LUICH v. ASTRUE

Filing 20

ORDER denying 15 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/18/2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VALETTA MAE LUICH

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 12-1514

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o
AND

NOW,

this

R D E R

18th

day

of

March,

2014,

upon

consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,
and

the

responses

Commissioner

of

thereto,
Social

the

Court,

Security's

upon

final

review

decision,

of

the

denying

plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act,
seq.,

finds

that

the

Commissioner's

substantial evidence and,
§405 (g)

i

Jesurum v.

Human Services,
Sullivan,
nom.,

944

(W.D.

F.3d 114,

970 F.2d 1178,

507 U. S.

(3d Cir.

48

924

1988).
Pa.

(1993)

1182
i

U. S.

117

Brown v.

are

Bowen,

of

1995);
cert.

Health

738 F.

denied sub

Supp.

(if supported by substantial evidence,

1

&

Williams v.

845 F. 2d 1211,

Sullivan,

et

supported by

Department

1992),

§1381,

See 42 U.S.C.

affirms.

(3d Cir.

(3d Cir.

See also Berry v.

1990)

findings

accordingly,

Secretary of

42 U.S.C.

1213
942,
the

Commissioner's decision must be affirmed,
neither
would

reweigh

have

the

decided

evidence,
the

claim

nor

as a federal court may

reverse,

differently)

merely

because

it

(citing

Cotter

v.

Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 First,
it is well-established that
[t]he ALJ
not
treating
or
examining
physicians
or
State
agency
consultants
must make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations."
Chandler v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 667
F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
"The law is clear
that
the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ
on the issue of functional capacity," Brown v. Astrue, 649
F.3d 193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2011), and a treating physician
opinion is only entitled to controlling weight if it is
"well-supported
by
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and it is not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence
in the
record."
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001).
"If, however, the treating physician's opinion conflicts
with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is free to give
that opinion less than controlling weight or even rej ect
it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains her reasons and
makes a clear record." Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229
Fed.Appx. 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2007).
Second, a treating physician opinion on the ultimate issue
of disability is not entitled to any "special significance" and
an ALJ is not required to accept it since the determination of
whether an individual is disabled "is an ultimate issue reserved
to the Commissioner." Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 178 Fed.
Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006).
After careful review of the record, the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") 's conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled and that
she retained the functional capacity to perform work consistent
with his Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") determination.
Contrary to Plaintiff's meritless contentions, the Court finds
that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in
the record and provided several legitimate reasons for why he
chose to assign little weight to the opinions of Dr. Simmons and
Dr. Newman. The ALJ thoroughly discussed all the relevant
medical evidence in the record and discharged his duty to
address the countervailing evidence which appeared to conflict
with his RFC assessment.
See Salles, 178 Fed.Appx. at 112. The
2

Therefore,
for Summary Judgment

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion
(document No.

15)

is DENIED and defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (document No. 13) is GRANTED.

s
N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

Court further finds that the ALJ properly included in his RFC
assessment and ensuing hypothetical to the vocational expert
(~VEn), only the limitations that he found were credibly
established by the record.
See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he ALJ must accurately convey to
the vocational expert all of a claimant's credibly established
limi ta tions. n ) (emphasis in original) .
Plaintiff essentially asks this Court to reweigh the
evidence and come to a different conclusion, which clearly is
improper under the deferential standard of review. Because
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the
medical evidence and ultimate determination of non-disability,
the Court affirms.

3