PARDINI v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part [ECF No.8] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; in particular, and for the reasons set forth in accompanying Opinion, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dagbrowski, Kirakowski and John Doe with regard to the denial of medical treatment; the Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to all claims asserted against Defendants Allegheny County and Ramon C. Rustin. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 5/16/2013. (ndf )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN PARDINI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY; RAMON C.
RUSTIN; OFFICER DAGBROWSKI;
OFFICER KIRAKOWSKI; JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 12-1254
)
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
)
)
) Re: ECF No. 8
)
OPINION
KELLY, Magistrate Judge,
Plaintiff John Pardini (“Plaintiff”) filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 asserting the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights in the course of his admission
into the Allegheny County Jail. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the alleged unlawful use of
excessive force, resulting in a fractured elbow, and the subsequent denial of medical treatment
for the injury.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contending that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts against any Defendant to state a cognizable cause of action for deliberate
indifference with regard to the provision of medical treatment. Defendants also seek dismissal of
claims asserted against Ramon C. Rustin, who served as Warden of Allegheny County Jail at the
time Plaintiff’s claims arose, contending that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to
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establish Defendant Rustin’s personal involvement in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights so
as to sustain a claim against him. Finally, Defendants seek the dismissal of claims asserted
against Allegheny County on the grounds that the Complaint fails to plead the factual predicate
necessary for a claim of municipal liability for his injuries. Defendants do not seek dismissal of
the excessive force claims alleged against Defendants Dagbrowski and Kirakowski.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8] is granted in part
and denied in part.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that during the course of his admission to the Allegheny County Jail on
September 4, 2010, Defendants Dagbrowski and Kirakowski slammed his head into a door jam
and wrenched his arm behind his back until it “popped.” The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff
was then left in a cell “for hours” during which time his arm swelled, cutting off circulation to
his hand. Although he repeatedly requested medical assistance for his fractured arm, it was not
until “several hours” had passed before the arrival of an individual who identified himself as a
medical professional. Plaintiff alleges that this “John Doe” defendant looked at Plaintiff’s arm
through a cell door and proclaimed that “it looked fine.” Plaintiff was released from the
Allegheny County Jail the following morning and immediately went to a hospital, where he was
admitted because of the degree of swelling. It was determined that Plaintiff had sustained a
fracture of his elbow.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek the dismissal of a complaint or
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portion of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). In order to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading party's complaint must
provide “enough factual matter” to allow the case to move beyond the pleading stage of
litigation; the pleader must “‘nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570(2007)). The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court revisited the requirements for surviving a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Iqbal, the Supreme
Court made clear that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements [are] not suffic[ient]” to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
Id. at 678. Only “a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief [will] survive[ ] a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 679.
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided a two-part test to determine whether a claim
survives a motion to dismiss. “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for
relief.’ The plaintiff must show ‘the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible. Where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
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misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ [This] ‘plausibility’ determination will be ‘a context – specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. If a court determines that a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court
must permit a curative amendment, irrespective of whether Plaintiff seeks leave to amend, unless
such amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994). See
also Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to protection from
excessive force and deliberate indifference to his need for medical treatment were violated by
each of the Defendants. Defendants contend, however, that the allegations set forth in the
Complaint do not sufficiently state a claim for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights with regard to the
provision of medical care for his injuries. Accordingly, Defendants seek the dismissal of
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Plaintiff’s claim arising out of the alleged denial of medical care pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In
addition, Defendants Allegheny County and Warden Rustin seek the dismissal of all claims
against them because the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts regarding their personal
involvement in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
A.
Medical Treatment Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied Plaintiff medical treatment for his fractured arm,
leaving him to suffer in pain until he was released. Because of his status as a pre-trial detainee,
his denial of medical care claim will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of
Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 243–45 (1983) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, controls the
issue of whether prison officials must provide medical care to those confined in jail awaiting
trial); Hubbard v. Taylor (“Hubbard I”), 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005); King v. County of
Gloucester, 302 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2008). See also Montgomery v. Ray, 145 F. App’x 738,
740 (3d Cir. 2005) (“the proper standard for examining such claims is the standard set forth in
Bell v. Wolfish, [441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979)]; i.e., whether the conditions of confinement (or
here, inadequate medical treatment) amounted to punishment prior to adjudication of guilt ....”)
