FORBES v. ASTRUE

Filing 16

ORDER denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/18/2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA M. FORBES

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 12-1269

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY t
Defendant.

o R D E R
AND

NOW t

this

18th

day

of

2014,

March t

upon

consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,
the Court,
final

upon review of the Commissioner of Social Security's

decision t

denying

under Subchapter

insurance benef
Act,

42 U.S.C. §401 t

supplemental

et seq.,

securi ty

claim

plaintiff's

income

II

for

of

Social

the

disability
Security

and denying plaintiff's claim for
benef i ts

under

Subchapter XVI

of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq.t finds that the
Commissioner's
and t

findings

accordinglYt

are

affirms.

supported
See 42

by

U.S.C.

substantial
§405(g)

i

evidence

Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services t 48 F.3d
114

t

117

(3d Cir.

1182 (3d Cir. 1992)

1995);
t

Williams v.

Sullivan,

cert. denied sub nom.,

1

970

F.2d 1178 t

507 U.S. 924

(1993)

i

Brown v.

Bowen,

Berry v.

Sullivan,

supported by

845 F.2d 1211,
F.

substantial

must be affirmed,
evidence,

738

as

nor reverse,

claim differently)

a

1213

Supp.

942,

evidence,
federal

(3d Cir.
944

the

1988).

(W.D.

Pa.

Commissioner's

court may neither

See also
1990)

(if

decision

reweigh the

merely because it would have decided the

(citing Cotter v.

Harris,

642 F. 2d 700,

705

(3dCir.1981)).1

While the Court does not reach all of Plaintiff's
arguments, it does note that the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in the
record and thoroughly explained his rationale for why he gave
less than controlling weight to the treating physician opinion
rendered by Dr. Gaul.
First, it is well-established that [t]he ALJ - not treating
or examining physicians or State agency consultants - must make
the ultimate disability and RFC determinations." Chandler v.
Comm'r of Social Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e) (I), 404.1546(c)). "The law is clear ...
that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ
on the issue of functional capacity," Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d
193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2011), and a treating physician opinion
is only entitled to controlling weight if it is "well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record." Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43
Od Cir. 2001).
"If, however, the treating physician I s opinion
conflicts with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is free to
give that opinion less than controlling weight or even reject
it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains her reasons and makes a
clear record." Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed.Appx. 140,
148 Od Cir. 2007).
Second, a treating physician opinion on the ultimate issue
of disability is not entitled to any "special significance" and
an ALJ is not required to accept it since the determination of
whether an individual is disabled "is an ultimate issue reserved
to the Commissioner." Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 178 Fed.
Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006) i see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) i
SSR 96-6p.
As the ALJ thoroughly explained, Dr. Gaul's opinion that
2

Plaintiff was unable to perform sedentary or light work was not
binding on him and the ALJ was free to give his opinion less
than controlling weight so long as he adequately explained his
rationale for doing so, which the Court finds he did. The ALJ
did not outright reject Dr. Gaul's entire opinion and he more
than sufficiently discussed his reasoning for rejecting the
portions of his opinion which conflicted with his RFC
assessment. (R. 15-23).
Indeed, the ALJ cited to the fact that
Dr. Gaul's opinion was not supported by his own clinical data
and was based largely on Plaintiff's subjective complaints,
which the ALJ found to not be fully reliable given her
dishonesty regarding her drug abuse history, her admitted
history of overuse of pain medications, "and the fact that the
physicians never found any objective reason for such pain
complaints." (R. 22).
The ALJ noted that the record revealed a
"major discrepancy between what [Plaintiff] told certain
providers, her testimony and the medical evidence of record that
undermines the reliability of her testimony and her report of
symptoms to provideers." Id. .
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, "[a]n ALJ may discredit
a physician's opinion on disability that was premised largely on
the claimant's own accounts of her symptoms and limitations when
the claimant's complaints are properly discounted." Morris v.
Barnhart, 78 Fed.Appx. 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, after the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff's complaints of disabling pain
were not fully reliable - a conclusion that the Court finds is
supported by substantial record evidence -- he was entitled to
discount the portions of Dr. Gaul's opinion that were based on
Plaintiff's subjective complaints. See id. (\\[W]e find that the
ALJ properly discounted those aspects of Dr. Picciotto's opinion
that were based on Morris's subjective complaints.") .
The Court also notes that Plaintiff is mistaken in her
assertion that the "ALJ rejected the testimony of a lay witness
without explanation," (Doc. No. 13 at 5), as the ALJ
specifically stated that he gave Tiffany McMasters' testimony
"some weight" but that "nothing in her testimony would prevent
the claimant from performing substantial gainful activity within
the residual functional capacity that has been determined." (R.
21) .
Against this backdrop, the Court finds that the ALJ: (i)
properly accounted for the functional limitations that were
credibly established by the medical evidence; (ii) adequately
explained the basis for his RFC finding; and (iii) was entitled
to credit the opinion of Dr. Richless, the state agency
consultative examiner, after finding that his opinion was more
consistent with the objective medical evidence. See Myers v.
3

Therefore,
for Summary Judgment

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion
(document No.

12)

is DENIED and defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (document No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

Barnhart, 57 Fed. Appx. 990 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that ALJ did
not err in crediting opinion of state agency consultative
examiner over that of treating physician). The Court has
carefully reviewed the record and it finds that the ALJ's
ultimate determination of non-disability enjoys the support of
substantial record evidence.

4