WHITNEY v. WETZEL et al

Filing 89

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 72 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court filed by CHARLES WHITNEY. Signed by Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 10/31/2014. (blr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES WHITNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 12-cv-01623
Chief United States District Judge
Joy Flowers Conti
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Conti, C.J.
Before the court is an appeal (ECF No. 72) filed by plaintiff Charles Whitney (“Whitney” or
“Plaintiff”) requesting review of the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Order dated April 21,
2014 (ECF No. 67) (the “Order”), denying Whitney’s Motion to Compel Discovery &
Interrogatories. Upon review of the matters raised by the appeal, the court grants Plaintiff’s appeal
insofar as he will be afforded additional discovery with respect to grievances and complaints
complaining that defendants Cpt. T. Berier and Carl E. Walker retaliated against other inmates for
filing grievances or agreeing to be a defense witness for a fellow prisoner. The appeal will be denied
in all other respects.
Standard of Review
The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639, provides two separate standards for
judicial review of a magistrate judge’s decision: (i) “de novo” for magistrate resolution of dispositive
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), and (ii) “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” for magistrate
resolution of nondispositive matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), (b);
Local Civ. R. 72(C)(2); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1986).
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In this case, the Order is nondispositive because it addresses a discovery dispute and “[i]t is
well-established that a magistrate judge’s ruling concerning discovery is non-dispositive.” V. Mane
Fils S.A. v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., Civil No. 06-2304, 2011 WL 1344193, at *4 (D.N.J.
Apr. 8, 2011). Accordingly, the Order will not be disturbed unless it is found to be clearly erroneous
or contrary to law.
A finding is clearly erroneous “‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citing United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948)). This standard is difficult and becomes even more
difficult when the appeal involves a discovery decision. “There is particularly broad deference given
to a magistrate judge’s discovery rulings.” Farmers & Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Grp.
Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). A magistrate judge’s discovery ruling “is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J. 1996). “Where a magistrate judge is authorized to exercise his or her discretion, the decision
will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.” Cooper Hosp./Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 183
F.R.D. 119, 127 (D.N.J. 1998). The deferential standard is particularly appropriate in the case where
the magistrate judge has managed the case from the outset and developed a thorough knowledge of
the proceedings. Id. at 127.

Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred when she denied his Motion to Compel
Discovery and Interrogatories. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s ruling in the
following five respects: (i) the finding that policy 6.5.1 is a privileged and confidential document;
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(ii) the court “lost” his motion for partial summary judgment; (iii) the rejection of Plaintiff’s
allegation that defendant Varner is tampering with and destroying his legal mail; (iv) the fact that the
magistrate judge did not specifically address Plaintiff’s request for “e-mails of all the grievances he
had filed;” and (v) the issuance by the magistrate judge of an amended case management order. (See
Plaintiff’s Appeal, ECF No. 72.)
As an initial matter, the court notes that Whitney made serious accusations against the
magistrate judge. For example, he states that “[t]he court seems to . . . call plaintiff a liar by the use
of the word ‘sprawling’”; the court “makes the false claim that the plaintiff has no problem with
litigating his claims”; “[t]o the plaintiff it looks as if the courts [sic] is fighting this civil action and
not the defendants”; and “[t]he plaintiff believe [sic] that the courts do not want the plaintiff to have
the evidence he needs to win this civil action [sic] the plaintiff can win by a land slide if he is
provided with the evidence he has requested in discovery.” (ECF No. 72 at 1, 2.) These are grave
accusations which the court considers a serious matter. The court finds that Whitney’s accusations
are unwarranted and baseless. Like most litigants, Whitney no doubt feels strongly that he should
prevail. He is entitled to argue vigorously on his own behalf, and to point out errors he believes the
court has made, but he is not to make scandalous, baseless accusations against the court in his
filings.

Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s requests, the court finds that the decision of the

magistrate judge to deny Whitney’s request for a copy of policy 6.5.1 & DC-ADM 6.5.1 was proper
because this document is a privileged and confidential document that “addresses the administration
of Security Level 5 Housing Units.” Huertas v. Beard, Civil No. 10-10, 2012 WL 3096430, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 30, 2012). In Huertas, the court referenced a declaration submitted by the defendants in which
the declarant, an intelligence captain, opined that the disclosure of that material posed a security risk to
the institution. Id. As the magistrate judge noted in this case, relying upon Huertas, defendants have

