SADELMYER v. PELTZER et al

Filing 51

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 45 Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) in the form of a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Warden J. Peltzer, Deputy Warden Teamus, Leverne Rossi, Facility Nurse, and Sergeant Chipps. The County Defendants shall file an Answer in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(A). Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 04/14/2014. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARIANNE SADELMYER,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN J. PELTZER, DEPUTY
WARDEN TEAMUS, FACILITY
DOCTOR ISLEY, M.D., LEVERNE
ROSSI, FACILITY NURSE, AND
SERGEANT CHIPPS,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 12-cv-1785
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently pending is the “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) In The Form
of a Motion for Summary Judgment,” with brief in support, filed by Defendants Warden J.
Peltzer, Deputy Warden Teamus, Leverne Rossi, Facility Nurse, and Sergeant Chipps (ECF Nos.
45 and 46) and the Opposition filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 50).
The issues have been fully briefed and the factual record has been developed. See ECF
Nos. 47 and 48. After careful consideration of the motion, the filings in support and opposition
thereto, the memoranda of the parties, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the Court
finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.1

The parties have consented to jurisdiction by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See ECF
Nos. 1-4; 13; and 28.
1

1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Marianne Sadelmyer, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Albion Correctional
Facility, in Albion, New York.

This matter involves events that purportedly transpired from

August 17, 2012, through October 3, 2012, during the forty-eight (48) days that Plaintiff was
confined at Washington County Correctional Facility (the “Correctional Facility”). Complaint at
¶ 1. From August 17, 2012, through September 25, 2012, Plaintiff was confined as a pretrial
detainee; on September 26, 2012, however, Plaintiff’s status changed to that of a convicted
prisoner as she was sentenced to a two (2) year term of probation on that date. She remained in
the Correctional Facility until October 3, 2012, at which time she was released to the New York
State Police for extradition to New York.2
Plaintiff initiated this action on December 7, 2012, by the filing of a Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis. The motion was granted and the Complaint was filed. (ECF No. 7.)
Named as Defendants are Warden J. Peltzer (now the former Warden), Deputy Warden Teamus
(now the current Warden), Laverne Rossi, Facility Nurse (name incorrectly spelled in case
caption), Sergeant Eli Chipps (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “County Defendants”)

Based on the Court’s review of The Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal,
Plaintiff was arrested by the Canonsburg Police on August 17, 2012, and charged with identity
theft; unauthorized use of access device, forgery, theft by deception - false impression; theft by
unlawful taking - movable property; and false identification to a law enforcement officer. On
September 26, 2012, Plaintiff pled guilty to the unauthorized use of access device charge and was
sentenced to two (2) years of probation. The remainder of the charges against her were nolle
prossed on that day. http://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CommonPleasDocket
Sheets/CPReport.ashx?DocketNumber=CP-63-CR-002149-2012. Plaintiff remained in the
Washington County Correctional Facility until she was extradited to New York on October 3,
2012.
2

2

and Matthew Eisley, M.D., a facility doctor (named incorrectly spelled in case caption).3 The
Complaint does not indicate whether Plaintiff is suing the County Defendants in their individual
or official capacities, or both. For purposes of this Opinion only, the Court will assume that
Defendants have been named in both their official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff arrived at the Correctional Facility on August 17, 2012, at which time a Nursing
Intake Assessment was conducted. Plaintiff reported having hip replacement surgery nine and a
half weeks prior and “reported having a fractured pelvis and broken wrists.” Affidavit of
Autumn Loghman, LPN (ECF No. 48-6, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was assigned a Medical Clinic Handicap
cell because she required the use of aluminum braces on both of her arms. During the early
morning hours of August 18, 2012, the nursing staff was advised that Plaintiff had fallen and was
complaining of left hip pain. She was transported to Washington Hospital for evaluation. She
was discharged from Washington Hospital on the same day with a diagnosis of hip contusion,
depression, and anxiety. She was to have a follow up with Family Medicine and a psychiatry
consultation. Id.
Later that evening, Plaintiff was discovered hanging from the air vent in an apparent
suicide attempt. She was placed on the floor, her vital signs were taken and were noted to be
stable. It was determined that Plaintiff did not require any medical treatment.

