WILLIAMS et al v. WEAVER et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mark R. Hornak on 7/11/13. (bdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SAM WILLIAMS & JOHN F. MCCOY,
III,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RANDALL D. WEAVER & BIG G
EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.2: 13-cv-160
Judge Mark R. Hornak
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Cross-Claim. The
sole question before the Court is whether the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act
("WCA" or "Act"), 77 P.S. § 1, et. seq., pennits a defendant to file a cross-claim against a co
plaintiff/co-employee for the purposes of establishing liability, indemnity, contribution, or
apportioning liability.
I. Background
The underlying suit concerns a vehicular accident that took place in Washington County,
Pennsylvania. On September 13, 2011 at approximately 9:00 a.m., Sam Williams and John
McCoy were traveling in a tractor-trailer. Compi.
~
6; ECF No. 21 at 1-2. Williams was driving
while McCoy was a passenger in the sleeper section. Jd. Williams and McCoy were co
employees at the time, and Williams was driving the tractor-trailer for his employer, Schneider
National. ECF No. 19 ~ 6; ECF No. 20; ECF No. 21 at 2. Williams was driving in the right lane
on Interstate 70. Compi. ~4T 6, 8; ECF No. 21 at 2.
Around the same time and place, Randall Weaver was driving a tractor-trailer in the same
direction as Plaintiffs in the left lane, in the course and scope of his employment as a driver for
Big G Express, Inc. CompI.
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7, 9; Answer at 5, , 9; ECF No. 21 at 2. Plaintiffs contend that
the tractor-trailer driven by Weaver struck the Plaintiffs' tractor-trailer, ultimately resulting in an
accident that led to injuries to both Plaintiffs and damage to both tractor-trailers. Compi. , 8;
ECF No. 21 at 2.
Plaintiffs Williams and McCoy filed suit against Big G Express and Weaver for injuries
sustained in the accident. ECF No. 1-2. Defendants removed this action from the Court of
Common Pleas of Washington County on January 1, 2013 pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1441 and
1446. ECF No.1. On February 15, 2013, Defendant Big G Express filed an Answer which
included a Cross-Claim for negligence against Williams. Answer, ECF No.5. Williams filed a
Motion to Dismiss Big G Express's Cross-Claim. ECF Nos. 19 & 20. Defendant Big G Express
filed a Brief in Opposition, ECF No. 21, and Plaintiff Williams filed a Reply. ECF No. 24. Both
parties also provided a supplemental memorandum at the Court's request. ECF Nos. 29 & 30.
The Court has carefully considered each parties' briefs, and the issue is now ripe for disposition.
For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.)
II. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege
"enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "The District Court must accept the complaint's well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009)). "Threadbare recitals of the
I On June 4, 2013, Defendant Weaver filed an Answer with a similar Cross-Claim against Plaintiff Williams. ECF
No. 25. The parties agreed on the record at the June 19, 2013 status conference (and subsequently stipulated in
writing, ECF No. 27) that the disposition of this issue would also apply to Weaver's Cross-Claim.
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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. In short, a motion to dismiss should be granted if a party does not allege facts
which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. See Fowler, 578 F .3d at 211.
III. Discussion
The Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act ("WCA") bars certain claims that arise out
of the employment relationship, and essentially "substitute [s] a method of accident insurance in
place of common law rights and liabilities for all employees covered by its provisions." Colyer v.
Pa. State Police, 644 A.2d 230, 233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (citing Vescio v. Pa. Elec. Co., 9
A.2d 546 (Pa. 1939)). "In exchange for the right to compensation without the burden of
establishing fault, employees gave up their right to sue the employer in tort for injuries received
in the course of employment." Snyder v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 656 A.2d 534, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (quoting Kosowan v. MDC Indus., Inc., 465 A.2d 1069, 1072 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)).
However, the WCA also bars other claims that arise out of the employment relationship. For
instance, Section 72 of the WCA states:
If disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to
anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any
act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person
disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.
77 P.S. § 72. See also Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Boiler Erection & Repair Co., 964 A.2d 381, 389
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) ("where an employee's injury is compensable under the Act, Section 72
immunizes fellow employees from liability for their negligence"). Moreover, with respect to
actions involving third-parties, Section 303(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 481 (b), specifies that:
(b) In the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party, then such
employe . . . may bring their action at law against such third party, but the
employer, his insurance carrier, their servants and agents, employes,
representatives acting on their behalf or at their request shall not be liable to a
third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in any action at law, or
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otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or indemnity shall be
expressly provided for in a written contract ...
77 P.S. § 481(b) (emphasis added).2
In its Cross-Claim, Defendant Big G Express alleges that Williams, as the driver of the
tractor-trailer in which Plaintiffs were riding, was negligent in operating his vehicle and that
Williams caused his tractor-trailer to strike the tractor-trailer that Weaver was driving, ultimately
contributing to or causing McCoy's injuries. ECF No.5 at 7-9. Therefore, according to Big G
Express, Plaintiff Williams is "alone liable to [fellow Plaintiff] John F. McCoy and/or jointly
and/or severally liable with this Defendant or liable over to this Defendant for indemnity and/or
contribution for any amount which may be adjudged against it." !d. at 9.
Williams moves to dismiss this Cross-Claim on the basis that the WCA bars Defendant
Big G Express from maintaining such a cross-claim. ECF Nos. 19, 20, 24. Williams argues that
pursuant to the WCA, 77 P.S. §§ 72 & 481, Defendant is prohibited from bringing a cross-claim
against Williams alleging that he is solely or jointly and severally liable to McCoy, or that
Williams is liable to Big G Express for indemnity and/or contribution, or even for purposes of
apportioning liability. !d.
