DERR v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by DAVID J. DERR, and re 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 02/21/2013. (lmt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID J. DERR,
Plaintiff,

12cv1030
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff David J. Derr (“Derr”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”), denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental
security income (“SSI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”) [42
U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383f]. The matter is presently before the Court on Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment filed by the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. ECF
Nos. 10 & 12. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12) will be granted, and Derr’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) will be
denied.
II.

Procedural History
Derr protectively applied for DIB and SSI benefits on February 26, 2009, alleging that he

had become “disabled” beginning on July 15, 2008. R. 124, 129. Pennsylvania’s Bureau of
Disability Determination (“Bureau”) denied the applications on October 16, 2009. R. 50-76.
Derr responded on December 2, 2009, by requesting an administrative hearing. R. 77-78. On

February 7, 2010, a hearing was held in Mars, Pennsylvania, before Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) John J. Porter. R. 23-49. Derr, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified
at the hearing. R. 26-46. Fred A. Monaco, Ph.D. (“Monaco”), an impartial vocational expert,
also testified at the hearing. R. 57-59. In a decision dated March 24, 2011, the ALJ determined
that Derr was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. R. 9-19.
On May 24, 2011, Derr sought administrative review of the ALJ’s decision by filing a
request for review with the Appeals Council. R. 7-8. The Appeals Council denied the request
for review on June 8, 2012, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the “final decision” of the
Commissioner in this case. R. 1. Derr commenced this action on July 24, 2012, seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision. ECF No. 1. Derr and the Commissioner filed CrossMotions for Summary Judgment on November 30, 2012, and December 3, 2012, respectively.
ECF Nos. 10 & 12. Those motions are the subject of this memorandum opinion.
III.

Standard of Review
This Court’s review is plenary with respect to all questions of law. Schaudeck v.

Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). With respect
to factual issues, judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision
is “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46
(3d Cir. 1994). A United States District Court may not undertake a de novo review of the
Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v.
Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-1191(3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention
that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “does not
mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court “would
have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999). “Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v.
Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).
In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a “medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any
‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777
(3d Cir. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered to be
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity “only if his [or her] physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or
her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative law judge must do more than
simply state factual conclusions. He or she must make specific findings of fact. Stewart v.
Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The administrative
law judge must consider all medical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate
explanations for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d
955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated

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rule making authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose
of determining whether a claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. The United
States Supreme Court has summarized this process as follows:
If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will
not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability
unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find
non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,”
defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the
impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant
qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the
list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the
claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is
determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth,
and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether
the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Factual findings pertaining
to all steps of the sequential evaluation process are subject to judicial review under the
“substantial evidence” standard. McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, 370 F.3d 357,
360-361 (3d Cir. 2004).
In an action in which review of an administrative determination is sought, the agency’s
decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the agency in
making its decision. In Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947), the Supreme Court explained:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with
a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized
to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more
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adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized the applicability
of this rule in the Social Security disability context. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7
(3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court’s review is limited to the four corners of the ALJ’s decision.
Cefalu v. Barnhart, 387 F.Supp.2d 486, 491 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
IV.

The ALJ’s Decision
In denying Derr’s request for benefits, the ALJ determined that Derr did not have an

impairment (or combination of impairments) that met or equaled the criteria of any impairment
in the listing of impairments. More specifically, he noted that Derr’s mental impairments were
the only impairments of record that could be reasonably considered for purposes of meeting or
equaling a listed impairment. R. 14. Relying upon the medical evidence supplied by Dr. Uran,
Dr. Croyle, and the progress notes of Derr’s treating physician, Dr. Lockward1, the ALJ found
that Derr had “at worst, only moderate limitations of functioning for purposes of any of the Part
‘B’ criteria.” R. 15.
The ALJ relied in part in Dr. Lockward’s progress notes but not on Dr. Lockward’s
assessment of Derr’s limitations as they related to his work capabilities because Derr failed to
provide Dr. Lockward with “an accurate and reliable history as to his drug and alcohol abuse[.]”
R. 15.
The ALJ explained that in order to satisfy the Part “B” criteria, Derr’s mental
impairments, taken singly or in combination, had to “result in at least two of the following:
1

It is noted that the ALJ referred to Dr. Lockward as “Dr. Lockwood” throughout his written decision.
However, it is clear to this Court from the context of the ALJ’s decision, as well as the references the ALJ
made to the exhibits which included the actual medical records, that the ALJ was referring to Dr.
Lockward whenever he wrote “Dr. Lockwood.”