She was

transferred to Processing Cell No. 2, where she remained until she was transferred back to the

Defendant Eisley filed a separate Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40), which was granted in
part and denied in part. (ECF No. 43.) The Motion was denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of
deliberate indifference and granted as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
3
3

Medical Clinic on August 29, 2012.

Plaintiff remained in the Medical Clinic until she was

released to the New York State police.
Plaintiff alleges that during her time at the Correctional Facility, the County Defendants
(i) subjected her to unsanitary prison conditions; (ii) were deliberately indifferent to her serious
medical needs; and (iii) discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”).
The County Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
In the Form of a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 45). The Court advised the parties
that the pending motion would be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and that the motion would be evaluated under the standard set forth in
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff was further advised that she must
comply with Local Rule 56.C by filing a brief in response, concise counter statement of facts and
any appendix. (Order of October 17, 2013, ECF No. 49). In response to the motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiff filed a “Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgement In the Form
of a Sworn Affidavit.” (ECF No. 46.) For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in
part and denied in part.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, the record indicates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be
granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any
4

element to that party's case and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying
evidence or the lack thereof that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving
party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986). The inquiry, then, involves determining “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52). If a court, having reviewed the evidence with this
standard in mind, concludes that “the evidence is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly
probative,” then summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50. Finally,
while any evidence used to support a motion for summary judgment must be admissible, it is not
necessary for it to be in admissible form. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
DISCUSSION
1.

Claim of Unsanitary Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges without any specificity that she was “exposed to other person’s body

fluids.” Complaint at IV.C.1, 2 and 5. The County Defendants have provided record evidence
5

that only on two occasions did Plaintiff complain of unsanitary conditions in her cell.
First, the summary judgment record evidence reflects that on August 24, 2012, while
housed in Processing Cell No. 2, Plaintiff filed a “Formal Inmate Grievance,” in which she stated
that “Today while on the toilet something hit my leg. It was a bloody tampon from another
inmate. The toilet sends feces, urine, vomit and now tampons up into other cells.” (ECF No. 481, at 3.) According to the Affidavit of Sergeant Eli Chipps, he was on duty that day and Plaintiff
reported the incident to him. When Defendant Chipps asked Plaintiff to show him the tampon,
she claimed that she had flushed the tampon down the toilet. He looked in her toilet and saw
nothing. Defendant Chipps also noted that there were no problems with any of the toilets in the
processing area. In an abundance of caution, Plaintiff was permitted to shower. Defendant
Chipps also provided Plaintiff with a Grievance form, which she completed.
Defendants also have submitted the Affidavit of Officer Ray Prevost, a Maintenance
Officer for the Correctional Facility. In his Affidavit, Officer Prevost describes the construction
of the drains, which contain baffles or steel bolts that extend through the drain pipes so that large
objects cannot be flushed down the toilets.(ECF No.48-2, ¶¶ 8, 12.) Officer Prevost explains in
his Affidavit that in order for the water to rise high enough in any toilet to touch the person
sitting on it, all of the toilets on the floor would have to be flooding. Id. at ¶ 13.
Second, the summary judgment record evidence reflects that on a date not given, while
Plaintiff was housed in the Medical Center, she told Officer Prevost that she had noticed a “turd”
in her toilet that came from another cell. Officer Prevost inspected the toilet, saw nothing, and
noted that the toilet flushed normally.
6

Plaintiff alleges inaccuracies in both Affidavits. She claims that Officer Chipps never
entered her cell and that he told her “that the entire building had the problem of one toilet
flushing comming (sic) into the connected cells.” (ECF No. 50.) She also contends that she had
“a very short and to the point conversation” with Officer Prevost, in which he told her that “the
only way to fix it [her toilet] would be to gut the building.” Id.
At the time of the first incident, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. Therefore, the protection
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to this incident. However, it is
not clear from the summary judgment record evidence whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
a convicted prisoner at the time of her second complaint. Thus, it is also not clear whether the
protection of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to her second report of unsanitary
conditions.4 See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard I) (stating that
claims that arose while a plaintiff was a pretrial detainee must be prosecuted under the Due
Process Clause, while claims that arose after he was sentenced are analyzed under the Cruel and

