BRIDGES v. ASTRUE

Filing 12

ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 11/22/2013. (sje)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUANITA YVON BRIDGES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 12-1565
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. MEMORANDUM
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 8) will be
denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10) will be granted.
Plaintiff Juanita Yvon Bridges (“Bridges”) initially applied for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits on August 15, 2006. (R. at
14). The claims proceeded through the administrative process until August 19, 2008, when they
were denied in a decision rendered by an administrative law judge. (R. at 14, 190-191). Bridges
responded to that decision by filing a request for review with the Appeals Council. (R. at 14).
She protectively filed new applications for DIB and SSI benefits on September 8, 2009, alleging
the existence of a disability beginning on July 11, 2007. (R. at 141, 145, 190). On February 16,
2010, Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Disability Determination (“Bureau”) denied the new
applications. (R. at 74, 80, 86, 92). Bridges timely requested an administrative hearing on
March 10, 2010. (R. at 98-100). The Appeals Council denied her request for review on April
27, 2010, thereby making the administrative law judge’s decision the “final decision” of the

1

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) pertaining to the original applications. (R.
at 14). Bridges sought judicial review of that decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3). The Commissioner’s decision was affirmed in a memorandum opinion and order
dated December 21, 2010. Bridges v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 10-863, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135100 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010).
On March 31, 2011, the hearing requested by Bridges was held before Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Douglas Cohen. (R. at 36). Bridges, who was represented by counsel,
appeared and testified at the hearing. (R. at 40-64, 67-68). Fred A. Monaco (“Monaco”), an
impartial vocational expert, provided testimony about the expectations of employers existing in
the national economy. (R. at 44, 64-66). In a decision dated May 11, 2011, the ALJ determined
that Bridges was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. (R. at 11-31).
On July 7, 2011, Bridges sought administrative review of the ALJ’s decision by filing a
request for review with the Appeals Council. (R. at 9-10). The Appeals Council denied the
request for review on August 24, 2012, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s
“final decision” in this case. (R. at 1). Bridges commenced this action on October 27, 2012,
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Docs. 1 & 2). Bridges and the
Commissioner filed motions for summary judgment on March 25, 2013, and April 24, 2013,
respectively. (Docs. 8 & 10). The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe
for disposition.
Although Bridges listed July 11, 2007, as her alleged onset date, the administrative
decision denying her earlier claims was given res judicata effect. (R. at 14-15). The ALJ
proceeded to consider whether Bridges had become “disabled” on or after August 20, 2008. (R.
at 15). It was determined that, as of that date, Bridges had been suffering from a back disorder,

2

obesity, valvular disease, hypertension with mild left ventricular hypertrophy, and pain in her
right hip. (R. at 17). These impairments were deemed to be “severe” under the Commissioner’s
regulations. (R. at 17-19); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii),
416.920(c). The ALJ also concluded that, as of January 28, 2010, Bridges had been inflicted
with “the additional severe impairment of depression.” (R. at 17).
In accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 and 416.945, the ALJ assessed Bridges’s
residual functional capacity as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that the claimant can occasionally
climb (ramps/stairs only), balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, and kneel. She cannot
engage in work around hazards, e.g., no unprotected heights, moving machinery,
or commercial driving. As of January 28, 2010, the claimant was limited to
simple routine repetitive tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production
environment, involving only simple, work-related decisions, and in general,
relatively few work place changes.
(R. at 21). Bridges had “past relevant work” experience as a general clerk and clerk receptionist.
(R. at 64). Monaco respectively classified those positions as “semi-skilled” and “unskilled” jobs
at the “sedentary” level of exertion. (R. at 44). He testified that the physical limitations
contained within the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment would not preclude an
individual from performing the duties of either position. (R. at 64-65). Monaco further stated
that while the limitations applicable as of January 28, 2010, would prevent an individual from
working as a general clerk, they would not compromise his or her ability to work as a clerk
receptionist. (R. at 65). The ALJ ultimately denied Bridges’s claims on the ground that she
could return to her past relevant work. (R. at 28-31).
Bridges was born on July 4, 1954, making her fifty-three years old on her alleged onset
date and fifty-six years old on the date of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 29, 141, 145). During the
3

