BASILE v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mark R. Hornak on 6/19/13. (bdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER L. BASILE,
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTMORELAND COUNTY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-01847
Judge Mark R. Hornak
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint, ECF
No.7, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court has considered Plaintiff Peter Basile's
Complaint, ECF No.1, the pending Motion and Brief in support, ECF No.8, and Plaintiffs
Response in Opposition, ECF No.9, and Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 12. For the reasons that
follow, Defendant's motion is denied.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Basile alleges that his employer, Westmoreland County, discriminated against him
because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended
(ADEA). Title 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs favor. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011). Therefore, for the purposes of the disposition of Defendant's Motion, the essential facts
are as follows.
Mr. Basile worked for the Westmoreland County Park Police for thirty years, from 1982
until 2012. Most recently, he served as the Assistant Chief of Police. Compl.
~
7, ECF No. 1.
Around March 26, 2012, Defendant terminated Mr. Basile at the age of 52, telling him his
position was no longer necessary. Id.
~~
4,8. Mr. Basile was replaced by Aaron Goughnor, "who
is [] substantially younger, less qualified, less senior and less experienced" than he. Id.
~
14.
During proceedings with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (PHRC), Defendant
offered new and different reasons for Mr. Basile's termination other than those he was initially
given, including a somehow improper conversation Mr. Basile had with a union member while
being employed a management position, the fact that Mr. Basile had advocated for the removal
of the Chief of Police's secretary, the fact that Mr. Basile looked at documents on the Police
Chiefs desk, and an assumedly poor performance evaluation of Mr. Basile that was unsigned
and previously unknown to Mr. Basile. Id.
~
9. Mr. Basile filed suit in this Court on December
19,2012, asserting a single count of unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADEA. ECF No.
1.
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule l2(b)(6) both Plaintiffs Complaint in its
entirety, as well as Plaintiffs "claim" of willfulness more specifically. ECF No.7.
II.
DISCUSSION
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege
"enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "The District Court must accept the complaint's well
pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC ShadYSide, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009». "Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, a motion to dismiss should be granted if a party does
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not allege facts which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at
211.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, [Plaintiff]
must make a showing that: (1) she is forty years of age or older; (2) the defendant
took an adverse employment action against her; (3) she was qualified for the
position in question; and (4) she was ultimately replaced by another employee
who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of discriminatory animus.
Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 FJd 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). To prevail on his claim, a plaintiff
must ultimately prove that age was the "but for" cause of the employer's adverse action. Gross
v. FBL Financial Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
Defendant makes two arguments in support of its Motion: first, that Plaintiff s Complaint
In
its entirety should be dismissed under the Twiqbal 1 standard, because Plaintiff did not
specifically allege certain details such as the exact age of his replacement, Mr. Goughnor, nor
allege other "non-speculative and non-conclusory allegations" that could support a claim of
discrimination, Def.'s Br. Support Mot. Dismiss at 7, ECF No.8; and second, that Plaintiffs
"claim" that Defendant's conduct was willful under the ADEA should be dismissed now, just as
this case gets going, id. at 3.
Defendant's first argument rings hollow, as Twombly'S standards are not as stringent as
Defendant would have them. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 320 n.l8
(3d Cir. 2010) ("The touchstone of Rule 8(a)(2) is whether a complaint's statement of facts is
adequate to suggest an entitlement to relief under the legal theory invoked and thereby put the
defendant on notice of the nature of the plaintiffs claim.") (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565
n.10)). Here, Mr. Basile has plausibly pled a case for discrimination under the ADEA. He
plainly meets the age and adverse employment action requirements, his qualifications can be
I "Twiqbaf' refers to the civil pleadings standards as expounded by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).
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readily inferred from the fact that he was a thirty-year employee of the Westmoreland County
Park Police, and he has named a specific individual who replaced him (one presumably well
known to Defendant), whom he alleges to be "substantially younger" and also less qualified.
Therefore, within the scenario set out here, Plaintiff is not required to plead the exact age of his
already-named replacement in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations of his employer's shifting explanations of the reasons
for his termination also support a "non-speculative and non-conclusory" plausible inference that
those proffered reasons were therefore pretextual, and that therefore he was discriminated against
in violation of the ADEA. See Burton, 707 F.3d at 427 (an employee proves pretext by
"demonstrat[ing]
such
weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies,
incoherencies,
or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did
not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reason") (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
765 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal marks omitted).
Therefore, Mr. Basile's allegations rise well
beyond the level of "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements" that fail the Twiqbal test, and state a plausible claim of an ADEA
violation. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Turning to Defendant's second argument regarding willfulness, the Court concludes that
it is premature. As another member of this Court recently explained in a case involving this
same Defendant,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the issue of
whether an ADEA violation is willful depends not on any additional proof
adduced by a plaintiff in excess of the evidence required to sustain an ADEA
claim but whether the facts of the case meet the legal definition of willfulness,
i.e., did the employer know or show a reckless disregard for the fact that its
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA? See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
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54 FJd 1089, 1099 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 617 (1993) ("An ADEA violation is willful if the employer either' []knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the ADEA' " and such determination does not require additional evidence than is
required to prove the substantive ADEA claim). Therefore, the Court finds that
dismissal would not be appropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in light of the
arguments raised by Defendants.
Zampogna v. Sheriff of Westmoreland Cnty., Pa., CIV.A. 13-233, 2013 WL 1909146, at *2
(W.D. Pa. May 8, 2013). The Court agrees with Judge Fischer's reasoning in Zampogna, and
holds that here, Defendant's attempt to strike Plaintiff's "claim" of willfulness simply comes too
early in the game, and that it is "more appropriately addressed in the context of a well-supported
motion for summary judgment or, if there are genuine disputes of material facts, argued to the
jury at trial," once more facts have been adduced. Id.
For these reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. An appropriate order will
Issue.
Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge
Dated: June ft.,2013
cc:
All counsel of record
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