MILLIRON v. ASTRUE

Filing 12

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/18/2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KERRI ANN MILLIRON

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 12-1452

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o
AND

NOW,

this

R D E R

18th

day

of

March,

2014,

upon

consideration of the parties' cross motions for summary judgment,
the Court,
final

upon review of the Commissioner of Social Security's

decision,

denying

plaintiff's

claim

insurance benefits under Subchapter II
Act,

42 U.S.C. §401,

supplemental

for

of

Social

the

disability
Security

et seq., and denying plaintiff's claim for

security

income benefits

under

Subchapter XVI

of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq., finds that the
Commissioner's
and,

findings

accordingly,

are

affirms.

supported
See 42

by

U.S.C.

substantial
§405(g)

i

evidence

Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d
114,

117

(3d Cir.

1995);

Williams v.

Sullivan,

1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Brown v.

Bowen,

845 F.2d 1211,

1213
1

970

F.2d 1178,

507 U.S. 924

(3d Cir.

1988).

(1993)

i

See also

Berry v.

Sullivan,

supported
must

be

evidence,

by

738

F.

substantial

affirmed,

as

nor reverse,

claim differently)

a

Supp.

942,

evidence,
federal

944

the

court

(W.D.

Pa.

Commissioner's
may neither

1990)

(if

decision

reweigh the

merely because it would have decided the

(citing Cotter v.

Harris,

642

F. 2d 700,

705

(3dCir.1981)).1

After careful review of the record, the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's
("ALJ")'s ultimate determination of non-disability. While the
Court does not reach all of Plaintiff's arguments, it notes that
the ALJ: (i) properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in
the record and adequately explained his rationale for why he
gave little weight to Dr. Leonida's treating physician opinion;
(ii) was entitled to assign weight to the opinion of non­
examining state agency physician Dr. Trani and (iii) thoroughly
explained the basis for his credible determination.
It is well-established that [t]he ALJ - not treating or
examining physicians or State agency consultants - must make the
ultimate disability and [Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC")]
determinations.
Chandler v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 667 F.3d
356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e) (1),
404.1546(c)). "The law is clear ... that the opinion of a
treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of
functional capacity," Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n. 2
(3d Cir. 2011), and a treating physician opinion is only
entitled to controlling weight if it is "well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record."
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43
(3d Cir. 2001).
"If, however, the treating physician's opinion
conflicts with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is free to
give that opinion less than controlling weight or even reject
it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains her reasons and makes a
clear record." Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed.Appx. 140,
148 (3d Cir. 2007). "Where, as here, the opinion of a treating
physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining
physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason." Morales v.
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Thus,
an ALJ must explain the basis for the weight he assigns to the
II

2

medical opinions in the record and he can choose to assign more
weight to the non-examining physician's opinion if he finds that
it is more consistent with the other substantial evidence in the
record. See Salerno v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed.Appx. 208
(3d Cir. 2005).
The Court notes, however, that a treating physician opinion
on the ultimate issue of disability is not entitled to any
"special significance" and an ALJ is not required to accept it
since the determination of whether an individual is disabled "is
an ultimate issue reserved to the Commissioner." Smith v.
Comm'r of Soc.
., 178 Fed. Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006) ; see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e); SSR 96-6p. Moreover, although
substantial evidence must support an ALJ's credibility
determination, such determinations are "typically [] entitled to
deference because of [the ALJ's] ability to assess the demeanor
of witnesses at the hearing." Williams v. Barnhart, 87 Fed.Appx.
240, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).
Against this backdrop, the Court finds that the ALJ was
entitled to give "minimal weight" to Dr. Leonida's opinion of
temporary disability and that substantial evidence supports his
decision to do so. The ALJ explained that the opinion was
offered on a PA Department of Public Welfare form and was: (i)
not supported by any clinical or objective medical findings;
(ii) was inconsistent with Dr. Leonida's own treatment notes and
Dr. Tran's opinion; (iii) was contradicted by Plaintiff's
activities of daily living and the overall minimial objective
findings in the record; and (iv) was an opinion on the ultimate
issue of disability which does not merit any special
consideration in any event. (R. 18);
v Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 178 Fed.Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that "no
special significance is given to the source of an opinion on the
ultimate outcome."). The ALJ thus discharged his duty to explain
why certain evidence was rejected and the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the
medical opinion evidence and his decision to give more weight to
Dr. Tran's opinion that Plaintiff could perform medium work. (R.
15-16) .
The Court also finds that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ's credibility determination.
In finding that Plaintiff's
allegations of disabling physical and mental problems were
exaggerated and not fully credible, he noted that he had
considered her subjective complaints against the record as a
whole, but that such evaluation only highlighted the lack of
objective medical support for her claim of disability.
He
pointed out that her complaints were inconsistent with the
diagnostic studies and objective findings upon physical and

3

Therefore,
for Summary Judgment

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion
(document No.8)

is DENIED and defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

mental examination, her activities of daily living, and her
appearance and demeanor at the hearing.
(R. 14). The ALJ also
discussed the progress notes from Chestnut Ridge Counseling
Services which noted in December of 2009 that Plaintiff's
doctors had "released her back to work."
(R. 15, 385).
Plaintiff stated that she was "going to return to work at
Subway" on December 16, 2009, and that she felt that returning to
work "will be the best thing for her."
Id.).
The ALJ also
noted that Plaintiff had denied any physical complaints in her
most recent mental examination which took place in October of
2010, only two months before her hearing where she testified
that her physical issues were disabling.
Thus, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's allegations
of disabling physical and mental issues were not entirely
credible.
The Court notes, however, that the ALJ did give some
credence to Plaintiff's subjective complaints, as he did
incorporate into his RFC assessment limitations he found to be
credibly established by the record. (R. 14).

4