LAPAGLIA v. BOROUGH OF BALDWIN
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part [ECF No. 8] Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; in particular, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Opinion, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's reinstatement claims at paragraphs 23(c) and 28(d) of her Complaint, but is denied as to Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 6/16/2013. (ndf )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRACEY LAPAGLIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOROUGH OF BALDWIN,
Defendant.
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 12-1576
)
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
)
)
OPINION
KELLY, Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Tracey LaPaglia (“Plaintiff”) has filed this employment discrimination action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 952 et seq., alleging that her former employer, Defendant
Borough of Baldwin (“Defendant” or “Baldwin Borough”), discriminated against her on the
basis of her gender after she sustained an employment related injury. [ECF No. 1]. Baldwin
Borough has filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), as to her gender
discrimination claims and, alternatively, as to paragraphs 23(c) and 28(d) of the Complaint,
which seek the imposition of damages in the form of reinstatement to her former position. [ECF
No. 8].
For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8] is granted as to
Plaintiff’s claims for relief set forth in paragraphs 23(c) and 28(d), but is otherwise denied.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant Baldwin Borough as a police
officer since January 2003, and served until March 2010, when she sustained a job related injury
to her right wrist and arm. After surgery was performed on her wrist, she was unable to serve as
a patrol officer, and was off of work until September 2010. At that time, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant required her to return to work and perform light duty work. Plaintiff alleges that
comparator males were not required to return to work, but were permitted to convalesce at home
until they were fully healed and able to perform full time patrol officer duties. In addition,
Plaintiff alleges that upon her forced return, she was placed in a secretarial position, based solely
upon her gender. Plaintiff alleges that comparator males were never made to perform secretarial
work.
Plaintiff further alleges that unlike her male comparators who were injured in the course
of their employment, she was required to undergo repeated independent medical exams to
confirm her partial disability. Plaintiff alleges that after approximately eighteen months,
Baldwin Borough required Plaintiff to return to full time patrol duty, regardless of the continuing
nature of her injury which made it unsafe for her to perform her job. Because of this
requirement, she was forced to resign, and seek workers’ compensation benefits, which were
granted through the settlement of certain of her claims against Baldwin Borough. In entering
into the settlement, Plaintiff voluntarily relinquished any right to seek reemployment with
Baldwin Borough. Accordingly, Defendant seeks the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in
paragraphs 23(c) and 28(d) of the Complaint, requesting damages in the form of reinstatement to
her former position as a police officer for Baldwin Borough. Plaintiff concedes that her damages
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are limited in this respect and so has joined in the Motion to Dismiss these particular claims.
[ECF No. 11, p. 5].
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek the dismissal of a complaint or
portion of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). In order to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading party's complaint must
provide “enough factual matter” to allow the case to move beyond the pleading stage of
litigation; the pleader must “‘nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570(2007)). The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court revisited the requirements for surviving a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Iqbal, the Supreme
Court made clear that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements [are] not suffic[ient]” to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
Id. at 678. Only “a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief [will] survive[ ] a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 679. In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided a two-part test to determine
whether a claim survives a motion to dismiss. “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
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should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.’ The plaintiff must show ‘the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible.
Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ [This] ‘plausibility’ determination will be ‘a context – specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides adequate facts to establish “how,
when, and where” will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 212; see also Guirguis
v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App'x. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009). If a court determines
that a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court must permit a curative amendment,
irrespective of whether Plaintiff seeks leave to amend, unless such amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
III.
DISCUSSION
Baldwin Borough contends that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be dismissed because
Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that she suffered any adverse employment
action, given the fact that there are no allegations that her light duty assignment resulted in
altered compensation, terms or privileges of employment. Plaintiff responds that she has alleged
several instances of adverse actions, sufficient to state a claim at this stage of the litigation.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race [or] ... sex ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
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2(a). Title VII claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 79 (1973); and see
Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999).
Under this standard, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee is qualified for the
position; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action was taken
under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Jones, 198 F.3d at
410–11. An adverse employment action refers to “a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
A complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit need not contain specific facts
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Instead, a plaintiff merely must “put forth
allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation and citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint must be examined to see if
she pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See
also Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176–177 (3d
Cir. 2010) (discussing the Twombly/Iqbal standard). Twombly's “plausibility paradigm ...
applies with equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.”
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Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315,
322 (3d Cir. 2008)).
In the case at issue, Plaintiff alleges, as to the first prong of a prima facie case of
discrimination, that she was continuously employed by Baldwin Borough as a police officer for
approximately seven years leading up to a job related injury in 2010. As to the second prong,
Plaintiff alleges that after sustaining her injury, she was improperly required to return to work in
a secretarial position, which failed to account for the injury to her right wrist and arm, and which
had not been required of male police officers who were unable to work as regular duty police
officers after sustaining an injury. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that although she had not healed,
she was required to undergo repeated independent medical exams to verify that she was impaired
and could not return to work as a regular duty police officer, but comparator injured males were
not required to prove their continued disability. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after eighteen
months, she was forced to return to work as a full time patrol officer regardless of continued
disability, which resulted in her forced resignation and application for workers’ compensation
benefits.
An “adverse employment action,” has been defined as “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Plaintiff's characterization of the change in her
status, eventually leading to her forced resignation, is sufficient at this stage of the litigation to
qualify as an adverse employment action. The Complaint alleges that she was held to standards
with regard to her work-related disability that were not applied to those who were male and that,
as a result, she was forced to resign from her job.
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The Court concludes that Plaintiff has raised sufficient factual assertions to withstand
Baldwin Borough’s Motion to Dismiss her Title VII claim. Therefore, the Court will deny
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Title VII claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8 ] is granted solely with
respect to Plaintiff’s claims at 23(c) and 28(d) of the Complaint relative to reinstatement, but the
Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2013, upon review of Defendants Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) [ECF No. 8],and the briefs filed in support and opposition thereto,
and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion issued this date, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s reinstatement claims
at paragraphs 23(c) and 28(d) of her Complaint, but is denied as to Plaintiff’s Title VII
discrimination claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, if the Plaintiff wishes to appeal from this Order he or she must do so within
thirty (30) days by filing a notice of appeal as provided in Rule 3, Fed. R. App. P.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc:
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing
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