CAMPBELL v. ASTRUE

Filing 9

ORDER denying 5 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 7 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 4/10/2013. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DELIA M. CAMPBELL

1

)

)

Plaintiff l

)
)

vs.

)

Civil Action No. 12-1288

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE 1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 1

)
)

)

Defendant.

)

o

R D E R

AND NOW 1 this lOth day of Aprill 2013, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under Subchapter
II of the Social Security Act l 42 U.S.C. §401, et seg., and denying
plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seg.,
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g) i Jesurum

v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d
1141 117

(3d Cir. 1995) i Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182

(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993)
Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,1213 (3d Cir. 1988).

1

i

Brown v.

See also Berryv. Sullivan,

738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1Plaintiff challenges the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
regarding her mental health impairments on several grounds. While, as stated, the
Court finds that substantial evidence supports the decision, a few points require
further clarification. Plaintiff's primary argument is that the ALJ erred in not
specifically addressing the Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") scores she
received from several different treating and examining mental health care providers.
Under the facts of this case, the Court disagrees that express discussion of these
scores was necessary.
GAF scores do not directly correlate to a determination of whether an individual
is or is not disabled under the Act:
The GAF scale, which is described in the DSM-III-R (and the
DSM-IV), is the scale used in the multiaxial evaluation
system endorsed by the American psychiatric Association.
It does not have a direct correlation to the severity
requirements in our mental disorders listings.
65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764 65. While under certain circumstances a GAF score can
be considered evidence of disabi Ii ty, standing alone, a GAF score does not evidence
an impairment seriously interfering with a claimant's ability to work. See Lopez
v. Barnhart, 78 Fed. Appx. 675, 678 (10 th Cir. 2003). GAFscoresmayindicateproblems
that do not necessarily relate to the ability to hold a job. See id.; Zachary v.
Barnhart, 94 Fed. Appx. 817, 819 (loth Cir. 2004); Wilkins v. Barnhart, 69 Fed. Appx.
775, 780 (7 th Cir. 2003) i Howard v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241
(6 th Cir. 2002); Power v. Astrue, 2009 WL 578478, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2009).
Nonetheless, a GAF score is evidence that an ALJ should consider in determining a
claimant's impairments and limitations in setting forth the claimant's residual
functional capacity ("RFC") and in fashioning a hypothetical question to the
vocational expert ("VEil). See Irizarry v. Barnhart, 233 Fed. Appx. 189 (3d Cir.
2007) .
Of course, an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, see
FargJ:'loli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001), and GAF scores are not afforded
any unique status in that they must expressly be discussed and analyzed in all cases.
The Court must look at the overall context. For instance, in Gilroy v. Astrue, 351
Fed. Appx. 714 (3d Cir. 2009), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that remand
was not required where the ALJ did not reference a GAF score of 45 assigned by the
treating psychiatrist where the ALJ did refer to observations from the psychiatrist's
reports and where the psychiatrist did not explain the basis for the GAF score.

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In this case, there is no indication that Plaintiff's GAF scores related to
any specific work-related limitations. Here, as in Gilroy, none of Plaintiff's
treating physicians or psychologists offered any opinion as to whether Plaintiff
had any such limitations, nor did any of these professionals suggest that Plaintiff's
GAF scores referred to work-related impairments or restrictions. This is not,
therefore, a case where the ALJ ignored GAF scores offered by treating physicians
or psychologists in the course of rejecting limitations offered by those
professionals. Rather, the ALJ accepted their findings, including the GAF scores,
but these findings contained no evidence of any particular limi tations. Plaintiff's
GAF scores, standing alone, do not indicate whether she faces limitations in working
or what those limitations would be. While a GAF score can assist an ALJ in
understanding the limitations contained in the opinions of medical professionals,
the actual number itself does little to describe the specific functional limitations
caused by the claimant's impairments. See Howard, 276 F.3d at 241 ("While a GAF
score may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC, it is not essential
to the RFC's accuracy."). It is the limitations faced by a claimant, and not an
ambiguous GAF score, that must be included in the RFC and hypothetical. The RFC
and hypothetical question in this case contained numerous limitations based on
Plaintiff's mental health impairments, despite the fact that none of Plaintiff's
treating or examining physicians or psychologists opined that she had any
work-related limitations. Indeed, the only person to offer an opinion as to
Plaintiff's work-related limitations, Trina Christner-Renfroe, Psy.D., the state
reviewing agent, actually found fewer restrictions than were ultimately included
in the RFC by the ALJ. (R. 508-09).
Plaintiff seems to argue also that her GAF scores were somehow relevant to
the ALJ's discussion of her credibility regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms. However, she does not indicate how the GAF scores
provide support for any work-related limitations. Moreover, the ALJ' s credibility
determination was not based on a lack of evidence of serious limitations. Indeed,
she specifically found that there was "evidence that the claimant has some very
substantial limitations." (R. 28). Rather, her determination as to Plaintiff's
credibility was based primarily on Plaintiff's less than candid statements about
her drug use and her frequent instances with non-compliance with prescribed
treatment. (R. 26-27). Plaintiff's GAF scores do not bear on these issues.
Under these circumstances, there was no particular need to discuss the GAF
scores themselves. The ALJ did not rej ect the scores, or any of the medical evidence
in this case, but rather used the evidence to formulate the RFC and hypothetical
to the VE, which actually contained more restrictions than were included in the only
opinion in the record as to such limitations. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how
any of the limitations contained in the RFC are contradicted by her GAF scores.
Moreover, since a GAF score does not directly correlate to a finding of disability,
and since a GAF score can mean many things, there would be no basis for including
the score itself in the RFC. Simply put, nothing in the RFC determined by the ALJ
suggests that she rejected the scores. See Rios v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 444
Fed. Appx. 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2011) (remand not warranted where ALJ was not
cherry-picking or ignoring medical assessments that ran counter to her finding) .
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in not including restrictions
related to excessive absenteeism and excessive time off task in the hypothetical
question to the VE. However, as the ALJ explained in her decision, she did not find

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Therefore

I

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment (document No.5) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No.7) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

any foundation in the evidentiary record for such limitations. (R. 29). Although
a hypothetical question to a VE must accurately portray the claimant I s physical and
mental impairments, it need reflect only those impairments that are supported by
the record. See Chrupcala v. Heckler l 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). The
hypothetical on which the decision relied contained all of the limitations found
by the ALJ, and substantial evidence supports her findings. While Plaintiff's
attorney did proffer additional limitations regarding Plaintiff's alleged
absenteeism and time off-task in an alternative hypothetical to the VE, the ALJ did
not ultimately find such limitations.
See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123
(3d Cir. 2002) (\I [W] hile the ALJ may proffer-a variety of assumptions to the expert,
the vocational expert's testimony concerning a claimant's ability to perform
alternative employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability
if the question accurately portrays the claimant's individual physical and mental
impairments." (citing Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)).

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