SNATCHKO v. PETERS TOWNSHIP et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT granting 26 Motion to Dismiss; granting 28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 35 Motion to Dismiss; denying 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 04/23/13.(mcp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT E. SNATCHKO, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETERS TOWNSHIP, OFFICER MARK E.
MADEY, STEVE VASKO, INC. trading and doing
business as VASKO DODGE, WILLIAM VASKO
and JOHN VASKO,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court are the MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANTS STEVE VASKO, INC., t/d/b/a VASKO DODGE,
WILLIAM VASKO, AND JOHN VASKO (ECF No. 26) with brief in support (ECF No. 27); the
MOTION TO PARTIALLY DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 28)
with brief in support (ECF No. 29) filed by the Township Defendants; the SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANTS STEVE VASKO,
INC., t/d/b/a VASKO DODGE, WILLIAM VASKO, AND JOHN VASKO, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 33) with brief in support
(ECF No. 34); and the DEFENDANTS PETERS TOWNSHIP’S AND OFFICER MARK E.
MADEY’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IN ITS
ENTIRETY (ECF No. 35) with brief in support (ECF No. 36). Plaintiff filed a responsive brief
in opposition (ECF No. 39) in which he addresses and disputes all of the pending motions; the
Township Defendants (ECF No. 40) and the Vasko Defendants (ECF No. 41) filed reply briefs.
As a threshold matter, this Court must first decide whether to treat the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Generally, “to the extent that [a] court considers evidence beyond the complaint in
deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, it is converted to a motion for summary judgment.” Anjelino v. New
York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999). However, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, a court may look beyond the complaint to matters of public record, including court
files and records, and documents referenced in the complaint or are essential to a plaintiff’s
claim. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993).
Appended to the briefs submitted by the Defendants is the verdict slip for the non-jury
criminal trial held in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania on
January 30, 2013. The Court takes judicial notice of this public record and declines Defendants’
invitation to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
I.
Background
The parties, counsel, and the Court are familiar with the background of this case and,
therefore, the Court will not recite the facts at any length again. See Snatchko v. Peters Twp.,
2:12-CV-1179, 2012 WL 6761369 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2012) (ECF No. 23). The following is
only a brief recitation of the procedural history salient to the issues presently before the Court.
Plaintiff commenced this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the filing of
a seven-count Complaint in which he alleges various federal and state law claims. Shortly after
service of process, all Defendants named in the initial Complaint filed their respective Rule
12(b)(6) motions.
By a Memorandum Opinion dated December 28, 2012, the Court granted in part and
denied in part the motions and provided Plaintiff with leave to amend. At the conclusion of that
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opinion, the Court noted that “[i]f Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, it will be
important to address the shortcomings previously discussed to assure that it contains sufficient
factual allegations to render the claim ‘plausible’ in compliance with the pleading standard set forth
and explained in Twombly and Iqbal.” (ECF No. 23 at 28). The Court likewise cautioned that
“[s]hould Plaintiff fail to heed this instruction, dismissal of certain claims with prejudice may
follow.” Id.
Plaintiff seemingly embraced the opportunity to cure the initial pleading deficiencies,
submitting a seven-count Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) approximately two weeks later.
The Amended Complaint sets forth claims for (1) False Arrest against Plaintiff Mark E. Madey;
(2) Municipal Liability against Peters Township; (3) Civil Conspiracy against all of the
remaining named Defendants; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all of the
remaining individual Defendants; (5) Defamation against all of the remaining individual
Defendants; (6) Assault against John Vasko; and (7) Battery against John Vasko.
The filing of Rule 12(b)(6) Motions once again followed. Initially, Defendants sought
dismissal of the civil conspiracy count based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with the
Court’s Order to set forth sufficient factual allegations in support of his claims. Defendants soon
filed a motion for leave to supplement their respective motions based on the outcome of a related
state court criminal proceeding arising from the underlying events of this civil lawsuit.
