O' LEARY v. ASTRUE
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER granting 7 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 9 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the court's Memorandum Judgment Order. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 8/5/13.(kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLAIRE L. O'LEARY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 12-1350
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
~~ay
AND NOW, this
the
parties'
of August, 2013, upon consideration of
cross-motions
for
summary
judgment
pursuant
to
plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of
Social
Security
("Commissioner" )
denying
in
part
her
application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title
II
of
the
Social
Security
Act
("Act"),
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.7) be, and
the same hereby is granted,
summary judgment
denied.
and the Commissioner's motion for
(Document No.9)
be,
and the same hereby is,
The case will be remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to
sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further proceedings consistent
with this Memorandum Judgment Order.
When the
Commissioner determines
that a
claimant
is not
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act, the findings leading to
such a
conclusion must
"Substantial
evidence
be based upon substantial
has
been defined as
'more
evidence.
than a
mere
~A072
(Rev. 8182)
scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate. '"
(3d Cir. 1999)
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(citation omitted).
Despite the deference to administrative decisions required by
this
standard,
reviewing
courts
,,\ retain a
responsibility
to
scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the
[Commissioner's]
evidence. '"
decision
is
not
supported
by
substantial
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310,317 (3d Cir. 2000),
quoting, Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981).
evaluating
findings,
whether
substantial
'''leniency
[should]
evidence
be
shown
supports
in
an
In
ALJ's
establishing
the
claimant's disability, and ... the [Commissioner's] responsibility
to rebut
it
[should]
,"
be strictly construed
Reefer v.
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003), quoting, Dobrowolsky
v.
Califano,
606
F.2d 403,
407
(3d Cir.
These well-
1979).
established principles dictate that the court remand this case to
the Commissioner for further proceedings as discussed herein.
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on February 13, 2009,
alleging disability beginning on December 5, 2007, due to right
leg problems, depression and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
( \\ COPD") .
request,
At plaintiff's
Plaintiff's application was denied.
an ALJ held a
hearing on February 3,
2011,
at which
plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified.
On March 31, 2011, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision
finding that plaintiff was not
sabled prior to March 3, 2010,
but became disabled on that date when her age category changed and
that she was entitled to benefits as of that time.
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
-
2
On September
6, 2012, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review
of the partially favorable decision, making the ALJ's decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff, who is a high school graduate, was 53 years old
when
she
applied
for
benefits,
which
is
classified
as
an
individual closely approaching advanced age under the regulations.
20 C.F.R. §404.1563(d).
2010,
the
date
she
Plaintiff turned 55 years old on March 3,
became
eligible
for
benefits,
which
is
considered a person of advanced age pursuant to §404.1563(e).
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an administrative
assistant, but she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
at any time since her alleged onset date of disability.
After
testimony
reviewing
from
plaintiff's
plaintiff
and
a
medical
records
vocational
and
expert,
hearing
the
ALJ
concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of
the Act prior to March 3, 2010, but she became disabled on that
date pursuant to Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06 when she turned
age 55.
At all times relevant to the decision,
the ALJ found that
plaintiff's severe impairments included traumatic arthritis of the
right knee, COPD, hypothyroidism, obesity and mood disorder, but
those impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal
the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P.
The ALJ found that plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity
to
perform
light
work
'Ilt.Aon
(Rev 8/82)
- 3
with
a
number
of
additional
limitations.
Plaintiff
requires
a
sit/stand
option,
she
is
limited to no more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching and crawling, and she is precluded from climbing ropes,
ladders or scaffolds.
to dust,
She must avoid more than moderate exposure
fumes, odors, gases, poor ventilation and temperature,
humidity and wetness extremes.
In addition, plaintiff is limited
to performing low-stress jobs in a stable environment.
She also
is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks that involve
short,
simple
instructions
decisionmaking.
contact
with
and
require
little
independent
Finally, plaintiff is restricted to occasional
the
general
public,
co workers
and
supervisors
(collectively, the "RFC Finding-) .
As a result of these limitations,
the ALJ determined that
However,
plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony,
the ALJ concluded
that
age,
prior
background,
to
work
March
3,
2010,
experience
and
plaintiff's
residual
educational
functional
capacity
enabled her to perform other work that exists in the national
economy, such as an order caller, marker and ticket seller.
As a
result, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act from her alleged disability onset date of
December 5, 2007, through March 3, 2010.
When plaintiff turned 55
years old on March 3, 2010, the ALJ found that she was disabled as
of that date by application of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 4
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A).
The impairment
or impairments must be so severe that the claimant uis not only
unable to do
[her]
previous work but cannot,
considering
[her]
age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy
42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A).
II
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.
The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3)
if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)
if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
if so,
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,
in light of
her age,
residual functional capacity.
education,
work experience and
20 C.F.R. §404 .1520 (a) (4).
If the
claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step,
further
inquiry is unnecessary.
Id.
In this case, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at step
5 that
there are other jobs available which the claimant was
capable of performing from her alleged onset date of December 5,
2007,
through
March
2,
2010
I
consistent
~A072
(Rev 8/82)
- 5
with
her
vocational
factors and residual functional capacity.l
Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ erred at step 5 because he failed to indicate what weight,
if any, he gave to the opinion of her treating physician and a
consulting physician who examined her.
For reasons explained
below, the court agrees.
Dr.
Lynn
Potts,
who was
plaintiff's
treating physician,
completed a Medical Source Statement of her ability to perform
physical work related activities.
(R. 387-90).
that
less
plaintiff
could
lift/carry
than
Dr. Potts found
ten
pounds
only
occasionally, and she could stand/walk less than two hours in an
eight hour workday with an unlimited ability to sit.
Dr.
(R. 387-88).
Potts indicated that plaintiff could never climb,
could occasionally kneel,
crouch,
crawl and stoop.
but she
(R.
388).
According to Dr. Potts' assessment, plaintiff would be limited to
sedentary work, not light work as the ALJ found.
§§404.1567(a)
and
(b)
(stating
that
lifting no more than 10 pounds at a
sedentary
time,
See 20 C.F.R.
work
involves
whereas light work
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds and may
involve a good deal of walking or standing)
with regard to Dr.
Potts'
opinion of plaintiff's physical
capabilities, the ALJ simply stated that he "fully considered the
conclusions of Dr. Potts .
. that the claimant can perform no
idual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still
is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments.
20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a) (1).
In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the
ALJ is required to consider the claimant's abil
to meet the physical,
mental, sensory and other requirements of work.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4).
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