relevant period of time, she was initially classified as a “[p]erson closely approaching advanced
age.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(d), 416.963(d). Under the Commissioner’s regulations, a claimant
falls within a particular age category one day before his or her triggering birthday. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.102, 416.120(c)(4). Consequently, Bridges became a “[p]erson of advanced age” on July 3,
2009. She had the equivalent of a high school education and an ability to communicate in
English. (R. at 29, 40, 181, 187); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(4)-(5), 416.964(b)(4)-(5). Given the
applicable residual functional capacity and vocational assessments, the ALJ alternatively found
that Bridges had been capable of working as a document preparer, telephone service employee,
or hand packer prior to July 3, 2009. (R. at 29-30). Monaco’s testimony established the
existence of those jobs in the national economy. (R. at 65-66). As of Bridges’s fifty-fifth
birthday, Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06 compelled a finding that the economy did not offer
jobs consistent with her occupational profile. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table
No. 2, Rule 202.06. That finding was inconsequential, since an individual who can return to his
or her past relevant work is not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act regardless of whether
jobs consistent with his or her residual functional capacity exist in the national economy.
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003). Accordingly,
the ALJ denied Bridges’s claims in all respects. (R. at 30-31).
In support of her request for review, Bridges submitted documentary evidence to the
Appeals Council that had never been presented to the ALJ.1 (R. at 5-6, 243). The Act authorizes
judicial review only over a “final decision” of the Commissioner. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99, 108, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977); Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519-1521 (3d
Cir. 1992). A federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a decision by the
Appeals Council denying a claimant’s request for review. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594
1

On December 6, 2011, Bridges attempted to amend her alleged onset date to July 4, 2009. (R. at 245).

4

(3d Cir. 2001). When the Appeals Council denied Bridges’s request for review, the ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s “final decision” in this case. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,
106-107, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). The sixth sentence of § 405(g) provides that a
reviewing court “may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner
of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that
there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior
proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The standards governing the propriety of a sentence-six
remand are firmly established. Szubak v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 745 F.2d 831,
833 (3d Cir. 1984). Since Bridges does not move for a sentence-six remand, the Court’s review
is limited to the evidence that was before the ALJ at the time of his decision.2 Chandler v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011)(holding that a claimant had
not satisfied the “good cause” requirement of sentence six because she had failed to explain her
reasons for not procuring the relevant evidence at a time when it could have been considered by
an administrative law judge).
On January 7, 2010, Dr. Joseph Kalik performed a consultative physical examination of
Bridges in connection with her applications for DIB and SSI benefits. (R. at 343-351). After
completing the examination, Dr. Kalik reported that Bridges could frequently lift or carry objects
weighing up to twenty pounds and occasionally lift or carry objects weighing up to twenty-five
pounds. (R. at 349). Bridges’s sitting, standing, walking, pushing and pulling abilities were
deemed to be unlimited. (R. at 349). No additional restrictions were found. (R. at 349-350).
Dr. Kalik essentially determined that Bridges was physically capable of performing a full range
2

Bridges relies on Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the Court should
consider the entire record, including the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, in determining whether the
Commissioner’s “final decision” is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 9 at 16). The rule adopted in
Higginbotham, however, is not the governing law in the Third Circuit. Higginbotham, 405 F.3d at 335-336;
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592-595 (3d Cir. 2001).

5

of “light” work.3 The ALJ gave Bridges the “maximum benefit of the doubt” in limiting her to a
subset of “light” work involving only occasional postural maneuvers and no exposure to
workplace hazards. (R. at 21, 25).
Bridges’s mental abilities and limitations were assessed by Dr. Robert P. Craig during a
consultative evaluation performed on January 28, 2010. Dr. Craig opined that Bridges’s
“physical problems” were causing her to suffer from “mild-to-moderate depression and anxiety.”
(R. at 357). Nonetheless, he indicated that Bridges’s mental impairments did not limit her ability
to perform work-related tasks. (R. at 359). Specifically, Dr. Craig reported that Bridges’s
mental impairments did not affect her abilities to understand, remember and carry out
instructions or respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work pressures in a typical
work setting. (R. at 359).
Dr. Edward Jonas, a non-examining psychological consultant, opined on February 9,
2010, that Bridges had no “severe” mental impairments. (R. at 364). In rendering that opinion,
Dr. Jonas accorded “appropriate weight” to the findings of Dr. Craig’s consultative evaluation.
(R. at 376). The ALJ concluded that, as of January 28, 2010, Bridges was precluded from
working in a fast-paced production environment and limited to the performance of simple,
routine, repetitive tasks involving only simple work-related decisions and relatively few
workplace changes. (R. at 21). The additional limitations were attributed to Dr. Craig’s
determination that Bridges was suffering from depression. (R. at 27).
On March 22, 2011, Bridges started to attend mental health counseling sessions with Jill
Zikmund (“Zikmund”). (R. at 485). In a letter dated April 15, 2011, Zikmund stated that
3

“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, [a claimant] must have the
ability to do substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).

