POLARDINO v. ASTRUE
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security if affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 8/19/13. (gpr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MELINDA L. POLARDINO,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 12-806
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
~
AND NOW, this
the
parties'
of August, 2013, upon consideration of
cross -motions
for
summary
judgment
pursuant
to
plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security ("Commissioner")
denying her application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social
Security Act,
IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for
summary judgment
(Document No.
12)
be,
and the same hereby is,
granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
10) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may
reject
or discount
reasons for doing so.
Cir.
1999).
substantial
'%AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)
findings,
any evidence
if
Plummer v. Apfel,
the ALJ
explains
186 F.3d 422,
429
the
(3d
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,
even
if
it
a
reviewing
would
have
court
is
bound
by
decided
the
factual
those
inquiry
differently.
2001).
Fargnoli v.
Moreover,
it
is
Massanari,
well
247 F.3d 34,
settled
determined merely by the presence of
that
38
(3d Cir.
disability
impairments,
is
not
but by the
effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
125,
129
(3d
Cir.
1991).
These
Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d
well established principles
preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because
the record contains substantial evidence to support
the ALJ IS
findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff
filed
her
DIB
application
on August
9,
2010,
alleging disability beginning on May 24, 2010, due to depression,
anxiety and stress.
Plaintiff's application was denied.
At
plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on August 26, 2011, at
which she appeared represented by counsel.
On September I, 2011,
the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April
26,
2012,
making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
The instant action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 38 years old
on her alleged onset date of disability, and is classified as a
younger individual under the regulations.
20 C.F.R. §404.1563(c).
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a secretary, file
clerk, salon receptionist and salon shampoo attendant, but she has
not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since her
alleged onset date.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
medical
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2
records
and
hearing
testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the
ALJ
concluded
that
meaning of the Act.
plaintiff
is
not
disabled within
the
Although the medical evidence established
that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, lumbar radiculitis,
depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, those impairments, alone
or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the
listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart
P, Regulation No.4
("Appendix 1") .
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform light work, but she is precluded from climbing
ladders, ropes and scaffolds.
to
occasionally
climbing
occasionally balance,
In addition, plaintiff is limited
ramps
and
stairs,
and
stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.
avoid exposure to temperature extremes,
she
may
She must
wetness and humidity.
Further, plaintiff is limited to understanding,
remembering and
carrying out simple instructions and performing work that involves
simple, routine tasks.
Plaintiff also is limited to working in a
low stress environment that does not involve production rate paced
work.
Finally, plaintiff is restricted to work that involves only
occasional and routine changes, only occasional supervision and no
contact with co-workers and the public
(collectively,
the "RFC
Finding") .
As a result of these limitations,
the ALJ determined that
plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony,
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However,
the ALJ concluded
that
plaintiff's
capacity
enable
vocational
her
to
factors
perform
and
other
residual
work
significant numbers in the national economy,
cleaner, stock marker and mail clerk.
that
functional
exists
in
such as an office
Accordingly, the ALJ found
that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disabilityn as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A).
The impairment
or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only
unable to do
[her]
previous work but cannot,
considering
[her]
age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....
II
42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.
The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the
claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3)
if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)
if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
if so,
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,
in light of
her age,
education,
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work experience and
residual functional capacity.l
20 C.F.R. §404.1520{a) (4).
If the
claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further
inquiry is unnecessary.
Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5
because:
(1) he failed to include
the RFC Finding a restriction
to account for plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration,
pers
of
tence and pace; (2) he gave inadequate weight to the opinion
one
of
plaintiff's
treating physicians i
(3)
he
improperly
relied on the opinion of a state agency medical consultant; and
(4) he failed to properly evaluate plaintiff's credibility.
The
court finds that each of these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's RFC Finding did not
adequately account for her moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence and pace.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that a limitation to simple, routine tasks sufficiently
accounts for a claimant's moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence and pace.
946 (3d Cir. 2008)
Cir. 2008)
i
See McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941,
Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx. 410, 412 (3d
(restriction to simple, routine tasks accounted for the
claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and
pace) .
work
Here,
that
the RFC Finding limited plaintiff,
involves
simple,
routine
tasks
and
inter alia,
to
understanding,
lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1).
In assessing a claimant's
residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of
work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4).
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remembering and carrying out simple instructions.
adequately
accommodated
plaintiff's
moderate
Thus, the ALJ
limitations
in
concentration, persistence and pace.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ gave inadequate weight to
the opinion of her treating psychologist, Dr.
Susan Drolet.
A
treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if
it
is
well-supported
by
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence of record.
20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) (2).
Under this standard, the ALJ properly determined that Dr. Drolet's
opinion should be given little weight.
In
August
2011,
Dr.
Drolet
(R.28).
completed
a
Medical
Source
Statement on which she indicated that plaintiff would be unable to
"make it through a day of productivity./1
(R. 575).
Despite this
conclusion, Dr. Drolet rated plaintiff as having a fair ability to
understand,
remember
and
carry
out
very
short
and
simple
instructions, and commented that she "can work independently at
own pace with no time or productivity expectations."
The ALJ explained he
gave
little weight
(R.576).
to Dr.
Drolet's
opinion that plaintiff was unable to work because the treatment
she provided plaintiff was not the type one would expect for an
individual who was as limited as she described plaintiff.
28) .
In addition,
the ALJ
found Dr.
inconsistent with records from Dr.
(R.
Drolet's opinion to be
Matta,
plaintiff's treating
psychiatrist, which indicated that plaintiff's mental conditions
were controlled with medication.