More specifically, after a non-jury trial was held before Judge Katherine B. Emery of the
Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, that court found Plaintiff guilty of the crimes of
Criminal Mischief (M2), 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(a)(5) and Simple Assault (M2), 18 PA
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701(a)(3) and not guilty of the crimes of Terroristic Threats (M1), 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706(a)(1) and Recklessly Endangering Another Person (M2), 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2705. To the Defendants, that verdict now estops Plaintiff from challenging the
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validity of his arrest and his criminal charges under the doctrine established in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Likewise, the Township Defendants also advance the position
that the Monell claim necessarily fails because there is no underlying constitutional violation.
Plaintiff disagrees that the Heck doctrine easily disposes of this matter. Rather, citing to
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), Plaintiff argues that “this Court must analyze whether the
facts as alleged in his false arrest suit necessarily and materially impugn [his] misdemeanor
conviction.” (ECF No. 39 at 11). Plaintiff proposes that the Court answer this inquiry in his
favor for two reasons: (1) “[he] was acquitted on the more serious charges, reckless
endangerment and terroristic threats, and thus those charges were decided in his favor;” and (2)
“it is the terroristic threats charge that forms the gravamen of Plaintiff’s section 1983 case.”
(ECF No. 39 at 11).
The Court now turns to the pending motions to dismiss filed by both the Vasko
Defendants and the Township Defendants.
II.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept
all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor
of the plaintiff. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir.
2010)). However, as the Supreme Court of the United States made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, such “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
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The Supreme Court later refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, emphasizing the
requirement that a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief in order to survive a motion
to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Nevertheless, “the
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” but requires a plaintiff to show
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
To determine the legal sufficiency of a complaint after Twombly and Iqbal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that a district court must take a three step
approach when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that although Iqbal describes the
process as a “two-pronged approach,” it views the case as outlining three steps) (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). First, “the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675) (alteration in original). Second, the
court “should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Third, “‘where there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679).
Accordingly, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and
“accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but [ ] disregard rote recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” James v.
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City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220-21). The Court “must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.’ In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678). The determination
for “plausibility” will be “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
However, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal changed the other pleading standards for a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the requirements of Rule 8 must still be met. See
Phillips v. Co. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). The
Supreme Court did not abolish the Rule 12(b)(6) requirement that “the facts must be taken as
true and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff
can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on those merits.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553). Rule 8 also still requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
While this standard “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ [ ] it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation” and a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 544-55). Simply put, Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
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III.
Discussion
Pleaded in the Amended Complaint are three federal civil rights claims and four pendant
state law causes of action. For the reasons that follow, the motion(s) to dismiss will be granted
as to the federal claims and the common law counts will be dismissed without prejudice.
A. Federal Claims
Generally speaking, Heck controls whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and
civil conspiracy may survive and potentially impacts the Monell claim by extension. In Heck,
the Supreme Court of the United States announced the following rule:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted and emphasis in original). The Supreme Court “rested this
conclusion upon ‘the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.’” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
392 (2007) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486).
Here, Plaintiff has made no such showing, and the guiding principal of Heck instead leads
the Court to give the state court convictions preclusive effect such that he may not maintain §
1983 claims for false arrest or civil conspiracy. An ultimate judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his
federal civil rights claim would imply that he was unconstitutionally arrested and questionably
subjected to the prosecutorial force of the Washington County District Attorney’s Office when,
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in fact, Judge Emery found him guilty of the crimes of criminal mischief and simple assault.1
The Court will not permit Plaintiff to relitigate this matter in the face of those two criminal
convictions stemming from conduct that forms the very basis of this civil suit. Put differently,
the facts alleged in his § 1983 claims do not necessarily and materially impugn the findings of
guilt on the charges. Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate.
Even if the Court wholly disregards any application of Heck and solely focuses on the
federal pleading standards, the result would not change. Once again, Plaintiff’s cursory legal
conclusions dressed up as factual allegations simply do not comport with the federal standards to
state a plausible claim for relief. The Court will therefore grant the motions to dismiss Count
One and Count Three of the Amended Complaint.
