HANSFORD v. ASTRUE

Filing 12

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 4/15/2013. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEITH HANSFORD

I

)

)

)

Plaintiff l

)

vs.

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Civil Action No. 12-905

)

MICHAEL J. AS TRUE I
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY I )
)

Defendant.

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o

R D E R

AND NOW I this 15th day of Aprill 2013 1 upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment

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the Court

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upon

review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision l denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under Subchapter
II of the Social Security Act l 42 U.S.C. §401 1 et seq'l and denying
plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act l 42 U.S.C. §1381 1 et seq'l
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and I accordinglYI affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

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48 F.3d

1141 117 (3d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Sullivanl 970 F.2d 1178 1 1182

(3d Cir. 1992)

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cert. denied sub nom.

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507 U.S. 924 (1993); Brown v.

Bowen l 845 F.2d 1211 / 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
1

See also Berryv. Sullivanl

738 F. Supp. 942, 944

(W.D. Pa. 1990)

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d700, 705

(3dCir. 1981)).1

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The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's various arguments that the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding him to be not disabled, and finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's arguments are based on several false premises. For instance, he
states that the ALJ erred "when she relied upon the opinions of a non-examl.nl.ng
physician over those from two treating sources and two consultative examiners. Doc.
NO.9 at 21. He further states that "the ALJ erred by failing to recognize that
the only evidence that materially contradicts the findings of the examining and
treating sources in this matter is the opinions offered by a non-examining physician.
Id. at 10. These statements seem to imply that the only evidence in the record on
which the ALJ could have based her opinion were the various opinions from the treating,
examining, and reviewing professionals contained primarily in checkbox forms. To
the contrary, the record in this case is very well-developed, and contains a plethora
of evidence regarding Plaintiff's treatment for his mental impairments, including
treatment notes, Global Assessment of Functioning scores, and records of
non-compliance. The ALJ' s very thorough opinion relies almost exclusively on these
records, and not on the opinion of the state reviewing agent, in determining the
weight to give to the checkbox opinions submitted by Drs. Charles Cohen, Renata
Jurczak, and Anita LaLumere, and by Mr. Joseph Murdoch.
II

II

Despite Plaintiff's emphasis on the opinion evidence, forms such as those
submitted here, requiring the completing physician merely to "check a box or fill
in a blank," rather than provide a substantive basis for the conclusions stated,
are considered "weak evidence at best in determining whether the claimant is
disabled. Masonv. Shalala, 994F.2d1058, 1065 (3dCir.1993). TheALJ'sdecision
focused far more on the obj ective medical evidence, and substantial evidence supports
her well-reasoned rationale as to why these records do not support the opinions
contained in the record setting forth very restrictive limitations. This was not
a "battle of opinions" where the ALJ simply chose to credit one opinion over four
others; rather, she considered all of the opinions in light of the clinical findings.
Where as here, a treating physician's medical opinions are internally inconsistent
or generally inconsistent with the totality of the record, the ALJ can assign such
weight to the opinions as she finds to be warranted. See Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.
Appx. 210, 213 (3d Cir. 2004) i 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) (3) and (4) i 20 C.F.R. §§
416.927(c) (3) and (4). The Court further notes that the ALJ did not discount the
opinion of Dr. LaLumere in its entiretYI but rather afforded considerable weight
to aspects of the opinion and thoroughly explained her reasons for doing so.
ll

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Moreover, even if Plaintiff were correct that the ALJ's decision was based

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on crediting the opinion of the state reviewing agent over those of Drs. Cohen,
Jurczak, and LaLumere, and Mr. Murdoch - which, as explained above, he is not
he incorrectly asserts that this would amount to error as a matter of law. Plaintiff
is correct, of course, that when assessing a claimant's application for benefits,
the opinion of the claimant's treating physician generally is to be afforded
significant weight.
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001);
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). In fact, the regulations provide
that a treating physician's opinion is to be given "controlling weight" so long as
the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (2) i 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (2) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d
at 43; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. As a result, the Commissioner may reject a treating
physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence,
and not on the basis of the Commissioner'S own judgment or speculation, although
he may afford a treating physician's opinion more or less weight depending upon the
extent to which supporting explanations are provided. See
186 F. 3d at 429.
However, it is also important to remember that:
The ALJ
not treating or examining physicians or State
agency consultants -- must make the ultimate disability and
RFC determinations. Although treating and examining
physician opinions often deserve more weight than the
opinions of doctors who review records" [t] he law is clear
. . . that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind
the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity [.]" Brown v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir.2011). State agent
opinions merit
ficant consideration as well.
Chandlerv. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 667F.3d356, 361 (3dCir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted in part) (emphasis added). Although, in general, "the opinions of a doctor
who has never examined a patient have less probative force as a general matter, than
they would have had if the doctor had treated or examined him, Morales v. Apfel,
225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted), where "the opinion
of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining
physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit.
Id. at 317. See also
Barnhardt, 129 Fed. Appx. 715, 718-19 (3d Cir. 2005). The ALJ, of course, '''cannot
rej ect evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, ,
225 F. 3d at 317
(quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429), and can only give the opinion of a non-treating,
non-examining physician weight insofar as it is supported by evidence in the case
record, considering such factors as the supportability of the opinion in the evidence,
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, including other medical
opinions, and any explanation provided for the opinion.
SSR 96 6p, 1996 WL 374180
(S.S.A.), at *2 (July 2, 1996).
II

II

II

The Court cannot, therefore, simply as a matter of law find that the ALJ was
required to give more weight to the opinions of Drs. Cohen, Jurczak, and LaLumere,
and Mr. Murdoch than to the state reviewing agent. While there are undoubtedly many
situations where crediting the opinion of a reviewing agent over those of mUltiple
treating and conSUlting health care professionals would be improper, the decision
in this case was extremely thorough in explaining the rationale for doing so. Unlike
the decision of the first ALJ in this case, this ALJ explained in great detail why
the obj ective medical evidence was more consistent wi th the reviewing agent's opinion

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.8) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

than with those of the treating and consultative sources. In a case like this, it
would not be unwarranted to give more weight to the non-examining professional's
op~n~on.
SeeSalernov. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed. Appx. 208 (3dCir. 2005)
(affirming an ALJ' s decision to credit the opinion of the non-examining state agency
reviewing psychologist because his opinion was more supported by the record than
the opinions of the treating physician and the consultative examiner). Regardless,
as explained above, the ALJ's decision relies on far more than the non-examining
reviewer's opinion, relying, instead, primarily on the objective medical evidence
and, at least in part, on the opinion of Dr. LaLumere.
Under these circumstances, especially given the ALJ' s thorough and persuasive
discussion of the record evidence and her basis for treating the various opinions
as she does, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports her decision.

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