(citing Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 158).
The Fourteenth Amendment standard of unconstitutional punishment, like the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment standard, contains both an objective component and
a subjective component. Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, in
order to establish a claim, a “plaintiff must make an ‘objective’ showing that the deprivation [of
care] was ‘sufficiently serious,’ or that the result of defendant's denial was sufficiently serious.
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Additionally, a plaintiff must make a ‘subjective’ showing that defendant acted with a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir.
2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
With regard to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S 97, 104 (1976). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care,
delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a
denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v.
O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and
risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990). A serious
medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is
so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987).
Defendants assert that medical treatment was provided in the hours after Plaintiff’s injury
but that the treatment may have been merely negligent and, therefore, Plaintiff therefore does not
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.
2004)(neither claims of medical malpractice nor disagreements regarding the proper medical
treatment are actionable); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir, 1999) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105 (allegations of negligence and medical malpractice are not sufficient to
establish a Constitutional violation as the “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care
cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . .”)); and see,
Taylor v. Visinsky, 422 F. App'x 76, 78 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 406
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(2011)(allegations that the inmate was provided with medical care, but the care was
“inadequate,” fails to state a cognizable claim).
At this early stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff’s allegations of repeated requests for
medical treatment coupled with obvious but ignored excessive swelling of his arm are sufficient
to meet the minimum requirements of stating an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim. Deliberate indifference does not require a showing of complete failure to provide care,
rather “[w]here prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment ... and such
denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,’ deliberate
indifference is manifest.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Westlake v. Lucas,
537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.1976)), cited with approval in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Given the
allegations set forth in the Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim regarding the denial of medical treatment against Defendants Dagbrowski,
Kirakowski and John Doe is denied.
B. Claims Against Supervisory Defendants
Defendants also seek the dismissal of claims against Allegheny County and Ramon C.
Rustin, individually and in his capacity as Warden of the Allegheny County Jail. Defendants
contend that the Complaint does not allege sufficient personal involvement of each of these
defendants to support a viable Section 1983 claim arising out of either the use of excessive force
against inmates or the failure to provide medical treatment.
With regard to Defendant Allegheny County, Section 1983 claims against a municipal
entity are significantly different than those against individual officials. The United States
Supreme Court has held that municipalities and other local government units qualify as
“persons” subject to liability under Section 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
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690 (1978). However, a municipality cannot incur Section 1983 liability based on a theory of
respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Rather, Section 1983 imposes liability “if the governmental body
itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such
deprivation.” See Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)(quoting,
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, (1978). “[U]nder Section
1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.”’ Id., quoting Pembaur
v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
Thus, plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under Section 1983
must prove that “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the
acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically
have the force of law. Id.; Pembaur, supra, at 480–481. These are “action[s] for which the
municipality is actually responsible.” Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1359 (2011) (quoting Pembaur, supra, at 479–80). A plaintiff must show a “direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has refined these definitions,
explaining that policy or custom may be established: (1) “[w]hen a decisionmaker possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action, issues an official
proclamation, policy or edict,” or (2) through a “course of conduct ... when, though not
authorized by law, such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well-settled as to
virtually constitute law.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)
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(citations and quotations omitted); see also Anderson v. Goga, C.A. No. 11 – 528, 2011 WL
4737569 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011).
In addition, a plaintiff must show that the municipality has acted with “deliberate
indifference” to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d
1047, 1059 (3d Cir.1991). Mere negligence is not enough. Finally, the plaintiff must show that
the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. Berg v. County of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000). As the United States Supreme Court recently stated:
In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the
level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983. A municipality's
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on
a failure to train. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–823, 105 S.Ct.
2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“[A] ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate
training’ ” is “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the
constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell”). To satisfy the statute, a
municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained
employees] come into contact.” ... Only then “can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.”
Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359–60, (2011) (parallel and additional
citations omitted).
