MANNING v. ASTRUE

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 11 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 13 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/17/14.(kw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA MARIE MANNING,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 12 1778
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW, this

~~

of March, 2014, upon consideration of

plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for
disability insurance benefits ("DIE") and

supplemental security

income ("SS1") under Title II and Title XVI , respectively, of the
Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's
motion for summary judgment
hereby is,

(Document No.

13) be,

and the same

granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

(Document No. 11) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may

rej ect

or discount

reasons for doing so.
Cir. 1999).
substantial
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(Rev. 8/82)

findings,

any evidence

if

Plummer v. Apfel,

the ALJ explains

the

186 F.3d 422,

(3d

429

Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,

even

if

a

reviewing

it would have

court

decided

is

bound

by

the

factual

those
inquiry

differently.
2001).

Fargnoli v.

Moreover,

Massanari,

disability

is

not

247 F.3d 34,
determined

38

(3d Cir.

merely

by

the

presence of impairments, but by the effect that those impairments
have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful
activity.

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).

These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of
the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her DIB and SSI applications on February 24,
2009,

alleging

disability

beginning

October

1,

2008,

due

to

depression, anxiety and addiction.

Plaintiff's applications were

denied.

on June

An ALJ

held

a

hearing

14,

2011,

at

which

plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified.
On July 25, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff
is not eligible for DIB and SSI benefits because her substance
abuse

is

a

disability.

contributing

factor

On October 11,

2012,

material

to

the Appeals

the

issue

of

Council denied

plaintiff's request for review making the ALJ's decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.

The instant action followed.

Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 25 years old
on her alleged onset date of disability, and is classified as a
younger

individual

§§404 .1563 (c),

under

416.963 (c) .

the

regulations.

Plaintiff

experience as a nursing assistant,

has

past

20

C.F.R.

relevant

work

but she has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity at any time since her alleged onset
date.
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(Rev. 8/82)

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After

reviewing

plaintiff's

medical

records

and

hearing

testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the

ALJ

concluded

meaning of the Act.

that

plaintiff

is

not

disabled within

the

Although the medical evidence established

that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of personality
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and opiate dependence in
remission, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet
or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth
in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix
1") .

The

ALJ

determined

that

with

continued

substance

abuse,

plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform work at
all exertional levels, but she would be off task more than 15% of
the work day and/or unable to maintain regular attendance and was
likely to miss two or more days per months due to exacerbated
symptoms caused by the abuse of drugs such as heroin.
However,

the ALJ also found that absent substance abuse,

plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform work at
all

exertional

limitations:

levels

with

the

a limitation to simple,

non-exertional

following
routine,

repetitive tasks

that involve short, simple work-related decisions; a restriction
to

little

or no

changes

in

the

routine

work

setting;

and a

limitation to only occasional contact with the general public, co­
workers and supervisors (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
Based
concluded

upon
that

testimony
plaintiff's

by

a

vocational

%'AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

vocational

- 3 ­

expert,

factors

and

the

ALJ

residual

functional capacity do not permit her to perform her past relevant
work.

However,

substance

the

abuse,

vocational

plaintiff's

expert

testified

vocational

factors

that
and

absent

residual

functional capacity would enable her to perform other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a
machine feeder, machine presser and hand packer.

Based on that

testimony, the ALJ determined plaintiff would not be disabled if
she stopped her substance abuse,

thus making her ineligible for

benefits under the Act.
The Act defines "disabilityH as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A), 1382c(a) (3) (A).

The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant
"is

not

only

unable

considering [her]

to

age,

do

[her]

previous

work

but

cannot,

education and work experience, engage in

any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy .... "

42 U.S.C. §§423(d) (2) (A), 1382c(a} (3) (B).

The Act also provides that "an individual shall not be considered
to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . .
be

a

contributing

determination

that

factor
the

material

individual

is

to

the

disabled.

Commissioner's
II

42

U.S.C.

§§423 (d) (2) (C), 1382c (a) (3) (J) .
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.

