BANCROFT LIFE & CASUALTY ICC, LTD. v. LO et al
Filing
69
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 60 Motion for Reconsideration re 57 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 56 Memorandum & Opinion filed by Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 3/14/2013. (lmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BANCROFT LIFE & CASUALTY,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
12cv1431
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
v.
ERWIN LO, M.D., SUE JIN YU, M.D.,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PRIOR
COURT ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS’
COUNTERCLAIMS (DOC. NO. 60)
Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant’s (“Bancroft”) Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order (doc. nos. 56 and 57) denying
Bancroft’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ (“Defendants”)
Counterclaims or Alternatively, Summary Judgment. See Doc. No. 60. Defendants filed a
Response to the Motion for Reconsideration objecting to same. Doc. No. 63. Bancroft requested
leave to file a Reply to Defendants’ Response, which this Court agreed to allow, and Bancroft
filed same. Doc. No. 66. Thus, the matter is now ripe for adjudication.
I.
Standard of Review
The purpose of a Motion for Reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence. Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply
Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010), citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
909 (3d Cir. 1985). Generally, a Motion for Reconsideration will only be granted on one of the
following three grounds: (1) if there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) if
new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or (3) if it is necessary
to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See Howard Hess Dental,
602 F.3d at 251, citing Max’s Seafood Café by Lou Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d
Cir. 1999).
A motion for reconsideration “is a device of limited utility.” Pahler v. City of Wilkes
Barre, 207 F.Supp.2d 341, 355 (M.D. Pa. 2001). A motion for reconsideration may not merely
restyle or rehash issues previously presented. Id.; see also City of Johnstown v. Vora, 481 Fed.
Appx. 37, 38 (3d Cir. 2012) (denial of reconsideration appropriate where plaintiff did not
identify any of the three factors in her motion, but “merely rehashed arguments that were
presented in her previous filings”); Carroll v. Manning, 414 Fed. Appx. 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2011)
(affirming denial of “motion for reconsideration and ‘petition’ in support thereof appears to
merely reiterate the allegations made in the . . . petition and does not set forth any basis justifying
reconsideration”); and Grigorian v. Attorney General of U.S., 282 Fed. Appx. 180, 182 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming denial of Motion to Reconsider because it “does nothing more than reiterate the
arguments underlying his motion to reinstate the appeal.”).
A Motion for Reconsideration “addresses only factual and legal matters that the Court
may have overlooked . . . . It is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ask the Court to
rethink what [it] had already thought through rightly or wrongly.” Glendon Energy Co. v.
Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (internal citation and quotes
omitted). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for
reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Rossi v. Schlarbaum, 600 F.Supp.2d 650, 670
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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II.
Discussion
Turning to the three bases upon which a Motion for Reconsideration may be granted,
Bancroft argues, primarily, that this Court made clear errors of law causing manifest injustice to
Bancroft; and secondarily, that new evidence, not previously available, has come to light. Doc.
No. 61, p. 2. This Court disagrees with Bancroft and will therefore deny its Motion to
Reconsider as more fully explained below.
A. “Clear Error of Law”
Although “clear error of law” has not been expressly defined by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, other United States Courts of Appeals and District Courts
across the United States agree that its definition – at least in the context of a Rule 59(e) Motion1
– “should conform to a very exacting standard.” See, i.e., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272
(5th Cir. 2000); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 98 (N.D.
N.Y. 2003); Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.Supp.2d 414, 422 (D. D.C. 2005); and
Esparaza v. Telerx Marketing, case no. EP-04-CA-0241-FM, 2005 WL 1514046 (W.D. Tex.
June 21, 2005). In one case, when determining if a final judgment was clearly erroneous, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit defined clear error as a judgment which is
simply “dead wrong.” Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1988).