To determine the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations against Allegheny County with
regard to the adoption of a practice or custom of deliberate indifference causing his injuries, the
Court must look to the analysis that a district court in this Circuit must conduct in evaluating
whether allegations in a complaint survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The test, set forth
in Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2010), requires that the district
court initially “take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. at 130. Next,
the court should identify allegations that “are no more than conclusions” and thus, “not entitled
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to the assumption of truth.” Id. Lastly, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint formulaically alleges that Allegheny County was on notice of
past complaints regarding jail personnel using excessive force against inmates and failing to
provide inmates and detainees with adequate medical care. The Complaint further alleges in
conclusory terms that the use of excessive force and failure to provide medical treatment
constituted a pattern or practice which the County failed to rectify, and so it acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of its employees, causing Plaintiff’s injuries. [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 24-26, 2930]. The Complaint, however, does not allege the factual basis of these broad-sweeping
allegations. For example, there are no allegations of other instances of misconduct involving
Defendants Dagbrowski, Kirakowsi or John Doe sufficient to put Allegheny County on notice of
the potential for harm; nor are there allegations of routine abuse in the course of processing
inmates or responding to calls for medical assistance so as to give rise to a plausible inference
that the County acted with deliberate indifference by failing to protect Plaintiff. While discovery
may enable the Plaintiff “to uncover evidence that may support the allegations set forth in [his]
complaint, a court is not required to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged.” Evancho
v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of complaint where no basic
facts are alleged to support conclusory allegations).
In the context of the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the allegations against
Allegheny County simply do not set forth a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to a custom
or practice of unconstitutional conduct giving rise to municipal liability. See also Neil v.
Allegheny County, No. 12-0348, 2012 WL 3779182 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2012); Kipp v.
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Allegheny County, No. 11-1553, 2012 WL 1463309 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2012). Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Allegheny County as a defendant in this action is granted
without prejudice to the filing of an Amended Complaint alleging facts in support of Plaintiff’s
claims.
Similarly, Defendants argue that Defendant Warden Rustin should be dismissed because
Plaintiff has failed to allege his personal involvement in the constitutional violations suffered at
the Allegheny County Jail.
When a supervisory official is sued in a civil rights action, liability can only be imposed
if that official played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts
of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 F. A’ppx 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). See, also, Monell, supra,
(superiors of line officers who act in violation of constitutional rights may not be held liable on a
theory of vicarious liability merely because the superior had a right to control the line officer's
action); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293–1295 (3d Cir.1997), overruled in
part on other grounds by Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60
(2006) and by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998) (to hold police
chief liable under § 1983 for violating female subordinate officer's rights, she was required to
prove that he personally participated in violating her rights, that he directed others to violate her
rights, or that he had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations).
Plaintiff sets forth very few factual allegations against Defendant Rustin in the
Complaint. In particular, the Complaint lists Rustin as Warden of the Allegheny County Jail at
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the time of the events complained of and alleges broadly that he was aware of a pattern of abuse
and the unconstitutional denial of medical care and failed to prevent such customs or practices.
However, these allegations, stripped of their formulaic recitation of the elements of liability, are
devoid of facts plausibly showing Defendant Rustin’s involvement in the violation of Plaintiff’s
rights. There are no allegations that Defendant Rustin personally participated or directed others
to use excessive force against the Plaintiff or that he affirmatively adopted any particular policy
to withhold medical treatment or delay it to cause pain such that he directly caused the violation
of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Rustin had knowledge of Plaintiff’s
incarceration or his alleged injury so as to give rise to an inference that he was aware that
Plaintiff was denied medical treatment after sustaining an injury. As with Allegheny County,
Plaintiff has failed to enough factual matter to nudge his claims against Defendant Rustin “across
the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, at 570. See, also, Neil v.
Allegheny County, No. 12-0348, 2012 WL 3779182 *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2012); Kipp v.
Allegheny County, No. 11-1553, 2012 WL 1463309 * 5 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2012).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rustin are dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of an Amended Complaint alleging facts in support of Plaintiff’s claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8] is denied as to Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Dagbrowksi, Kirakowski and John Doe with regard to the denial of
medical treatment, and is granted with leave to amend as to all claims asserted against
Defendants Allegheny County and Warden Rustin.
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ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2013, upon consideration of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 8], and the briefs filed in support and opposition thereto, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Dagbrowksi, Kirakowski and John Doe with regard to the denial of medical treatment, and is
granted with leave to amend as to all claims asserted against Defendants Allegheny County and
Ramon C. Rustin.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, if any party wishes to appeal from this Order he or she must do so within
thirty (30) days by filing a notice of appeal as provided in Rule 3, Fed. R. App. P.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc:
All Counsel of Record via CM-ECF
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