WALLER v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss parties; and granting 11 Motion to Strike punitive damages, as explained therein. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 6/26/13. (mh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BETTY J. WALLER,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
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PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, )
AARON THORNE, individually and in his
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official capacity, and WILLIAM BATTLES,
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individually and in his official capacity,
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Defendants.
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2:12-cv-01244-TFM
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS and
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES (ECF No. 11),
with brief in support, filed by Defendants United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”),
Postmaster General Patrick R. Donahoe (“Postmaster General”), Aaron Thorne, and William
Battles. Plaintiff Betty J. Waller filed a response in opposition. The matter is ripe for
disposition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As the law requires, at this stage of the proceeding all disputed facts and inferences are to
be resolved in favor of Plaintiff, the nonmoving party.
Plaintiff, a female, was employed by the United States Postal Service as a sales and
services distribution clerk at the post office branch in Swissvale, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges
that she was discriminated against based upon her gender by Defendant Thorne, the customer
service manager at the Swissvale branch and Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. She further
alleges that Defendant Battles, the area manager of the Swissvale branch and the employee
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responsible for supervising Defendant Thorne, failed to address the purported discriminatory
treatment. On September 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed a one-count complaint alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).1
Defendants actually raise two separate issues. First, Defendants argue that the Postmaster
General, in his official capacity as chief executive officer of the Postal Service, is the only
appropriate defendant in this case and, therefore, all other defendants should be dismissed.
Second, Defendants argue that the Postal Service is an independent agency of the federal
government and is, therefore, exempt from punitive damages under Title VII. Plaintiff has
addressed both issues in her response.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all
well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of
the plaintiff. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, –––
U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1861 (2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314
(3d Cir. 2010)). However, as the United States Supreme Court made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, such “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
The United States Supreme Court later refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and
emphasized the requirement that a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief in order to
survive a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
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On January 8, 2013, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.
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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nevertheless, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’” but requires a plaintiff to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To determine the legal sufficiency of a complaint after Twombly and Iqbal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that a district court must make a three-step
approach when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that although Iqbal describes the
process as a “two-pronged approach,” it views the case as outlining three steps) (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). First, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state
a claim.” Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675) (alteration in original). Second, the court
“should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Third, “‘where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 679).
Accordingly, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and
“accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but [ ] disregard rote recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” James v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220-21). The Court “must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.’ In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC
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Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The determination
for “plausibility” will be “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
However, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal changed the other pleading standards for a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 must still be
met. See Phillips v. Co. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). The United States Supreme Court did not abolish the Rule 12(b)(6) requirement that
“the facts must be taken as true and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears
unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on those merits.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553). Rule 8 also still requires that a
pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). While this standard “does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ [ ] it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544-45). Simply put, Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL IS THE ONLY PROPER DEFENDANT IN
AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE AGAINST THE POSTAL
SERVICE UNDER TITLE VII
In her complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants: the Postal Service; Postmaster General
Donahoe; Customer Service Manager Thorne and Area Manager Battles, in both their individual
and official capacities. Defendants move to dismiss the Postal Service and Defendants Thorne
and Battles from this case by arguing that Postmaster General Donahoe, in his official capacity,
is the only proper defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Thorne and Battles may be held
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liable under Title VII in their individual capacities.
Title VII forbids workplace discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(a) explicitly extends this protection
to employees of the Postal Service and other federal entities. Pertinent to this case, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-16(c) provides that the only proper defendant in a Title VII claim filed by a federal
employee is “the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate,” in which the alleged
discrimination occurred.
