RANKIN v. ASTRUE
Filing
11
ORDER denying 7 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 7/26/13. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRYSTAL ANN RANKIN,
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Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 12-1275
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 7
and 9). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (Docket Nos. 8 and 10). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am granting Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9) and denying
Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 7).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (ACommissioner@) denying her application for disability insurance benefits and
social security income pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed an application
for benefits on August 7, 2009, alleging she had been disabled due to various issues since
December 12, 2006. (Docket No. 5-5, pp. 1-13). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Richard E.
Guida held a hearing on February 14, 2011. (Docket No. 5-2, pp. 27-62). On March 3, 2011,
1
Carolyn W. Colvin became acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013, replacing
Michael J. Astrue.
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the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Docket No. 5-2, pp
10-21). After exhausting all of his administrative remedies thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 7 and 9).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
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The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Whether the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to Plaintiff’s treating pain
physician, Dr. Stephanie Hahn Le
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in according inadequate weight to the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating pain physician, Dr. Le.
(ECF No. 8, pp. 15-17).
The amount of weight
accorded to a treating physician’s opinions is well established.
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians' reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient's condition over a
prolonged period of time.’ ” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where
... the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non3
examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician's assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, *5 (3d Cir.
Dec. 14, 2010).
Here, Plaintiff submits that “Dr. Le’s opinions are consistent with other medical evidence
of record and that her opinions are corroborated by her findings on physical examination.” (ECF
No. 8, p. 15). To begin with, Plaintiff has misapplied the standard. It is not whether there is
evidence to support the treating doctor’s opinion. Rather, it is whether there exists contradictory
medical evidence upon which the ALJ used to reject the treating physician’s assessment.
Becker, 2010 WL 5078238 at *5.
Applying the standard correctly and upon reading the record as a whole, I find no error
on the part of the ALJ. The ALJ gave Dr. Le’s opinion less weight because “her opinion is
inconsistent with the medical evidence and the claimant’s reported activities, and appears to be
based primarily on the claimant’s subjective reporting of her symptoms.” (ECF No. 5-2, p. 18).
After a review of the entire record, I find there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision to accord Dr. Le’s opinions less weight. (ECF No. 5-16, pp. 26-32; 5-14, pp. 53-73; 510; 5-2, pp. 17). See, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527. Therefore, I find no error by the ALJ in this regard.2
C.
Whether the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility in failing to
consider her inability to afford medical treatment
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Plaintiff also argues that it was error on the part of the ALJ for using Dr. Seaman’s opinion on permanent
and total disability as a basis for rejecting Dr. Le’s opinions. (ECF No. 8, p. 16-17). After a review of the
opinion, however, I find that the ALJ did not use Dr. Seaman’s ultimate opinion on permanent and total
disability to reject Dr. Le’s opinion. Rather, he rejected Dr. Le’s opinion based on, inter alia, Dr.
Seaman’s treatment records. (ECF No. 5-2, p. 18). Therefore, I find no merit to this argument.
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Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility based on a gap
in her medical treatment from 2006 until 2009.3 (ECF No. 8, pp. 17-19). I disagree. The ALJ did
not ignore that Plaintiff did not have insurance from the onset date until 2009. In fact, the record
which the ALJ cites as evidence for the “gap” plainly states that Plaintiff was not seen for a
period of time because she “reportedly lost her insurance from 2005 until now.” (ECF No. 5-10,
p. 4).
More importantly, unlike the case cited by Plaintiff, the ALJ here did not deny benefits due to
Plaintiff’s failure to seek medical treatment.
Rather, the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
credibility in this case was based on the record as a whole including the medical evidence, her
own statements, and how her statements compared to the medical evidence. (ECF No. 5-2, pp.
16-18). Therefore, I find the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility and find no error in this
regard.
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A review of the ALJ’s opinion indicates, however, that the gaps occurred from August 2004 through
2008. (ECF No. 5-2, p. 17).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRYSTAL ANN RANKIN,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,4
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 12-1275
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 26th day of July, 2013, it is ordered that the decision of the ALJ is
affirmed and Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 7) is denied and Defendant=s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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Carolyn W. Colvin became acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013, replacing
Michael J. Astrue.
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