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marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; or repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.” R. 15. He defined “marked limitation”
as “more than moderate but less than extreme.” R. 15. He defined “repeated episodes of
decompensation” as “three episodes within one year, or an average of once every 4 months, each
lasting for at least 2 weeks.” R. 15.
Insofar as Derr’s activities of daily living, the ALJ found that he was moderately
restricted. R. 15. With respect to social functioning, concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ
noted that Derr had only moderate difficulties. R. 15. The ALJ found that Derr only
experienced one to two episodes of decompensation. R.15. Thus, based on these findings, the
ALJ concluded that the “paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied – meaning that Derr did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 14-15.
With regard to Derr’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that Derr could
“perform light work as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that, during any
given 8-hour work day, [Derr]” is additionally limited as follows: “[F]requently lift twenty
pounds; sit for six hours; stand or walk for six hours; [Derr] needs a sit/stand option; [Derr] is
limited to performing routine and repetitive work not performed in a fast-paced production
environment; and [Derr] can have only occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and
the general public.” R. 15. In reaching the conclusion about Derr’s residual functional capacity,
the ALJ first determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable mental
impairment(s) – shown by medically accepted clinical and diagnostic techniques – which could
produce Derr’s pain or other symptoms. R. 15-16. The ALJ concluded, based on the medical

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evidence presented, that Derr’s medically determinable mental impairments could reasonably
have caused his alleged symptoms.
However, once the ALJ made this determination, he was required to evaluate the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Derr’s symptoms to determine the extent to which
they limited his ability to function. R. 16. In this regard, the ALJ found that the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of Derr’s symptoms were not substantiated by the objective
medical evidence. R. 16. Next, the ALJ considered Derr’s credibility with respect to his
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms, and found
that Derr was not credible, “primarily due to the discrepancy between [Derr’s] testimony,
especially about his drug and alcohol history, and the objective medical evidence of record.” R.
16.
In rendering the factual findings and legal conclusions about Derr’s residual function
capacity, the ALJ described, in great detail, his reliance upon Derr’s treating physician (Dr.
Lockward). The ALJ specifically noted that following Derr’s hospitalization from January 29 to
February 3, 2009, for anxiety, panic, depression, and a history of substance abuse, Dr. Lockward
became Derr’s primary mental health specialist. R. 16. The ALJ noted that Dr. Lockward’s
“extensive progress notes,” which document the doctor’s mental examinations of Derr all
indicated that Derr was “not showing any significant abnormalities.” R. 16-17. Thus, the ALJ
determined that “construing the evidence in a light most favorable to [Derr] . . . he has had only
moderate limitations and his mental functioning has been stable . . . .” R. 17. The ALJ further
found that Dr. Lockward’s progress notes did not indicate that Derr had “any significant mental
work-related limitation of functioning” and further found that the mental health, medical source
statement Dr. Lockward completed – which made statements contrary to his own

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contemporaneous findings set forth in his progress notes – to be “ambiguous, and as such, is all
but without merit or probative value.” R. 17.
The ALJ also considered medical evidence from Dr. Uran, who performed a
“consultative psychological evaluation of [Derr].” The ALJ noted that Dr. Uran determined that
Derr’s “mental capacity was diminished to the extent that, in relevant part, [Derr] has marked
limitations dealing with work pressure and interacting with the public.” R. 17. Dr. Uran found
that Derr had a GAF score of 55. R. 17. The ALJ noted that pursuant to the DSM-IV a GAF
score of 55 placed Derr “at worst, [with] moderate, mental, work-related limitations of
functioning . . .” which the ALJ found to be consistent with the overall, credible evidence of
record. R. 17. Finally, the ALJ noted that the medical history Derr provided to Dr. Uran (i.e.,
becoming depressed when he had to quit working to take care of family members) illustrates the
situational nature of his mental problems. R. 17.
The ALJ’s finding that Derr’s mental problems were/are situational is supported by the
history provided to Dr. Uran, the consultative psychologist, and by Dr. Lockward’s progress
notes which clearly indicate that Derr was only seeing his treating physician on an “episodic”
basis. R. at 17.
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Croyle (the state agency psychologist) found that Derr had
moderate limitations of functioning in activities of daily living; moderate limitations of
functioning in maintaining social functions, as well as in his concentration, persistence and pace;
and no episodes of decompensation. R. 18. The ALJ found Dr. Croyle to be credible. R. 18.
With respect to Derr’s testimony, the ALJ specifically found that Derr testified that he
was not using drugs or alcohol “when he was hospitalized in January/March of 2009[,]” but the
“medical evidence of record at that time” showed that Derr “was indeed engaging in alcohol and