The only substantial question that remains is what effect this ruling has on the Monell
claim. Axiomatically, Plaintiff cannot establish any Monell liability against Defendant Peters
Township absent an underlying constitutional violation. C.f. Stiegel v. Peters Twp., 2:12-CV00377, 2012 WL 3096663, *6 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2012) (“It is black letter law that without an
underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot as a matter of law establish any Monell
liability.”); Verbanik v. Harlow, CIV.A. 09-448, 2012 WL 4378198, *9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25,
2012) aff’d, 12-3887, 2013 WL 310237 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2013) (“Of importance, however, is that
the absence of an underlying constitutional violation precludes any supervisory liability on a
‘knowledge or acquiescence’ or ‘failure to train’ theory.”) (citations omitted). Because the Court
holds that there can be no underlying constitutional violation, it will likewise grant the motion to
dismiss Count Two of the Amended Complaint.
1. Even though Plaintiff was convicted of those crimes, the Amended Complaint avers that Madey knew or should
have known that the “Vaskos’ claims that Plaintiff had committed criminal acts, i.e., criminal mischief, terroristic
threats and reckless endangerment were false.” (ECF No. 25 at 14). Plaintiff also attempts to implicate the
Washington County District Attorney’s Office in the Amended Complaint, pleading that Madey was carrying out its
directive to afford the Vasko Defendants with “‘police protection’ from consumer complaints.” Id.
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B. State Law Claims
The remaining four causes of action are based on Pennsylvania law. Jurisdiction over
supplemental claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides that “the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.” The Court has discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, however, if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that, where all federal claims are dismissed before trial, “the district court must
decline to decide the . . . state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco,
204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780,
788 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original)). Finding no such justification, the Court will dismiss
the state law claims without prejudice.
C. Leave to Amend
If a civil rights complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must
permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A district court must provide the plaintiff with this
opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.
In non-civil rights cases,
however, a plaintiff must seek leave to amend and submit a draft amended complaint. Fletcher–
Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2007).
Under the circumstances of this matter, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend
as it would be futile.
The Court has already provided Plaintiff’s counsel a reasonable
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opportunity to cure the pleading defects present in the original Complaint, specifically placing
him on notice of the deficiencies. Accordingly, dismissal of the federal claims without leave to
amend is justified in this matter.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s federal claims and will dismiss the remaining state law claims without prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT E. SNATCHKO, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETERS TOWNSHIP, OFFICER MARK E.
MADEY, STEVE VASKO, INC. trading and doing
business as VASKO DODGE, WILLIAM VASKO
and JOHN VASKO,
Defendants.
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ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 23rd day of April 2013, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the MOTION TO
DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANTS STEVE VASKO, INC., t/d/b/a
VASKO DODGE, WILLIAM VASKO, AND JOHN VASKO (ECF No. 26); the MOTION TO
PARTIALLY DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 28) filed by the
Township Defendants; the SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANTS STEVE VASKO, INC., t/d/b/a VASKO DODGE,
WILLIAM VASKO, AND JOHN VASKO, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 33); and the DEFENDANTS PETERS TOWNSHIP’S
AND OFFICER MARK E. MADEY’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY (ECF No. 35) are GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART insofar as all federal claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 25) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and all pendent state law claims in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall docket this case closed.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Judge
cc:
Robert M. Owsiany
Email: rmowsiany@rmolaw.com
Paul D. Krepps
Email: pdkrepps@mdwcg.com
Estelle K. McGrath
Email: ekmcgrath@mdwcg.com
Teresa O. Sirianni
Email: tosirianni@mdwcg.com
Frank J. Lavery , Jr.
Email: flavery@laverylaw.com
Gary H. Dadamo
Email: gdadamo@laverylaw.com
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