4

The Eighth Amendment “was designed to protect those convicted of crimes and
consequently the Clause applies only after the State has complied with constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986)
(citation and internal quotations omitted). Thus, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause does not apply until “after sentence and conviction.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 392 at n.6 (1989). It imposes a duty on prison officials to provide “humane conditions
of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294 (1991), the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for alleged violations of the
Eighth Amendment while addressing non-medical conditions of confinement. The Court held
that the prisoner must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference that deprived
him of ‘ “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’ ” Id. at 298–99 (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
7

Unusual Punishment Clause). While recognizing that the case law is unclear as to whether the
Fourteenth Amendment provides more measure of additional protections for pretrial detainees
above what the Eighth Amendment affords convicted prisoners,5 the Court, in an abundance of
caution, will analyze both of these claims under the Due Process Clause because the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has hinted that a pretrial detainee’s “due process rights are at least
as broad, if not broader, than his rights under the Eighth Amendment.” Tapp v. Proto, 404 F.
App’x 563, 566 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2010)).6
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, when a pretrial detainee complains about the
conditions of her confinement, courts are to consider whether the conditions “amount to
punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with law.” Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at
158. The Fourteenth Amendment standard of unconstitutional punishment, like the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment standard, contains both an objective component and
a subjective component:

5

The standard to apply when evaluating conditions of confinement imposed on pretrial
detainees is not clear and has been the subject of recent scholarly debate. Catherine T. Starve,
The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1009 (2013). However, the United States
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have unequivocally held that the
Fourteenth Amendment due process standard is at least as protective as the Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment standard when analyzing conditions of confinement. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (“pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any
crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted
prisoners”); Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the protections due to
sentenced inmates provide a floor for what pretrial detainees may expect”).
The Court notes that Defendants analyzed both claims under Eighth Amendment
standards. Even if the Court were to analyze the claims under the Eighth Amendment, the
conclusion would be the same. Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation with
regard to her alleged unsanitary conditions of confinement claim.
8
6

Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective
components. As the Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . .
. (1991), the objective component requires an inquiry into whether “the
deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective component asks whether
“the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind [.]” Id. at 298. . . .
The Supreme Court did not abandon this bipartite analysis in Bell, but rather
allowed for an inference of mens rea where the restriction is arbitrary or
purposeless, or where the restriction is excessive, even if it would accomplish a
legitimate governmental objective.
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met the objective component necessary to establish
a Due Process violation. Plaintiff’s complaints are limited to an alleged exposure to unsanitary
material on two isolated occasions. There is no evidence of the length of time of such exposure,
that the cell flooded, or that the cell Plaintiff was housed in was in any way unsanitary.

The

Court concludes that the summary judgment record is void of any evidence which establishes
that Plaintiff was subjected to genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time.
See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978) (“the length of confinement cannot be ignored
in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell
and a diet of ‘gruel’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or
months”); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”) (holding that
triple celling of pretrial detainees and use of floor mattresses did not violate Due Process because
the inmates “were not subjected to genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of
time”); Piskanin v. Hammer, 269 F. App'x 159, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2008) (placement of pretrial
detainee on suicide watch for brief six day period, during which time he could not contact
counsel or file a habeas petition, did not amount to punishment prior to adjudication of guilt).
9

Thus, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find
for Plaintiff on her conditions of confinement claim. Therefore, summary judgment will be
granted to the County Defendants on this claim.
2.

Claim for Medical Indifference7

In accordance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the government is obliged “to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing
by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “[D]eliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 104 (citation omitted). “[W]hether the indifference
is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed . . . deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states
a cause of action under § 1983.” Id. at 104–05 (citations omitted).
A medical need is “serious” if “it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,

For purposes of analyzing Plaintiff’s medical indifference claim, the legal analysis is the
same whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted person. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has indicated that a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical
care should be analyzed under the well-settled standard established in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976), which provides that prison officials are required “to provide basic medical
treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
10
7

