BLACK et al v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY et al

Filing 251

ORDER denying 245 Motion to Consolidate Cases. All deadlines and obligations set forth in the 240 Pretrial Order remain in effect. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 4/20/2015. (bap)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEBRA BLACK, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-179
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Medical Defendants’ motion to consolidate cases for trial.
(ECF No. 245). Defendants request that the Court consolidate this case, (“Black I”), as well as
the related action, Black v. Youngue, Civ. No. 14-505 (“Black II”). Plaintiffs responded to said
motion, objecting to consolidation. (ECF No. 250). For the reasons which follow, the Medical
Defendants’ motion for consolidation will be DENIED.
As the parties agree, courts have broad discretion when considering whether to
consolidate two actions. Gonzalez v. Owens Corning, 2013 WL 5436963, *2 (W.D.Pa. 2013).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides the following:
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact,
the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). When considering such a motion, the court “should weigh the benefits of
judicial economy against the potential for new delays, expense, confusion or prejudice.”
Gonzales, 2013 WL 5436963, at *3 (citations and internal marks omitted).
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The Medical Defendants, as the moving party, carry the burden in convincing the Court
that consolidation is appropriate. Id. at *2. Their motion, however, does not acknowledge that
the Court does not have jurisdiction to consolidate these actions.

While the parties have

consented to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of final judgment in
Black I pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), (ECF Nos. 22, 23, 228), the undersigned does not have
the consent of all parties to conduct a jury trial in Black II. Therefore, because the Court is
without jurisdiction to conduct a trial in Black II, the Court is unable to grant the Medical
Defendants’ request.
Moreover, even assuming that the Court had the ability to consolidate these actions,
denial of the motion would nonetheless be appropriate, as Plaintiffs raise valid concerns in their
response brief. Indeed, Plaintiffs would experience prejudice if the cases were consolidated
because the Medical Defendants are prohibited from using an expert in Black I as a sanction for
ignoring the expert deadline, but may use an expert in Black II. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that the jury would have difficulty considering the Medical Defendants’ expert for only two of
the Defendants while disregarding the same testimony for the remaining Defendants. Therefore,
the dangers of confusion and prejudice would outweigh the benefits of judicial economy in this
case. Allowing consolidation would essentially result in the Medical Defendants being able to
avoid the sanction imposed upon them for blatantly disregarding one of the Court’s Orders,
which the Medical Defendants, through their counsel, have done throughout the entire duration
of the litigation in Black I. Any extra costs that the Medical Defendants bear for litigating two
cases is self-imposed.
AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2015, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the
Medical Defendants’ Motion for Consolidation (ECF No. 245) is DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT all obligations and deadlines set forth in the
Pretrial Order from December 3, 2014 (ECF No. 240) remain in effect.

By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all registered counsel via CM-ECF

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