6

Bridges was “unable to fulfill employment requirements” involving “interaction with others or
any degree of focus and attention.” (R. at 485). The ALJ afforded “little weight” to Zikmund’s
letter because it was not accompanied by “actual treatment notes” documenting Bridges’s
symptoms. (R. at 27). At the hearing, Bridges testified that she worked twenty hours per week
as a computer instructor for senior citizens. (R. at 40-41). The ALJ pointed out that Bridges’s
performance of that duty required her to interact with others. (R. at 27). Part-time work activity
that does not amount to “substantial gainful activity” under the Commissioner’s regulations may
nevertheless suggest that a claimant is capable of maintaining a full-time job. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1571, 416.971. In any event, the findings articulated by Dr. Craig and Dr. Jonas provided
the ALJ with a logical basis for rejecting the functional limitations described by Zikmund.
Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196-197 (3d Cir. 2011); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d
Cir. 1991).
Bridges does not mount a clear challenge to the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
assessment. Instead, she attempts to establish the existence of an ambiguity in the ALJ’s
decision. (Doc. 9 at 16-19). Contrary to Bridges’s belief, the ALJ’s decision is firmly grounded
in the law. A claimant’s residual functional capacity is only determined once. Her v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 203 F.3d 388, 391-392 (6th Cir. 1999). The same residual
functional capacity assessment is used at the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation
process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(5), 416.945(a)(5). The Commissioner’s burden of production
at the fifth step relates only to evidence establishing the existence of jobs in the national
economy consistent with the claimant’s vocational profile. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,
467-470, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983); Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir.

7

2003). The claimant’s abilities and limitations do not change from one step to the next. Her,
203 F.3d at 391-392.
The fact that Bridges’s residual functional capacity changed on January 28, 2010, is of no
dispositive significance. (R. at 21, 28-29). Bridges had previously worked as a general clerk and
clerk receptionist. (R. at 64). The ALJ’s first hypothetical question described Bridges’s
limitations during the earlier portion of the disputed period. (R. at 21, 64). Monaco testified that
such an individual could work as either a general clerk or a clerk receptionist. (R. at 64). The
ALJ’s second hypothetical question incorporated the mental limitations resulting from the onset
of Bridges’s depression. (R. at 21, 65). Monaco responded to that question by stating that while
the described individual could not perform the “semi-skilled” duties expected of a general clerk,
he or she could still maintain a job as a clerk receptionist. (R. at 65). In light of Monaco’s
testimony, Bridges was deemed to be capable of working as a clerk receptionist during the entire
period of time at issue in this case. (R. at 28-29).
Monaco testified that an individual with the abilities and limitations described by the ALJ
could work as a document preparer, telephone service employee, or hand packer. (R. at 65-66).
That testimony provided an evidentiary basis for the ALJ’s alternative finding at the fifth step of
the sequential evaluation process. (R. at 29-31). The alternative finding applied only to the
period of time preceding Bridges’s fifty-fifth birthday, since a finding of disability would have
been directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06 during the subsequent period of time. (R. at
29-31). The fact that Bridges would have otherwise been “disabled” at the fifth step as of July 3,
2009, does not undermine the ALJ’s decision at the fourth step. As noted earlier, a claimant who
is able to return to his or her past relevant work is not “disabled” under the Act regardless of
whether that work (or other work consistent with his or her residual functional capacity) exists in

8

the national economy. Thomas, 540 U.S. at 21-26. The Medical-Vocational Rules relate only to
“the types and numbers of jobs” existing in the national economy. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 468.
They simply have no application to a claimant who remains capable of performing his or her past
relevant work. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000)(recognizing that the
Commissioner bears the burden of production only at the “last step” of the analysis).
Bridges intimates that she had functional limitations extending beyond those found by the
ALJ.4 (Doc. 9 at 16-19). In any event, the ALJ was not required to accept every limitation
alleged by Bridges. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). Although the
ALJ was required to give serious consideration to Bridges’s subjective complaints, he was not
required to credit them in every conceivable respect. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 363. Every
limitation contained within the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment was conveyed to
Monaco at the hearing. (R. at 21, 64-66). The residual functional capacity finding is itself
“supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The portions of Monaco’s testimony
pertaining to a hypothetical individual with additional limitations did not preclude a
determination that Bridges was still able to work as a clerk receptionist. Craigie v. Bowen, 835
F.2d 56, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1987). Since all of Bridges’s credibly established limitations were made
known to Monaco, his testimony provided an adequate basis for the ALJ’s decision. Johnson v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 529 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008). The arguments advanced by
Bridges provide no basis for setting that decision aside. The Commissioner’s decision denying

4

The tenor of Bridges’s argument suggests that she is relying on evidence submitted to the Appeals Council in
support of her request for review. (Doc. 9 at 16). For the reasons discussed earlier, that evidence cannot be
considered at this time. Chandler v. Commissioner of Social Security, 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). Bridges
remained insured for Title II benefits beyond the date of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 17, 40). If she believes that the
evidence presented to the Appeals Council would warrant a finding of disability, she can file new applications for
DIB and SSI benefits.

9

Bridges’s applications for DIB and SSI benefits is supported by substantial evidence and will be
affirmed.
II. ORDER
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 8) is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 10) is GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc:

All counsel of record

10