SMITH-SCHAEFFER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING 18 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 06/13/2013. (jmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRYSTAL NICOLE SMITH-SCHAEFFER,
Plaintiff,
12cv1374
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Memorandum Order re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. No. 18)
I. Introduction
On May 10, 2013, this Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this appeal from
Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for supplemental social security income. Doc. Nos.
15 & 16. On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Doc. No. 18. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition
on June 10, 2013. Doc. No. 19. The matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees.
II. Standard of Review
The EAJA provides, in relevant part, that:
[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition
to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil
action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial
review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court
having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
The United States Supreme Court has defined “substantial justification” under the EAJA
as “justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “The government’s
position consists of both its prelitigation agency position and its litigation position.” Williams v.
Astrue, 600 F.3d 299, 302 (3rd Cir. 2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that “the government bears the burden of demonstrating substantial
justification.” Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 630 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
In order to meet this burden, the government must demonstrate “(1) a reasonable basis in truth
for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounded; and (3) a
reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.” Id. (quoting
Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir. 1998)). The Court must consider “whether the
government's position has a reasonable basis in both fact and law,” id. at 325, and may not
assume that the Government’s position is not substantially justified because Plaintiff prevailed
on the merits. Id. at 324-25 (citing Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684).
III. Discussion
In this case, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred because he failed to adequately assess
Plaintiff's eligibility for benefits under Listing 12.05, he failed to address evidence of physical
impairment and limitation, and he failed to provide a particularized residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). Doc. No. 14, 5-18. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s first two arguments, and found that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination. Doc. No. 15, 6-11. As the substantial
evidence standard is more exacting than the substantial justification standard, the Government’s
argument relating to Plaintiff’s first two claims of error were de jure substantially justified.
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The Court found that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s RFC because he did
not explain why he failed to include certain of Dr. Heil’s limitations in the RFC. Doc. No. 15,
11-12. The Court remanded the case to the ALJ to further develop the record and either include
Dr. Heil’s limitations or explain why he chose not to include those limitations in the RFC. Doc.
No. 15, 12-13.
As to the first element of the Morgan test, the Government’s position had a reasonable
basis in fact. The Court may not decide if an individual is disabled in the first instance. Instead,
Congress has chosen to delegate that authority to ALJs. However, the Court’s review of the
medical evidence of record, including Dr. Heil’s report, demonstrates that the Government’s
position had a reasonable basis in fact. It is for the ALJ to determine on remand if the
Government’s position is correct, and possibly for this Court to review if an appeal is filed.
However, the administrative record contains enough evidence to meet the Government’s burden
of showing that its position had a reasonable basis in fact.
As to the second element of the Morgan test, the Government’s position had a reasonable
basis in law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that, “the ALJ’s
finding of residual functional capacity must ‘be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.’” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir.
2001) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F. 2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Government’s
argument was that the ALJ’s RFC determination was “clear and satisfactory” and encompassed
all limitations discussed by Dr. Heil. Although the Court ultimately disagreed with the
Government’s position, its position had a reasonable basis in law.
As to the third element of the Morgan test, as the Court noted in its Opinion, “the
definition of unskilled work may arguably encompass Plaintiff's limitations with respect to
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carrying out detailed instruction and maintaining attention and concentration.” Doc. No. 15, 12.
Although the Court found that the other limitations were not adequately discussed by the ALJ,
the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Heil’s report, which included these additional limitations, provided
the Government with a substantial justification to argue that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. Thus, there was a reasonable connection
between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that the
Government’s position may be substantially justified where an ALJ may reach the same
conclusion on remand based on other evidence in the record. Williams v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 299,
302 (3d Cir. 2009). In this case, the Court recognized that upon remand the ALJ may reach the
same conclusion on remand by explaining why he rejected Dr. Heil’s proposed limitations. Doc.
No. 15, 12-13. Applying this principle, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania denied a motion for attorney fees in Butterfield v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1740121
(E.D. Pa. May 5, 2011). The Court found that because the matter had been remanded to the ALJ
for determination on a relatively narrow issue, much like in this case, attorney fees were not
justified under the EAJA. Id.
In Rhodes v. Astrue, 2011 WL 6372823 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011), Judge McLaughlin
denied a motion for attorney fees in similar circumstances. In Rhodes, Judge McLaughlin held
that the ALJ’s RFC was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to explain
why he was rejecting certain medical evidence. Rhodes v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3287011 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 13, 2009). However, Judge McLaughlin found that the Government’s position was
substantially justified as the ALJ discussed the limitations set forth by the doctor in question,
even if Judge McLaughlin later found that explanation to be inadequate. Rhodes, 2011 WL
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6372823 at *3. This is similar to the case at bar where the ALJ discussed Dr. Heil’s report, even
though the Court found that discussion inadequate. Doc. No. 15, 12-13.
The Court is mindful that, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
stated, “[t]he EAJA was passed . . . to allow individuals . . . to fight back against unjustified
government action, without fear that the high cost of doing so would make victory ultimately
more expensive than acquiescence.” Handron v. Sec'y Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 677
F.3d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, the Government rarely opposes
attorney fee motions in this Court when a decision of the Commissioner is overturned. For
example, over the past two years Ms. Osterhout has filed 21 motions for attorney fees under the
EAJA in this Court and the Government has consented to 18 of those motions.1
Case
10-0253 (Erie)
09-1073
10-658
10-1026
10-1096
10-1263
10-1560
11-0175
11-0377
11-0487
11-0698
11-0809
11-1160
11-1169
11-1248
11-1532
12-0573
12-0660
10-0318
(Johnstown)
12-0196
(Johnstown)
1
Amount
Awarded
$3,510.00
$5,100.00
$6,387.50
Pending
$3,412.50
$4,200.00
$5,000.00
$5,760.00
$4,905.00
$4,200.00
$3,850.00
$5,000.00
$3,600.00
$3,800.00
$4,185.00
$3,330.00
$2,070.00
$4,200.00
$4,300.00
Government's
Response
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Opposed
Stipulated
Opposed
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Stipulated
Unopposed
Stipulated
Stipulated
$5,900.00
Stipulated
This does not include requests for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C § 406.
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Judge
Bloch
Cercone
Lancaster
Bloch
Ambrose
Bloch
Bloch
Diamond
Cercone
Diamond
Fischer
Hornak
Bissoon
Standish
Conti
McVerry
Ambrose
Ambrose
Bloch
Gibson
Thus, the Court finds that the purpose of the EAJA will not be frustrated by the denial of
Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees as Ms. Osterhout, and other able counsel, will continue to
prosecute meritorious claims against the Commissioner.
In sum, the Government’s position, both before the Agency and in this Court, was
substantially justified, even if it was ultimately rejected by the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
not entitled to attorney fees under the EAJA.
IV. Order
AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2013, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. No. 18) is DENIED.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
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