Here, Plaintiff asserts, in essence, that: (1) the Postal Service is an independent “agency,”
(2) Defendant Thorne is the head of a “unit” as the customer service manager of the Postal
Service’s Swissvale branch, and (3) Defendant Battles is also the head of a “unit” as area
manager for said branch. Plaintiff’s suggested statutory interpretation has been rejected by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Postmaster General, in his official
capacity as chief executive officer of the Postal Service, is the only proper defendant in this
claim. In Wilson v. Potter, a non-precedential case involving a similar situation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Postal
Service and its employees—other than the Postmaster General—when a former employee
alleged that the Postal Service, its officials, and others had violated Title VII. 159 Fed. App’x
415, 417 (3d Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, Plaintiff may not assert any claims against Defendants Thorne or Battles in
their individual capacities. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077
(3d Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no individual liability under Title VII). Thus, the Court must
also dismiss the claims against Defendants Thorne and Battles in their individual capacities.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss and will remove the
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Postal Service, Thorne, and Battles as parties. The caption will be amended accordingly.
THE POSTAL SERVICE IS A “GOVERNMENT AGENCY” EXEMPT
FROM PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER TITLE VII
Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to recover punitive damages. Defendants argue that
the Postal Service is immune from exposure to punitive damages, due to its status as a
“government agency.”
Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a court may impose punitive damages in a Title
VII claim against an employer who “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a. Relevant to this case, a court may not impose
punitive damages against “a government, government agency or political subdivision” in a Title
VII claim. Id.
The statutory text of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 supports the contention that
the Postal Service is a government agency. See 39 U.S.C.A. § 201. In that legislation, Congress
designated the Postal Service “as an independent establishment of the executive branch of the
Government of the United States.” Id. (emphasis added). Under the plain meaning rule, “[o]ur
task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably
plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). From a plain reading of the law, this Court concludes that Congress intended the
Postal Service to be a government agency.
Indeed, Plaintiff admits in her complaint that the Postal Service “is an independent
agency of the United States government . . . .” Two courts have determined that the Postal
Service is not a government agency for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a. See Baker v. Runyon,
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922 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 114 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1997); Roy v. Runyon,
954 F. Supp. 368, 382 (D. Me. 1997). In Baker, the United States District Court for the District
of Illinois opined that “[i]f Congress had wanted to exempt the Postal Service from punitive
damages in the [Civil Rights Act of 1991], it would have mentioned it along with governmental
agencies in the same fashion it did in [42 U.S.C.A.] § 2000e–16(a).”2 Baker, 922 F. Supp. at
1299 (emphasis in original). The United States District Court for the District of Maine agreed,
having explained “that Congress could have and would have explicitly exempted the Postal
Service from amenability to punitive damages under Title VII had it intended to make the
defendant immune from this remedy in connection with discrimination claims.” Roy, 954 F.
Supp. at 383. Notably, the United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the
district court’s decision in Baker after examining the historical treatment of the Postal Service
and legislative history of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a.
Furthermore, the strong majority of “courts have continued to regard the Postal Service as
a government agency for the purposes of determining the scope of [its] liability under Title VII.”
Cleveland v. Runyon, 972 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (D. Nev. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Newbold v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 614 F.2d 46, 46 (5th Cir. 1980); Ausfeldt v. Runyon, 950 F. Supp. 478, 487-88
(N.D.N.Y. 1997); Tuers v. Runyon, 950 F. Supp. 284, 285-86 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Miller v. Runyon,
932 F. Supp. 276, 277 (M.D. Ala. 1996)). This Court agrees with the majority and holds that the
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According to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(a):
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to
aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in
section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including
employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the
United States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission, in those units of the
Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those
units of the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service,
in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing Office, the Government
Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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Postal Service is a government agency for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a. See also Wade v.
Donahoe, 2012 WL 3844380 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012); Jeffries v. Potter, 2008 WL 2607856 (D.
Del. July 1, 2008); Crumpton v. Runyon, 1998 WL 125547 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1998).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages will be
granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, Defendants’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
and MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES will both
be GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BETTY J. WALLER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
)
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, )
AARON THORNE, individually and in his
)
official capacity, and WILLIAM BATTLES,
)
individually and in his official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)
2:12-cv-01244-TFM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 26th day of June, 2013, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants’ PARTIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS and MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES (ECF No. 11) are GRANTED. The caption is amended as follows:
BETTY J. WALLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE,
United States Postmaster General,
in his official capacity,
Defendant.
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2:12-cv-01244-TFM
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Court Judge
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