Within the ambit of the Third Circuit, one Pennsylvania District Court has defined “clear
error of law” in the negative as follows: “It is well-settled that a mere disagreement with the
court does not translate into the type of clear error of law which justifies reconsideration of a
1
The Court recognizes Bancroft’s argument set forth in its Reply Brief with regard to the standard that
this Court may utilize when deciding whether it should reconsider its prior Order (doc. no. 57). See doc.
no. 66, pp. 1-2. Given the nature of Bancroft’s prior requests (doc. no. 25), and the Court’s disposition of
those requests in its prior Order (doc. no. 57), procedurally, Bancroft was and is not foreclosed from reraising any of those requests at a later point in this litigation.
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ruling.” Wilkerson v. Samuels, no. 3:12-cv-1462, 2012 WL 7145714 at *2 (M.D. Pa. December
13, 2012).
1.
“Clear Error of Law” – Counts III through V and VII through X;
Forum Selection Clause
Bancroft’s Motion for Reconsideration indicates that this Court “made clear errors of
law” which warrant reconsideration because its prior Opinion (doc. no. 56) “repeatedly
reference[d] only the counterclaims for fraud (Count I) and illegality (Count II), and fail[ed] to
discuss any of the remaining counterclaims with respect to Bancroft’s forum selection clause and
standing arguments.” Doc. no. 61, p. 3. Bancroft also contends that this “Court’s apparent
failure to consider” its “law of the case” and “lack of standing arguments[,]” with respect to
Counts III through V and VII through X constitutes “clear error.” Id., pp. 2-3.
Bancroft’s first premise is that this Court essentially failed to address arguments it raised
with respect to seven counterclaims, specifically Counts III – V and VII - X.2 This is incorrect.
This Court clearly acknowledged in its prior Opinion that Bancroft filed a 12(b)(3)
Motion for improper venue as to Counts I through V and VII through X, as well as a 12(b)(6)
Motion. The Court specifically stated on the first page of its Opinion as follows:
[Bancroft] also moved this Court to alternatively consider its Motion to
Dismiss for improper venue under 12(b)(3) as a Motion to Dismiss for improper
forum selection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6). Plaintiff further
suggests that a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for improper forum selection should
be converted to a Rule 56 Motion. These arguments are noted, but for the reasons
stated, infra., the Motion will be denied.
Doc. no. 56, p. 1, n.1.
2
Defendants’ counterclaims were enumerated as follows: Count I – Fraud; Count II - Illegality; Count III
– Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count IV – Demand for an Accounting; Count V – Rescission; Count VI –
Declaratory Judgment; Count VII – Breach of Contract, Failure to Return . . . Value; Count VIII –
Conversion, Failure to Return . . . Value; Count IX – [Violation of Pennsylvania’s] Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law; and Count X – Violation of Pennsylvania’s Uniform
Commercial Code.
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In this Court’s prior Opinion, the Court noted that Bancroft’s Brief in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss contended that Counts I through V and VII though X of Defendants’
Counterclaims had to be severed from the instant case and refiled in St. Lucia due to a forum
selection clause found in an agreement referenced as a “Group Master Policy.” Id., p. 5
(Bancroft “primarily contends that Saint Lucia . . . is the proper venue for Defendants’
Counterclaims because of a forum selection clause, ‘found in the Group Master Policy.’”); see
also, doc. no. 26, p. 4. The Court then recited the law supplied by Bancroft in support its
contentions, and summarized Defendants’ argument against application of the St. Lucia forum
selection clause. Doc. no. 56, p. 6.
Next, the Court noted that Bancroft failed to attach this “Group Master Policy”
containing the St. Lucia forum selection clause to its Complaint, and concluded that the “Group
Master Policy” was not the subject of Bancroft’s breach of contract claim against Defendants.
Id., p. 8. The Court then held that “Defendants’ Counterclaims for fraud and illegality [Counts I
and II] brought all logically related claims pertaining to the contract(s) which was/were attached
to the Complaint into a single litigation.” Id. at p. 8. The very next portion of the Opinion reads
reads:
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ Counterclaims were compulsory
with respect to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, and call into question the
validity and/or binding effect of the documents which were attached to Plaintiff’s
Complaint. The Court further finds that it is not extending federal jurisdiction or
venue in this regard. Therefore, the Court finds that this is one basis upon which
the Court must deny Plaintiff’s 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss Defendants’
Counterclaims for improper venue.