The ALJ must determine:

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4

­

(1) whether the

claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
if not t whether she has a severe impairment;

(3)

if

SOt

whether

her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)

if not t whether the claimantts impairment prevents her from

performing her past relevant worki

and

(5)

if

SOt

whether the

claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy

I

residual

in light of her age t
functional

416.920(a) (4).

education t

capacity.l

20

work experience and

C.F.R.

§§404.1520(a) (4),

If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled

at any stept further inquiry is unnecessary.

Id.

However, if a claimant is found disabled and there is medical
evidence of alcoholism or drug addiction, the regulations require
the ALJ to determine whether the claimant's alcoholism or drug
addiction Uis a contributing factor material to the determination
of disability."

20 C.F.R. §§404.1535(a), 416.935(a).

The process

for making that determination is explained in the regulations as
follows:
(1)
The key factor we will examine in
determining
whether
drug
addiction
or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material
to the determination of disability is whether
we would still find you disabled if you
stopped using drugs or alcohol.
(2) In making this determination, we will
evaluate which of your current physical and

lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (1) I 416.945(a) (1).
In assessing
a claimant's residual functional capacity
the ALJ
required to
consider her ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other
requirements of work.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (4)
416.945(a) (4).
I

I

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5 ­

mental limitations, upon which we based our
current
disability
determination,
would
remain if you stopped using drugs or alcohol
and then determine whether any or all of your
remaining limitations would be disabling.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1535{b) (1)-(2), 416.935{b) (1)

(2).

If the ALJ concludes based on the foregoing process that the
claimant's remaining limitations would not be disabling, then he
will

find

that

substance

addiction

is

a

contributing

factor

material to the determination of disability, and the claimant will
be

ineligible

for

20

Conversely,

416.935 (b) (2) (i) .

benefits.

if

C.F.R.

§§404.1535{b} (2)(i),

the ALJ determines that the

claimant's remaining limitations are disabling,

the claimant is

disabled independent of her substance addiction, and the ALJ will
find that the claimant's substance addiction

not a contributing
20 C.F.R.

factor material to the determination of disability.
§§404 .1535 (b) (2) (ii), 416.935 (b) (2) (ii) .
In

this

impairments,

the

case,

ALJ

determined

that

when including her substance abuse,

plaintiff's
resulted in a

residual functional capacity that would not allow her to maintain
gainful employment.

However,

determined

functional

that

the

absent substance abuse,
limitations

which

the ALJ

result

from

plaintiff's remaining severe impairments do not preclude her from
performing

work

that

exists

in

the

national

economy.

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's substance abuse is
a contributing factor material to the determination of disability
and therefore found her to be ineligible for benefits.
On appeal here, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding
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substance abuse material to the disability determination because,
in making that finding, the ALJ erroneously gave no weight to the
opinion of Dr. Dennis Wayne, who was her treating psychiatrist.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's RFC Finding is not supported
by substantial evidence because he failed to account for certain
limitations identified by the consultative examiner.
plaintiff

claims

that

the ALJ's

Finally,

hypothetical question to the

vocational expert was inadequate because it did not account for
all of her limitations.

For reasons explained below, we find that

each of these arguments is without merit.
First,

in finding that substance abuse

is a

contributing

factor material to the disability determination in this case,
ALJ

properly

rejected

Dr.

functional capabilities.

Wayne's

Dr.

opinion

of

Wayne completed a

the

plaintiff's

form entitled

"Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire" on which he
rated

plaintiff

as

being

seriously

limited,

unable

to

meet

competitive standards or having no useful ability to function in
every work-related category he was asked to assess.

(R. 379-80).

Dr. Wayne also checked a box to indicate that there would not be
any significant improvement in plaintiff's mental functioning if
she stopped using drugs.

(R. 381).

The ALJ determined that Dr.

Wayne's opinion was not entitled to any weight because the form
report was completely contrary to his own treatment notes.

(R.

18) .
We

conclude

that

the

ALJ

properly

rej ected Dr.

Wayne's

extremely restrictive assessment of plaintiff's mental functional
~A072

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capabilities

as

indicated

on

the

form

report

because

assessment is contradicted by his own treatment notes.
C.F.R.