In response, Big G Express argues that such a cross-claim may be brought for the purpose
of determining respective liability and rights of contribution. ECF No. 21. Big G. Express relies
primarily on two cases: Mazzoleni v. Shenanco Steel Erectors, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 598 (W.O. Pa.
1972) and Maio v. Fahs, 14 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1940). Relying on Maio, the Mazzoleni court noted
that "the employer may be joined as an additional defendant or third-party defendant for the
Big G Express notes that "there is no lease agreement or indemnity provision" in this action, and does not point to
any written contract which would qualifY for the exception to WCA Section 481. ECF No. 21. Consequently, 77
P.S. § 481 is applicable to this case.
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purpose of determining the rights as between the original defendant and the employer."
lvlazzoleni, 344 F. Supp. at 599 (emphasis added).
However, Maio and Mazzo/eni were decided prior to the 1974 amendments to the WCA
which materially amended Section 303, 77 P.S. § 481. See Hefferin v. Stempkowski, 372 A.2d
869, 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) ("the Pennsylvania Legislature in the years 1972 through 1974
undertook a massive overhaul of the State's Workmen's Compensation Law"). Referencing
Maio among other cases, the Pennsylvania Superior Court wrote that:
Such decisions were based upon the procedure and statutory provisions which
were effective under the Workmen's Compensation Act prior to the amendments
of December 5, 1974, which became effective February 5, 1975.... Under the
practice prior to February 5, 1975, a third party could join a plaintiffs employer
as an additional defendant in a tort action, and might enjoy a reduction in the
amount of any verdict which was to be paid to the injured employee, based upon
contributing negligence of the employer, and its prior payment of workers'
compensation benefits to the employee. However, the Act of December 5, 1974,
P.L. 782, No. 263, 77 P.S. § 481, which amended Section 303 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, unquestionably bars the joinder of a plaintiffs employer as an
additional defendant in any action brought by its employee against a third party
for injuries which may have occurred during the course of employment.
Beary v. Container Gen. Corp., 568 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see also Tsarnas v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 412 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. 1980) (explaining that Section 303(b)
was amended after Maio had been decided, and that the section as amended prohibits a third
party from joining an employer as an additional defendant, "[nJor may the third party otherwise
seek contribution or indemnity from the employer, even though the employer's own negligence
may have been the primary cause ofthe injury.,,).3
3 See also Hamme v. Dreis & Krump A1fg. Co., 716 F.2d 152, 153 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the Third Circuit was
"bound by the interpretation given to Pennsylvania law by the courts of Pennsylvania" and that the WCA precluded
a third-party complaint against the employer even when solely for the purpose of determining comparative
negligence); Heckendorn v. Consolo Rail Corp., 465 A.2d 609 (Pa. 1983) (holding that employer could not be joined
as an additional defendant by a third-party for the purpose of apportioning negligence under the Comparative
Negligence Act as joinder was barred by the WCA).
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Furthermore, William Harter & Cleaver Brooks, A Div. ofAqua-Chern., Inc. v. Yeagley,
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456 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), is on point with the issue before the Court. In Yeagley, the
wife of an employee brought an action for the death of her husband, Frederick Yeagley. Yeagley,
who had been employed by Cleaver Brooks, was assisting a crane operator in moving metal
boiler shells when the crane came into contact with an overhead high voltage transmission line
owned by Metropolitan Edison Company ("Met Ed"), electrocuting Yeagley. Id. at 1022. Met Ed
tried to bring various theories of liability against the deceased's employer -- Cleaver Brooks -
and the co-employee who was operating the crane at the time of the occurrence. Id. Relying on
both 77 P.S. §§ 72 and 481, the court held that the WCA prohibited Met Ed from joining and
bringing claims against the employer or the co-employee. Id. at 1023-26. The court held that the
defendant was not able to bring claims against these parties "even for the limited purpose of
apportioning liability." Id. at 1024. When analyzing how 77 P.S. §§ 72 and 481(b) impact actions
involving a third party5 defendant bringing claims against an employer or a co-employee, the
court noted that "the rationale advanced on behalf of immunity from suit of the employer applies
with equal force to immunity of a co-employee." Id. at 1026.
Similar to the situation in Yeagley, Plaintiffs Williams and McCoy were working as co
employees for Schneider National at the time of the accident. Defendant Big G Express seeks to
bring a claim against Williams for the purpose of establishing (1) Williams's liability to McCoy,
(2) Big G Express's indemnity or contribution rights, or (3) to apportion liability. However, in
In that neither party relied on Yeagley in making or opposing the Motion to Dismiss, the Court invited
supplemental briefing as to its application. Plaintiffs now contend that Yeagley is on point, ECF No. 29 at 3.
Defendants contend that it is subtly different, ECF No. 30 at I, principally arguing that Yeagley's analysis has been
the subject of strong dissents, id. at 3-5, and that the Yeagley court did not engage in a deep analysis of the issue. ld.
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In this context, the term "third party" refers to an entity that is outside of the employment relationship.
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light of Yeagley and the language of77 P.S. §§ 72 and 481(b), the WCA bars such a Cross-Claim
for all of the above listed purposes. 6
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss is granted with prejudice. 7 An
appropriate order will issue.
Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge
Dated: July 11,2013
cc:
All counsel of record
Contrary to the position taken by Defendants, the Superior Court's opinion in Yeagley directly addressed this issue,
notwithstanding with perhaps less expansiveness than Defendants would prefer. Further, the Superior Court's
decision in Heckendorn v. Conso!. Rail Corp., 439 A.2d 674 (Pa. Super. 1981), which is the target of much of
Defendant's argument, was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 465 A.2d 609 (Pa. 1983).
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For the reasons as stated above, and as noted in footnote 1 above, Defendant Weaver's Cross-Claim against
Plaintiff Williams is also dismissed with prejudice.
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