347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). “The seriousness of an inmate's medical need
may also be determined by reference to the effect of denying the particular treatment.” Id.
The “deliberate indifference” a plaintiff must allege lies “somewhere between the poles of
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other” and is frequently equated with
recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37
(1994). This standard “affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis
and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Where a prisoner has received medical care and only
the adequacy of the treatment is disputed, courts are often reluctant to second guess professional
medical judgment. See id.
However, deliberate indifference can be manifested by an intentional refusal to provide
care, delayed medical treatment, and the denial of prescribed medical treatment. See Durmer,
991 F.2d at 64; Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Deliberate indifference may
be shown by intentionally denying or delaying medical care.”).
Plaintiff contends that the County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious
medical needs. Specifically, she contends that (i) she was required to sleep without a mattress
despite her alleged hip surgeries, (ii) she was not seen by a doctor until eleven (11) days after her
suicide attempt; and (iii) she was neither treated for Xanax withdrawal, which can cause suicidal
thoughts and actions, nor was she weaned from Fentanyl, which has serious medical
consequences when not weaned from the system.

11

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need and,
assuming arguendo that she did, they were not deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. In
the alternative, the County Defendants argue that summary judgment is proper in their favor on
the basis of qualified immunity. The County Defendants contend that “a review of the medical
records reflects that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical condition” and that “every time she
issues a complaint, the staff at the Facility addressed her complaints and provided her with
medical treatment.” (ECF No. 46 at 9 -11.) Additionally, the County Defendants contend that
“there is no evidence that Defendants were not justified in believing that Plaintiff was in capable
hands when being treated by the physicians in this matter.” Id. at 11.8 In support of their
position, the County Defendants attach the Affidavits of Cheryl McGavitt, RN; LaVerne Rossi,
LPN; and Autumn Loughman, LPN.
Plaintiff responds that there are a number of inaccuracies in the Affidavits. For example,
the Affidavit of Autumn Loughman reflects that Plaintiff was seen by a psychiatrist on August
23, 2012; Plaintiff refutes that statement and states that she was not seen after her suicide attempt
“by any doctor until September 20, 2012.” Compare ECF No. 48-6, ¶ 14 with ECF No. 50 at 4.
Plaintiff also contends that statements in Cheryl McGavitt’s Affidavit are “contradicted by the
fact that Plaintiff’s Pharmacy records are in Plaintiff’s medical chart . . . and in the actual
Medical notes.” ECF No. 50 at 3.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “[i]f a prisoner is under the care
of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that
the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.2004). “[A]bsent a
reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or
not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth
12
8

Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s medical records were not attached to any of the Affidavits filed
by the County Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical records are relevant to the
County Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff received proper care and that a determination on this
issue cannot be made until the Court has had an opportunity to review these medical records. On
the record before it, the motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Plaintiff’s claims that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs is denied without prejudice.
While Plaintiff contradicts the statements about her medical care, she does not contradict
statements in the Affidavits that she was never required to sleep on a cement floor and that she
was provided with a mattress / pillow combination bedding or a separate mattress and pillow at
every location where she was housed in the Correctional Facility. ECF No. 48-3, ¶ 14; ECF No.
48-4, ¶ 7. Thus, the County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims
that she was required to sleep without a mattress.
3.

The ADA Claim

The County Defendants argue that the ADA claim brought against them in their
individual capacities is not cognizable under the ADA. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has stated in dicta that individual liability is not available for discrimination claims
brought under Title I or Title II of the ADA. See Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302
F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (“there appears to be no individual liability for damages under Title
I of the ADA”); Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting in dicta
that “individuals are not liable under Titles I and II of the ADA”) (citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y.

Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Id.
13

Health Sciences Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding Title II does not allow suits
against individuals)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADA claim will be dismissed as to all defendants to
the extent that she brings her claim against them in their individual capacities.
To establish a claim for relief under Title II of the ADA, an inmate must allege that: (1)
she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was either excluded from participation in or
denied benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was subject to
discrimination by a public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination
was “by reason of” her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment . . . “ 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Not every physical or mental
impairment or medical condition qualifies as a disability for purposes of the ADA.

The

impairment or impairments in question must also “substantially limit[ ] one or more major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Major life activities” include, but are not limited to:
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Major life activities also include the operation of major
bodily functions such as: “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).