""'A072
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(R. 28, 371-76, 579-80).
After reviewing the record, the court finds no error in the
ALJ's consideration and weighing of Dr. Drolet's opinion for the
reasons the ALJ explained in his decision.
despite
giving
incorporated
Dr.
some
Drolet's
of
her
opinion
assessment
We note, however, that
little
into
weight,
the
RFC
the
ALJ
Finding by
limiting plaintiff to understanding, remembering and carrying out
simple
instructions,
as
well
as
work
that
does
not
involve
production rate pace.
The court similarly finds no error in the ALJ's consideration
of, and reliance upon, the assessment of Dr. Edward Jonas, a nonexamining
state agency psychologist,
who
reviewed plaintiff's
records and completed a residual functional capacity assessment of
her ability to perform various mental work-related tasks.
(R.
428-31) .
not
Dr.
Jonas
determined
that
plaintiff
was
significantly limited in her ability to understand, remember and
carry out short and simple instructions, but she was moderately
limited
in
her
instructions.
moderately
ability
(R. 428).
limited
in
to
do
so
with
respect
to
detailed
Dr. Jonas also found that plaintiff was
her
ability
to
maintain
attention
and
concentration for an extended time, to respond to changes in the
work setting and to interact appropriately with the general public
and co-workers.
great weight.
(R. 428-29).
(R.
The ALJ gave Dr. Jonas' assessment
29).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly gave great weight
to Dr.
Jonas'
opinion because additional medical evidence was
added to the record after he reviewed her case and completed his
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and only occasional supervision.
Contrary to plaintiff's position,
"[t]he ALJ - not treating
or examining physicians or State agency consultants
the ultimate disability and RFC determinations."
F.3d at 361.
Thus
I
the
I
667
opinion that plaintiff was capable
of meeting the basic mental demands of work,
in
Chandler
it was entirely appropriate for the ALJ to
I
give great weight to Dr. Jonas
include
must make
RFC
Finding
more
(R.
restrictive
29,
431), yet
limitations
to
accommodate her ability to function socially with others in the
work setting.
Plaintiff/s final argument is that the ALJ failed to properly
evaluate her subjective complaints regarding her limitations.
claimant's
complaints
and
other
subjective
supported by objective medical evidence.
Hartranft v. Apfel
l
symptoms
must
A
be
20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)
181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
i
An ALJ may
reject the claimant/s subjective testimony if he does not find it
credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony.
Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429,
(3d
Cir.
1999).
In
this
case,
plaintiff's sUbjective complaints
I
the
ALJ
properly
433
analyzed
and he explained why he found
her testimony not entirely credible.
In evaluating plaintiff/s credibilitYI the ALJ complied with
the appropriate regulations and considered all of the relevant
evidence in the record
l
including plaintiff's own statements about
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9
her limitations,3 her daily activities, the extent and nature of
her treatment, the medical evidence and the opinions of physicians
who treated and examined her.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) (1)
(c) (3) i Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
extent
to
which
plaintiff's
The ALJ then considered the
alleged
functional
limitations
reasonably could be accepted as consistent with the evidence of
record and how those limitations affect her ability to work.
C.F.R.
§404.1529(c) (4).
The ALJ determined that the objective
evidence is inconsistent with plaintif f' s
disability.
20
Accordingly,
allegation of total
the ALJ determined that plaintiff's
testimony regarding the limitations caused by her conditions was
not entirely credible.
(R.27).
This court finds that the ALJ
adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination
in
his
decision,
(R.
26 29),
and
is
satisfied
that
such
determination is supported by substantial evidence.
In
asserts
connection
that
she
with
was
her
credibility
"entitled
to
a
argument,
favorable
inference based upon her excellent work history."
plaintiff
credibility
While it is
true that the testimony of a claimant with a long work history may
be
given
substantial
credibility
concerning
her
claimed
3 The ALJ noted that plaintiff made inconsistent statements such as
alleging she was unable to work, yet subsequently seeking full time
employment, and reporting limited social contacts while having friends
over all the time.
(R. 27).
Plaintiff attempts to explain these
inconsistencies by arguing that "things change. II
As the ALJ pointed
out, plaintiff may not have provided inconsistent information with a
conscious intent to mislead, but it suggests the information may not be
entirely reliable.
(R. 27). In any event, plaintiff's statements were
only one factor among many that the ALJ properly considered in
evaluating her credibility.
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limitations, see Dobrowolsky v. Califano,
606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d
Cir. 1979), work history is only one of many factors an ALJ may
consider in assessing a
claimant's subj ecti ve complaints.
20
C.F.R. §404.1529(c) (3).
Indeed, a claimant's work history alone
is not dispositive of the question of her credibility, and an ALJ
is
not
required
credibility.
to equate a
long work history with enhanced
See Christl v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4425817, *12 (W.D.Pa.
September 30, 2008).
Here, the ALJ clearly was aware of plaintiff's work history
and referred to it in his decision when he determined that she
could not perform her past relevant work.
(R. 30).
It likewise
is clear from the ALJ's decision that he considered the record as
in assessing plaintiff's credibility as discussed above.
An exemplary work history in and of itself is insufficient to
overcome the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ' s credibility
determination, thus a remand of this case is not warranted.
In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering
all of the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff
is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The ALJ' s findings
and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not
otherwise erroneous.
Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner
must be affirmed.
2
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
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cc: Elizabeth A. Smith. Esq.
Law Offices of Elizabeth A. Smith PC
129 S. McKean Street
Butler, PA 16001
Albert Schollaert
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
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