8

drug abuse.” R. 18. Although the ALJ specifically noted that Derr’s abuse of substances was not
material to the ALJ’s decision, it was relevant to the ALJ’s decision that Derr was not credible at
the hearing in this matter and with Dr. Lockward, thereby undermining the weight to be given to
Dr. Lockward’s opinions. R. 18.
Based on the progress notes of Dr. Lockward, as well as the GAF score derived by Dr.
Uran, and the findings of Dr. Croyle, the ALJ determined that Derr, who was first hospitalized in
January of 2009, and who had not been re-hospitalized since March of 2009, had remained
“stable” enough “so as to have performed sustained work activity within the parameters of his
residual functional capacity at all times relevant to [the ALJ’s] decision.” R. 18.
Finally the ALJ noted that the vocational expert opined that Derr could perform his past
relevant work as a packer. R. 19. Furthermore, the ALJ found that even if Derr could not
perform his past packer work, he could “nonetheless perform a substantial number of jobs in
existence in the national economy” such as an abrasive machine operator, a bench assembler, and
a machine feeder. R. 19. The ALJ found no credible evidence of record to support the
hypothetical question that Derr would be absent from work every other day. R. 19.
As a result of these findings and conclusions, the ALJ ultimately concluded that Derr had
not been under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act from July 18, 2008, through the
date of his decision (March 24, 2011). R. 19.
V.

Discussion
Although the Commissioner and Derr filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the

sole issue before this Court is whether there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
decision that Derr was not disabled.

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Derr contends the ALJ failed to properly consider medical evidence and improperly
determined that Derr was not credible. Conversely, the Commissioner contends that substantial
evidence of record supports the ALJ’s decision, including the manner in which he weighed the
medical evidence as well as Derr’s credibility.
Because this Court is being asked to review the factual basis upon which the ALJ based
his decision (which the Commissioner affirmed), judicial review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner’s decision is “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). As noted above, this Court cannot
undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision, nor re-weigh the evidence of record.
Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-1191(3d Cir. 1986). The Court
acknowledges that “the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones
v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).
A. The Medical Evidence
Derr first contends that the ALJ incorrectly discredited Dr. Lockward’s
opinions/assessments when the ALJ found the doctor’s progress notes incongruent with the
doctor’s opinions/assessments. Instead of pointing out how Dr. Lockward’s progress notes
(upon which the ALJ relied in concluding Derr was not entitled to benefits), in fact, substantiated
Dr. Lockward’s opinions concerning Derr’s inability to function in a workplace setting, Derr
argues that progress notes serve a different purpose than an opinion assessment. Although this
Court agrees that a doctor’s progress notes serve a different purpose than an evaluation,
assessment, or opinion, a doctor’s notes must still substantiate his or her evaluation, assessment
or opinion.

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Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Lockward’s progress notes did not support the opinions set
forth in his assessment. Moreover, Dr. Lockward’s progress notes were compatible with and/or
consistent with the findings of Dr. Uran, a consultative psychologist, and Dr. Croyle, the state
agency psychologist. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in giving greater weight to
Dr. Lockward’s progress notes and less weight (if any) to his assessment.
Next, Derr ascribes great weight to the ALJ’s finding that his depression was
“situational” and not long-standing. Doc. no. 11, p. 7. Although this Court notes that the ALJ
stated in his decision that Derr’s “mental problems, have been at worst, only situational[,]” this
statement was made with respect to the history Derr himself provided to Dr. Uran. The Court
further notes that the ALJ’s finding in this regard is bolstered by is review of the entire medical
record which included Dr. Lockward’s records which also indicate that Derr was only seen by
Dr. Lockward – his treating physician – on an “episodic” basis. Finally, this Court concludes
that the ALJ’s finding with respect to the situational or episodic nature of Derr’s mental status is
only one of the many medical factors the ALJ considered in reaching the conclusion that Derr
had the residual functional capacity to perform light work with some additional limitations.
Next, Derr attempts to argue that during the hearing in this matter he testified that he
suffered from anxiety attacks six months prior to his quitting the job he held for 15 years, and
that he was fired from his last two jobs for missing work as a result of his emotional condition.
Although this Court could address this argument in the next section of this Opinion concerning
Derr’s credibility, the Court notes at this juncture that Derr admitted to more than one medical
doctor that he quit his job of 15 years because he had to provide care for ailing family members.
Additionally, Derr argues that the ALJ erred in finding his ability to work for 15 years
was inconsistent with Dr. Lockward’s assessment wherein Dr. Lockward opined that Derr had