Id.
To the extent that the Court was not clear in its prior Opinion, this Court declined to grant
Bancroft’s Motion to dismiss any of Defendants’ Counterclaims predicated upon a forum
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selection clause set forth in a (purported) contractual document which Bancroft failed to attach to
its Complaint, and failed to allege formed the basis of Bancroft’s breach of contract claim against
Defendants.
Accordingly, Bancroft’s Motion for Reconsideration contending that the Court’s prior
Opinion and Order (doc. nos. 56 and 57) denying their Motion to Dismiss Defendants’
Counterclaims set forth in Counts III through V and VII through X was clearly erroneous shall
be denied. The Court finds that Bancroft’s disagreement with its prior Opinion and Order does
not translate into the type of error of law which justifies reconsideration of a ruling under any
reconsideration standard.
2.
“Clear Error of Law” – Compulsory Counterclaim
Bancroft claimed this Court erred by holding that Defendants’ Counterclaims were more
properly brought in this action in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13, as opposed to being severed
and brought in St. Lucia – again pursuant to the forum selection clause set forth in the “Group
Master Policy,” a purported contract which Bancroft failed to attach to its Complaint and failed
to allege was the subject of (or even implicated in) its original lawsuit against Defendants. Doc.
no. 61, p. 3. Bancroft cited numerous cases in support of its argument that the forum selection
clause found in this unattached and unreferenced “Group Master Policy” document would trump
Fed.R.Civ.P. 13. Id., pp. 3-8. The Defendants also cited law in support of the Court’s prior
decision that their Counterclaims were properly brought in this forum and made part of this
lawsuit. Doc. no. 63, pp. 3-8.
The prior Opinion of this Court specifically noted that forum selection clauses are to be
afforded “great weight” and are “presumptively valid.” Doc. no. 56, p. 5. However, as this
Court stated in its prior Opinion (doc. no. 56) and has reiterated in this Opinion, Bancroft failed
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to allege that the purportedly contractual document containing the St. Lucia forum selection
clause was breached by Defendants. Accordingly, this Court’s reliance upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 13, as
stated in its prior Opinion, does not extend federal jurisdiction or venue, nor did the Court hold
that Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 “trumps” the St. Lucia forum selection clause, because no contract
containing a St. Lucia forum selection clause is presently at issue in this case. See doc. 56, p. 8
(“The court further finds that it is not extending federal jurisdiction or venue in this regard.”).
Thus, the Court finds no error of law which justifies reconsideration of this ruling.
3.
“Clear Error of Law” – Law of the Case
Bancroft next claims the Court committed clear error of law by concluding that the law of
the case doctrine allowed Defendants to “avoid the operation of the forum selection clause.”
Doc. no. 61, p. 8. This was not the conclusion the Court reached in its prior Opinion and Order.
As stated above, as well as in its prior Opinion, the Court concluded that the St. Lucia
forum selection clause did not apply to Defendants’ Counterclaims because Bancroft’s
Complaint failed to allege a breach with respect to the alleged contract which contained the St.
Lucia forum selection clause. Again, as noted throughout this Opinion and in the Court’s prior
Opinion, the alleged contract containing a St. Lucia forum selection clause was not even attached
to the Complaint nor made the subject of Bancroft’s breach of contract claim against Defendants.
The Court’s prior Opinion also discussed the law of the case doctrine with respect to the
Defendants’ fraud and illegality counterclaims. Specifically, the Court noted that it had
previously heard argument from both sides as to whether Defendants’ allegations of fraud and
illegality could defeat Bancroft’s previously filed Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to
the alleged breach of the documents which were attached to Bancroft’s Complaint. Doc. no. 56,
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p. 9. None of the documents attached to Bancroft’s Complaint were the “Group Master Policy”
and none contained a St. Lucia forum selection clause.