§§404.1527(c) (2)

i

416.927(c) (2)

that

See 20

(a treating physician's

opinion only is entitled to controlling weight if it is well
supported

by

medically

diagnostic

techniques

acceptable

and is not

substantial evidence of record).

clinical

and

laboratory

inconsistent with the other
Dr.

Wayne's treatment notes

repeatedly indicated that plaintiff's mental status examination
was within normal limits, described her mental status as stable
and noted that her symptoms improved with medication.
353,

369,

391).

information

to

Dr.

Wayne's

support

the

treatment
restrictive

notes

(R. 351,

do not contain

mental

work-related

limitations that he subsequently attributed to plaintiff on the
form report.

For these reasons, the ALJ properly determined that

Dr. Wayne's opinion of plaintiff's mental functional capabilities
was not entitled to any weight. 2
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's RFC Finding is not
supported by substantial evidence because he did not adequately

2 Pl a intiff
also
tiques the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Wayne's
opinion by contending the ALJ improperly relied on his own lay
assessment that it was inappropriate for Dr. Wayne to prescribe Klonopin
for plaintiff. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the ALJ's decision
specifically states that he rejected Dr. Wayne's opinion set forth on
the form report because it was "completely contrary to the actual
treatment notes he supplied."
(R. 18).
The ALJ simply noted he was
"perplexed" that Dr. Wayne continued to prescribe Klonopin for plaintiff
considering her history of drug dependence and the fact that the
doctor's treatment notes suggested she was preoccupied with obtaining
the drug.
(R.18).
The ALJ's decision makes clear that he did not
evaluate and ultimately reject Dr. Wayne's opinion based on his own lay
assessment, but rather because the opinion was inconsistent with the
doctor's treatment notes.
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account for certain limitations identified by Dr. James Hepburn,
who performed a mental consultative examination.

According to

plaintiff, despite giving Dr. Hepburn's opinion greater weight,
(R. 18), the ALJ did not account for Dr. Hepburn's assessment that
she

had a

marked

limitation 3

in both her ability to

respond

appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting and to
respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. 4

(R.

328) .

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ accounted for her
limitations in these areas by including in the RFC Finding a
restriction to little or no changes in the routine work setting,
as well as a limitation to simple, routine and repetitive tasks
that involve short,
Accordingly,
identified

simple work-related decisions.

(R.

18).

the ALJ's RFC Finding incorporated the limitations
by

Dr.

Hepburn,

and

therefore

is

supported

by

substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical
question to the vocational expert did not adequately account for
all of the work-related limitations caused by her impairments.

An

ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the

3The Medical Source Statement form completed by Dr. Hepburn defined
"marked as "[t]here is a serious limitation in this area. The ability
to function is severely limited but not precluded. 1I
(R. 327).
ll

4 Dr . Hepburn otherwise found that plaintiff had either no, slight
or moderate limitation in her ability to perform the other mental work
related activities he was asked to assess.
(R. 328). Dr. Hepburn noted
that "drug addiction is a primary cause of limitations listed [and] ...
[i]f abstinent for over a year, [plaintiff] would likely develop more
functional and socially appropriate coping skills to manage her anxiety
and stress. 1I
(R. 329).
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claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the medical
evidence.
1987) .

Chrupcala v.
Here,

the

Heckler,

ALJ's

plaintiff's functional

829 F. 2d 1269,

hypothetical

1276

incorporated

(3d Cir.
all

of

limitations that the evidence of record

supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the
RFC Finding.

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the

vocational expert's testimony to conclude that, absent substance
abuse,

plaintiff

can

perform

other

work

that

exists

in

the

carefully and methodically considering all

of

the

national economy.
After

medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony,

the ALJ

determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
the Act.
substantial

The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by
evidence

and

are

not

otherwise

erroneous.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc: Jaya A. Shurtliff, Esq.
Stanley Law Offices
215 Burnet Ave.
Syracuse, NY 13203
Christy wiegand

Assistant U.S. Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

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