inpatient treatment for a period exceeding 120 hours, a hearing
was conducted pursuant to 50 PA. STAT.
§
7303.
(R.
at 379)
Instead of directly contesting her commitment, Gaffney
stipulated to an additional period of involunta.. ry treatment not
to exceed ten days."
December 16, 2009.
(R.
at 379) .
She was discharged on
(R. at 379-381)
In the aftermath of her hospitalization, Gaffney continued
to see Dr. Sinu for treatment.
months.
(R.
at 271) .
These visits occurred every four
In a "meEtal residual f·.lnctional capacity
questionnaire" dated August 24, 2010, Dr. Sinu reported that
Gaffney was \\ [u] nable to meet competitive stamlards" in various
areas of work-related functioning.
(R. at 273-274).
Dr. Sinu
14 A period of extended involuntary treatment authorized pursuant to 50 PA.
STAT. § 7303 cannot exceed twenty days.
50 PA. STAT. § 7303(h).
The parties
seeking a "certification for extended involuntary treatment" must prove the
applicable criteria by "clear and convincing evidence."
In re: Jacobs/IS
A.3d 509, 510 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2011). Although the administrative record does
not contain copies of the documents filed in connection with the commitment
proceedings, a treatment note discussing Gaffney's "303 hearing" states that
she "stipulated for up to 10 days."
(R. at 379).
15
predicted that Gaffney's "impairments or treatr:1ent" would cause
her to miss more than four days of work per month if she were to
be employed on a full-time basis.
(R. at 274).
At the hearing
held before the ALJ, Krull testified that no work existed in the
national economy for an individt:.al who needed to miss four or
more days of work per month. 1S
(R. at 47-48) .
The ALJ accorded "great weight" to Dr. Brace's assessment
(R. at 19).
of Gaffney's mental limitations.
opinion was given "little weight.."
(R. at 19)
Dr. Sinu's
In the relevant
portion of her decision, the ALe· stated that she did not find
Dr. Sinu's opinion to be consistent with the e'lidentiary record
as a whole.
(R.
at 19) .
Gaffney argues that the AL.::r failed to properly weigh Dr.
Sinu's opinion in accordance with 20 C.F.R.
No. 11 at 4-12).
§
416.927. 16
(ECF
Under that regulation, a treating source's
opinion is entitled to "controlling weight" if it is "wellsupported by medically acceptab1e clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques" and "not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [a claimant's] case record."
20 C.F.R.
l'The inquiry required under the Social Security Act does not account for any
"reasonable accommodations" mandated by Title I of the junericans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 12117].
c..~eveland v. Policy
Management
tems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966
(1999) i Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 474 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir.
2007) .
16 In her brief, Gaffney mistakenly refers to 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527, which
applies to claims for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act
[42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433].
(ECF No. 11 c.t 4-7).
Since she seeks an award of
SSI benefits under Title XVI, the applicable regulation is 20 C.F.R. §
416.927.
16
§
416.927(c) (2).
Even when such an opinion is not afforded
"controlling weight
Gonzalez v. Astrue
l
ll
l
it must still be given some consideration.
537
F.Supp.~~d
644
660
1
(D.Del. 2008).
Opinions rendered by treating sources do not bind the
Commissioner on the issue of a claimant IS resi.lual functional
capacity.
Brown v. Astrue l
649 F.3d 193 1 196 1 n. 1 (3d Cir.
Every medical opinion
2011).
afforded some consideration.
l
regardless of its source
Williams v. Sullivan l
1178 1 1185 1 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1992).
l
must be
970 F.2d
Where a conflict exists
between competing medical opinions, an administrative law judge
is ordinarily "free to choose the medical opinion of one doctor
over that of another.1I
oner of Social Security,
Diaz v. Commi
577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
Nonetheless, a residual
functional capacity determination is not "supported by
substantial evidence" if
is based solely on an administrative
law judge's "own credibility judgments
opinion."
Morales v.
I
specul:ttion or lay
225 F.3d 310
1
317 (3d Cir. 2000).
The extent to which a claimant/s impairments limit his or her
ability to perform work-related tasks must be:tscertained by
reference to competent medical evidence.
F.2d 26
1
Doak v.
er, 790
29 (3d Cir. 1986).
Under certain circumstanceE:, an opinion rendered by a non
examining consultant may be sufficiently probacive to outweigh a
contrary opinion put forth by a treating source.
17
Jones v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).
Where all other
factors are equal, however, the opinion of a treating source
should be accorded more weight than an assessment submitted by a
non-examining consultant.
BrowJ:'a
1 v. Comminsioner of Social
Security, 554 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2008).
That is especially
true when psychiatric impairments are at issue .
"In contrast to
some physical impairments, which can be verified or discounted
solely by reference to reports of objective medical tests,
mental impairments are generally identified on the basis of a
psychiatric professional's interactions with an impaired
individual."
Haisley v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services,.
Inc., 776 F.Supp.2d 33, 50 (W.D.Pa. 2011).
Under the present circumstcmces, Dr. BracE:!' s assessment did
not provide the ALJ with a sufficient basis for rejecting Dr.
Sinu's opinion.
The probative f:orce of any medical opinion must
be judged in relation to the evidentiary record as a whole.
ller v. Commissioner of SociaJ Security, 172 F.3d 303, 304 (3d
Cir. 1999).
When Dr. Brace completed his cons'.. lltative report,
he specifically observed that Gaffney had never been
hospitalized because of her psychiatric impairment.
243).
(R. at
Gaffney, of course, was involuntarily c:Jmmitted three
months later.
(R. at 379-381).
An involuntary commitment must
be predicated on a determination that an individual is "severely
mentally disabled."
50 PA. STAT,
§
18
7301(a).
Consequently, it
cannot be doubted that Gaffney's mental condit_,.on deteriorated
after the submission of Dr. Brace's report.
S~nce
that report
preceded the exacerbation of Gaffney's symptoms, it was not
probative of her abilities and limitations dur:.ng the period of
time postdating her hospitalization.
Dr. Sinu completed her questionnaire on August 24, 2010.
(R. at 271-274).
By that time, eight months had elapsed since
Gaffney's release from inpatient treatment.
379-381}.
{IL
at 2 71 - 274 ,
Dr. Sinu indicated that Gaffney's mental impairment
was expected to last for at least twelve monthB.
{R. at 274} .
In this respect, Dr. Sinu's assessment supported a finding that
Gaffney was "disabled" within tl'l.e meaning of the Act.
Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214-222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d
330 (2002).
Because Dr. Brace never examined Gaffney in the
first place, his opinion was not of the kind entitled to
significant weight under the Commissioner's re'julations.
C.F.R.
§
416.927{c} (I).
20
The diminished value of that opinion is
magnified in this case, given
t~e
subsequent deterioration in
Gaffney's condition that ultimately necessitated her
hospitalization. 17
17 The Court acknowledges that a consul
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