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poor ability to follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public, interact with
supervisors, deal with stress in a usual work setting, and maintain concentration. Doc. No. 11, p.
7-8. However, this Court notes that the ALJ’s opinion discounts Dr. Lockward’s assessment
(and the opinions contained therein) because Derr failed to provide Dr. Lockward with a
complete history – especially concerning his history of alcohol and drug abuse – and because Dr.
Lockward’s progress notes, along with the GAF score Dr. Uran derived, do not support Dr.
Lockward’s assessment. The Court thus finds that the ALJ’s decision discounting Dr.
Lockward’s assessment of Derr is not predicated upon the ALJ’s finding that the assessment is
inconsistent with Derr’s 15-year work history.
With respect to the amount of emphasis the ALJ placed upon Derr’s failure to notify Dr.
Lockward of his history of drug and alcohol abuse (see doc. no. 11, p. 10-11), Derr seems to
believe that because he was not directly asked by his treating psychologist (Dr. Lockward) about
his drug and alcohol history, he was under no obligation to disclose this information. Ignoring
the credibility problem Derr created for himself in failing to affirmatively disclose this
information to his treating physician for a moment, the Court finds that the ALJ correctly noted
that Derr’s failure to affirmatively disclose this information caused Dr. Lockward to render an
assessment replete with opinions predicated on incomplete information. If the ALJ had found to
the contrary, and determined that Dr. Lockward would have rendered the same exact opinions in
his assessment if presented with Derr’s complete medical mental history, would have been pure
guesswork.
Finally, Derr contends that the ALJ erred when he found that Dr. Uran’s assessment
indicating that Derr had marked limitations was consistent with the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity determination. Doc. no. 11, p. 11. However, as the Commissioner points out (see doc.

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no. 13, p. 11), the ALJ did note that Dr. Uran assessed that Derr could understand, remember,
and carry out simple instructions. The law in this regard indicates that a person does not have
marked limitations if he can sustain and persist at simple tasks but has difficulty with
complicated tasks. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P., App. 1, Pt. A, § 12.00(C)(3). Given that the
ALJ noted, and Derr does not dispute, that Dr. Uran determined that Derr’s GAF score was 55,
and given that a GAF score of 55 indicates only moderate limitation, the Court finds that the ALJ
did not err as a matter of law when finding that Dr. Uran’s assessment supported the ALJ’s
overall finding that Derr did not have marked limitations.
Accordingly, based on the above law and arguments presented by Derr and the
Commissioner, the arguments advanced by Derr related to the medical evidence provide no basis
for disturbing the ALJ’s decision.
B. Derr’s Credibility
Derr next suggests that the ALJ’s decision (and the Commissioner’s affirmance) was
predicated upon the erroneous conclusion reached by the ALJ that Derr was not credible. Derr
claims that the ALJ’s only reason for discounting his testimony was due to “his statements
regarding his drug and alcohol usage.” Doc. no. 11, p. 13-14. Derr suggests that his statements
concerning his drug and alcohol usage should be “deemed credible” because his usage “was not
abusive or material during the relevant period of time.” Id.
It is important to note, as the Commissioner points out in his brief (see doc. no. 13, p. 14),
that the ALJ found Derr to be not fully credible in part because he omitted his history of alcohol
and drug abuse to Dr. Lockward, but also because Derr testified he quit working because of his
mental condition, yet he told others (including Dr. Uran) that he quit working to take care of
ailing relatives. R. 17. The Court also notes that the ALJ specifically found that Derr testified

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that he was not using drugs or alcohol “when he was hospitalized in January/March of 2009” but
the “medical evidence of record at that time” showed that Derr “was indeed engaging in alcohol
and drug abuse.” R. 18.
Finally, the Court also notes, and the Commissioner alludes to this as well, that the ALJ
did not find Derr to be fully credible, because of all three of these transgressions, however, he
did not find that Derr’s drug and alcohol history was material to the decision. Rather it is clear
from the ALJ’s opinion that Derr’s failure to provide his complete mental history (which would
have included his drug and alcohol use/abuse) could have affected Dr. Lockward’s assessment of
him. In addition, because Derr testified at the hearing concerning his drug and alcohol use and
this testimony was inconsistent with the information he provided to Sharon Hospital upon his
admission in 2009, the ALJ had a sound basis to reject Derr’s subjective testimony. Thus, it is
clear from the record in this case why the ALJ found Derr’s testimony not to be fully credible.
See, Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.1999) (An ALJ may
reject a claimant’s subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he explains why
he is rejecting the testimony.).
VI.

Conclusion
The Commissioner’s “final decision” denying Derr’s applications for DIB and SSI

benefits are “supported by substantial evidence” and will be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Derr’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) will be denied, and the Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) will be granted. An appropriate order will follow.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc:

All counsel of record
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