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legitimate security concerns about the release of this document, which concerns outweigh Plaintiff’s
need, if any, for the document. The court finds that the magistrate judge’s decision to deny this
request was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
Second, according to Plaintiff, he submitted a motion for partial summary judgment, with
supporting documentation, to the court on January 3, 2014, and, received a note from the Clerk’s
office informing him that his filing had been resized as it was on 8.5″ x 14″ paper. Assuming the
veracity of Plaintiff’s arguments, it appears that the Clerk’s office may have lost Plaintiff’s
documents because those documents were not filed and docketed. Plaintiff, however, was not
prejudiced by this error as the magistrate judge extended the deadline for filing summary judgment
motions to allow Plaintiff time to refile his motion. The docket reflects that, on May 15, 2014,
Plaintiff refiled his motion for partial summary judgment accompanied by a brief in support (ECF
Nos. 77 and 78).
Third, the court finds that the magistrate judge properly denied Plaintiff’s claims that Dorina
Varner destroyed his motion for partial summary judgment and is tampering with and even
destroying his legal mail. Those allegations are without any support and are somewhat contradictory
given that Plaintiff also alleges that it was the court that lost his motion for partial summary
judgment.
Fourth, Plaintiff submitted to defendants approximately ten separate requests for email and
other grievance-related documents. See Pl.’s Request for Documents Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,14, 15,
21, and 24 (ECF No. 53-1). The magistrate judge did not rule separately on each of these requests,
but accepted defendants’ representation that they had provided Plaintiff with his own grievance
history and copies of his relevant grievances. Defendants stated that they had produced all
responsive documentation that could be located. (See ECF Nos. 46, 54, and 61.) The magistrate
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judge found that, subject to defendants’ duty to supplement should more information or documents
be made available, defendants’ responses were satisfactory. (ECF No. 67, at 4.)
In his appeal, although not crystal clear, it appears that Plaintiff’s objection is directed to the
magistrate judge’s failure to grant in full Plaintiff’s request for production No. 7, to wit: “any and all
grievances or complaints filed against defendants Cpt. T. Berier, Carl E. Walker. This should include
those file [sic] by the plaintiff as well from the time frame of 5/6/2011 to 5/17/2012 which allege
retaliation.” (ECF No. 53-1, at 1.) Defendants objected as follows:
This request is Objected to as seeking information that is over broad and unduly
burdensome (as records are not kept in a manner to easily obtain this information),
irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible information, and
privileged and confidential (relating to other inmates). Without waiver of this
objection, see grievance history of the plaintiff and grievances already provided.
(ECF No. 54-1, ¶ 7.) Defendants did not submit any support for their assertion that those requested
documents are privileged or confidential. In his brief in support of his motion to compel, Plaintiff
contended that he had “asked and requested ‘e-mail, memos’ of grievances. The grievances nor [sic]
e-mail are not confidential because grievances was gave to plaintiff by inmates who filed them.”
(Pl.’s Br. 4, ECF No. 58.) The magistrate judge granted the request only to the extent any such
documents pertained specifically to Whitney.
The court finds that the magistrate judge’s determination was too narrow and that the
information requested in Request for Production No. 7 is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore,
Plaintiff will be entitled to discover any and all grievances or complaints filed against defendants
Cpt. T. Berier and Carl E. Walker, to the extent such grievances or complaints specifically allege the
essence of Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against prisoners who utilize the grievance system or
prisoners who have agreed to be a defense witness for a fellow prisoner.
With respect to the objection related to the amended case management order, the court has
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the inherent power to control its own docket and the amended case management order was entered to
do just that. Once it came to the court’s attention that Plaintiff was sending defendants discovery in
a piecemeal fashion, the court entered an amended case management order so that discovery could
be conducted in an orderly fashion. Plaintiff must adhere to the schedules established by the court,
even if the schedules differ from what is outlined in various handbooks upon which Plaintiff relies.
If Plaintiff needs discovery in a manner not contemplated by the case management order, he may
request the court to amend the order.
For the reasons stated above, the court grants Plaintiff’s appeal insofar as he will be afforded
additional discovery with respect to grievances and complaints complaining that defendants Cpt. T.
Berier and Carl E. Walker retaliated against other inmates for filing grievances or agreeing to be a
defense witness for a fellow prisoner. On or before December 1, 2014, defendants shall serve a
supplemental answer to Request for Production No. 7 and shall provide Plaintiff the opportunity to
review any such documents. In all other respects, Plaintiff’s appeal will be denied. An appropriate
order will be entered.

Dated: October 31, 2014

cc:

/s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge

CHARLES WHITNEY
DM 3996
SCI Benner
301 Institution Drive
Bellefonte, PA 16823
Yana L. Warshafsky
Office of the Attorney General
Email: [e-mail]
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