14

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her in violation
of the ADA

when they (i) denied her access to “church;” (ii) denied her access to the

commissary; (iii) denied her access to the library; and (iv) denied her access to the law library.
Plaintiff’s allegations will be addressed seriatim.
At the outset, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established she is a “disabled” person
protected by the ADA. She has not established (i) that she has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or (ii) that she has a record of a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; or (iii) that
she is “regarded” as having such an impairment. 28 CFR § 35.104.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was a “qualified individual with a disability,” she
has failed to identify any discrimination she has suffered, or program, service, activity or benefit
from which she has been excluded or which she has been denied “because of” her alleged
disability.
First, Plaintiff alleges she was denied access to “church.” In response to her allegation,
the County Defendants have submitted the Affidavit of Deputy Warden Edward Strawn. In his
Affidavit, Deputy Warden Strawn explains that the Correctional Facility has no “designated
Chapel,” but that there are locations within the facility for conducting religious services. (ECF
No. 48-5, ¶ 4.) Additionally, the Correctional Facility is commonly visited by Chaplains and has
a Chaplain on staff. According to the Correctional Facility’s records, Plaintiff never requested to
be seen by the Chaplain. Plaintiff does not contest that the Correctional Facility does not have a

15

designated Chapel or that she never requested to be seen by the Chaplain. Therefore, the Court
finds that this claim has no merit.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that while she was housed in the Medical Clinic, she was denied
access to the commissary and was not permitted to purchase items from a cart, such as cookies,
candy, and other types of snacks. In response, Deputy Warden Strawn explains that it is the
policy of the Correctional Facility that any inmate housed in the Medical Clinic does not have
commissary privileges. Id. at ¶ 14. Deputy Warden Strawn has articulated two penological
reasons for denying inmates housed in the Medical Clinic access to the commissary: (1) the need
to limit the Medical Unit to only inmates who have significant medical needs and (2) to prevent
inmates in the Medical Unit from obtaining certain foods that could be contraindicated by their
medical diagnosis and which could cause further medical problems. Id. at ¶¶ 14-20. Plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the regulation at issue is unreasonable and not rationally related to the
furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest. Jewell v. Gonzales, 420 F. Supp.2d 406, 430
(W.D.Pa. 2006). Plaintiff has not disputed that the Correctional Facility has a legitimate interest
in advancing its stated penological goals. Accordingly, the Court finds this claim has no merit.
Third, Plaintiff complains that she was denied access to the library. According to Deputy
Warden Strawn, the Correctional Facility does not maintain any type of a library. Id. at ¶ 7.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Correctional Facility does not have a library. Accordingly, the
Court finds this claim has no merit.
Plaintiff’s last complaint is that she was denied access to the law library. Because the
Correctional Facility does not maintain a law library, upon request, the Correctional Facility will
16

provide any inmate with access to Lexis legal research, which is gained through computers which
are on carts and can be wheeled to the inmate if the inmate is housed in the Medical Unit. Id. at ¶
8. Fatal to Plaintiff’s claim is that the records from the Correctional Facility do not reflect that
Plaintiff ever requested access to the Lexis computer and Plaintiff does not dispute the County
Defendants’ position that she never requested access to the Lexis computer. Accordingly, the
Court finds that this claim is without merit.
In sum, the Court finds that, after reviewing the summary judgment record evidence,
there is no factual basis under which Plaintiff can prove discrimination under the ADA.
Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims based upon the
ADA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the County
Defendants will be granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of April, 2014, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
1.

The Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim regarding unsanitary conditions

of confinement;
2.

The Motion is DENIED without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claim of medical

deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, with the exception that Plaintiff’s claim
that she was required to sleep without a mattress is dismissed; and
17

3.

The Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims based upon the American with

Disabilities Act.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the County Defendants shall file an Answer in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(A).

s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge

cc:

MARIANNE SADELMYER
13G298
Albion Correctional Facility
3595 State School Road
Albion, NY 14411-9399
Paul D. Krepps
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Email: [e-mail]
Jason J. Zivkovic
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC
Email: [e-mail]
Katie M. Mills
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC
Email: [e-mail]

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