Because fraud and illegality were the two primary issues raised by Defendants and
formed a legitimate basis upon which to defeat Bancroft’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
which requested judgment predicated upon the allegations in its Complaint and the documents
attached to its Complaint, the Court discussed them in its Memorandum Opinion denying
Bancroft’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 33). See doc. no. 56, p. 9. Accordingly, the
Court’s prior decision and opinions with respect to the impact of these two issues, fraud and
illegality, became law of the case – again, only insofar as the alleged contract(s) at issue,
meaning the alleged contract(s) attached to Bancroft’s Complaint.
Therefore, the Court finds no error of law which justifies reconsideration of this ruling.
4.
“Clear Error of Law” – Standing
Bancroft also contends that this Court “committed clear error of law by misapprehending
the standard” applicable to Bancroft’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims for lack of
standing. Doc. no. 61, p. 13. Bancroft claims, inter alia, that this Court failed to consider its
standing argument under a Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 standard, and only considered it under a 12(b)(6)
standard. Additionally, Bancroft argues that the portion of the Court’s prior Opinion only
addressed Counts I and II of Defendants’ Counterclaims (fraud and illegality).
The Court concurs with Bancroft that it adjudged Bancroft’s standing argument upon a
12(b)(6) standard, and found that with respect to Defendants’ fraud and illegality Counterclaims,
Defendants met that standard. The Court further concurs that Bancroft did indeed argue that
under a summary judgment standard, all of Defendants’ Counterclaims should be dismissed for
lack of standing. However, the Court also notes that Bancroft’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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was filed as an alternative to its 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court concludes it did not
err in ruling under the 12(b)(6) standard; however, it did not specifically address the Rule 56
standard, nor did it specifically reference any counterclaim other than the fraud and illegality
counterclaims.
In re-reviewing Bancroft’s prior argument (doc. nos. 26, pp. 14-15) and Defendants’ prior
response on the standing argument (doc. no. 35, pp. 13-15), it is clear to this Court that Bancroft
predicated its Summary Judgment Motion upon the “Group Master Policy,” and not the
documents it actually attached to its Complaint as “contract” documents. As noted by the Court
in its prior Opinion (doc. no. 56), the alleged contract documents attached to Bancroft’s
Complaint bear the signatures of the individually named Defendants, but those documents do not
include the “Group Master Policy.” Accordingly, as the Court has repeatedly noted in both this
Opinion and its prior Opinion (doc. no. 56), the “Group Master Policy” does not appear to form
the basis for Bancroft’s breach of contract claim nor the Defendants’ Counterclaims, and thus,
any standing argument asserted predicated upon a purported contractual document not at issue is
of no moment.
With this minor clarification, the Court finds no error of law which justifies
reconsideration of its ruling with respect to standing.
B. “New Evidence”
Finally, in passing, Bancroft suggests that Defendants’ discovery requests demonstrate
the insurance-based nature of their counterclaims and thus, constitutes “new evidence” which
was not previously available. Doc. no. 61, p. 2. New evidence for purposes of a “Motion for
Reconsideration” is defined as: “[E]vidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court
because that evidence was not previously available[;]” and evidence “that is not newly
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discovered, as so defined, cannot provide the basis for a successful motion for reconsideration.”
Harsco, 779 F.2d at 909.
The Court finds that discovery requests do not constitute “evidence.” Accordingly, the
Court finds there is no basis for Bancroft’s Motion for Reconsideration with respect to “new
evidence.”
III. Conclusion
Based on the forgoing law and authority, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration (doc. no. 60) will be denied.3 An appropriate Order will accompany this
Opinion.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc:
All Registered ECF Counsel
3
Because the Court finds that this Motion for Reconsideration (doc. no. 60) is frivolous, the
Court orders that counsel for Bancroft (Plaintiff) should not charge its client any attorneys’ fees
and costs related thereto.
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