GAMRET v. ASTRUE
Filing
11
ORDER granting 7 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; remanding matter for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 1/10/14. (ask)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN M. GAMRET,
)
) CA No. 13-246
)
)
Plaintiff,
V.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
In this action, Plaintiff filed for disability benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. Plaintiff claims disability primarily due to
lymphedema in her right arm and side, and complications from breast cancer; her application
also raised mental impairments of depressive disorder and panic disorder. The claims were
denied initially, and on rehearing. The Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review.
Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted, and Defendant’s denied.1
OPINION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
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Because the issues addressed in today’s Order are relatively narrow, I do not recount Plaintiff’s medical history in
full.
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support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).
While the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must provide at
least a glimpse into his reasoning. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 889. "Even if enough evidence exists in
the record to support the decision, [the court] cannot uphold it if 'the reasons given by the trier of
fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result. '" Hodes v.
Apfel, 61 F. Supp. 2d 798, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307
(1996)). Further, if the ALJ he has not sufficiently explained the weight he has given to all
probative evidence, it may be inappropriate for the court to find that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 407. "Since it is apparent that the ALJ
cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the
reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can
determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
706-07 (3d Cir. 1981).
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II. THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
Plaintiff bases her appeal on five interconnected grounds. She claims that the ALJ erred in
the following respects: 1) at step five, by finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing
sedentary work; 2) in failing to submit to the VE Plaintiff’s non-exertional reaching limitations,
in assessing alternate sedentary work; 3) in failing to submit to the VE Plaintiff’s mental
limitations, in assessing alternate sedentary level work; 4) failing to consider Plaintiff’s mental
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in determining RFC; and 5) relying on the VE’s
response to the ALJ’s hypotheticals, which do not constitute substantial evidence.
First, I address Plaintiff’s challenge to the manner in which the ALJ dealt with reaching
limitations. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had an RFC for sedentary work, limited to only
occasional fingering and handling with the dominant right hand, and limited to the performance
of simple and repetitive tasks. In determining the RFC, the ALJ relied on the work-related
physical activities assessments performed by two of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Drs. Soran
and Rafkal. Both assessments found Plaintiff ‘s lymphedema affected her in the physical
functions of pushing, pulling, reaching, handling, and fingering with the right arm. Neither
physician specified a degree of limitation. Plaintiff contends that SSR 85-15 provides that
reaching and handling are activities required in almost all jobs. Thus, she contends, limitations
on reaching and handling may eliminate a large number of occupations, and the hypothetical to
the VE should have reflected Plaintiff’s reaching impairment.
This argument implicates step five of the sequential analysis, in which the burden shifts
to the Commissioner "to show that other jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant could perform." Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir.
2005). If the ALJ seeks advisory testimony from a vocational expert, "the hypotheticals posed
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must 'accurately portray' the claimant's impairments and [] the expert must be given an
opportunity to evaluate those impairments 'as contained in the record.'" Id. Accordingly, if the
hypothetical question does not include "medically undisputed evidence of specific impairments"
in the record, then "the expert's response is not considered substantial evidence." Burns v.
Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002). Otherwise stated, “[h]ypothetical questions asked of
the vocational expert must 'set out all of the claimant's impairments.' If the record does not
support the assumptions in the hypothetical, the vocational expert's opinion has no evidentiary
value." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517-18 (9th Cir. 2001).
In this case, Drs. Rafkal and Soran each completed a Medical Source Statement of
Claimant’s Ability to Perform Work-Related Physical Activities, which noted that reaching was
affected by Plaintiff’s lymphedema. At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE the following
hypothetical:
If we assume an individual with the claimant’s age, education, and
limited work experience and assume that she would be capable of performing
work at the sedentary level, remaining seated most of the workday and
performing only occasional fingering and handling with the dominant right arm,
no—and no work above shoulder level with that right arm, are there jobs that can
be – limit the tasks to simple and repetitive nature, are there jobs that can be
performed?
“Reaching,” a physical demand addressed in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations
Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“SCO”), is defined as "Extending
hand(s) and arm(s) in any direction." SCO, App. C at C-3.
While Defendant correctly suggests
that “no work above shoulder level” incorporates a reaching limitation, it is not clear that the
physicians’ opinions were directed towards or restricted to overhead reaching. Although an
overhead reaching limitation is not inconsistent with the medical evidence, nor does it accurately
reflect the medical evidence. Indeed, it is unclear how the ALJ arrived at a limitation narrowed
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and particularized to lifting the right arm above shoulder level; as Defendant points out,
Plaintiff’s treating physicians did not specify any particular nature or degree of reaching
limitation. Defendant suggests that the ALJ’s conclusion may have been based on Plaintiff’s
complaint, reflected in rehabilitation records, that she had difficulty with overhead reaching. The
ALJ’s decision, however, does not refer to those records; thus, Defendant’s suggestion is no
more than speculation. In contrast, the ALJ’s decision does refer to the treating physicians’
conclusions regarding the effect of Plaintiff’s condition on her ability to reach. Those physicians
used the term without qualification or modification – thus potentially implicating reaching in
distances and directions other than over Plaintiff’s head.
I note, too, that it is possible, even likely, that a broader reaching limitation would have
affected the VE’s conclusions. Several cases have addressed the jobs identified by the VE in this
case – telephone quotation clerk, sedentary inspector jobs – and noted that the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles lists them as requiring frequent reaching. See, e.g., Amick v. Colvin, No.
12-922, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111661 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 8. 2013); McKaughan v. Astrue, No. 656, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25745 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008); Jones v. Astrue, 570 F. Supp. 2d
708 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Moreover, many of these jobs might become unavailable if the person
could reach overhead, but not in front of herself. See Bandy v. Astrue, No. 10-119, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82415, at *15 (M.D. Tenn. Jul. 28, 2011). Thus, the extent of a reaching limitation
reaches the heart of the vocational expert’s assessment.
Of course, there exists the possibility that the ALJ intended to reject or assign little
weight to the unilluminated “reaching” conclusions stated by Plaintiff’s treating physicians, or
otherwise found support in the record for restricting the reaching limitation to overhead
movement. The opinion of a treating physician is, unless inconsistent with other evidence of
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record, entitled to great weight. Ahmad v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-4367, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15063 (3d Cir. July 23, 2013). Further, "[i]n making a residual functional capacity
determination, the ALJ must consider all evidence before him .... Although the ALJ may weigh
the credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence which he rejects and
his reason(s) for discounting such evidence." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d
112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ does not discuss the weight, if any, that he accords the
opinions that Drs. Soran and Rafkal proffer regarding Plaintiff’s ability to reach. If the ALJ
indeed intended to reject or alter the physicians’ opinions, he must explain his reasons for doing
so.
Remand is required where the hypothetical question is deficient. Anderson v. Astrue,
825 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498 (D. Del. 2011). Likewise, remand is required if the ALJ has not
identified the basis for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion. Jones v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 350,
357 (D. C. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, this matter must be remanded so that the ALJ can identify
the basis for concluding that Plaintiff is subject only to a limitation on overhead reaching, or so
that the ALJ can obtain VE testimony in response to a complete and accurate hypothetical based
on the medical evidence. On remand, the parties may further explore the issues addressed
herein, and supplement the record if necessary. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.983.
As a final matter, I reject Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. The hypothetical to the VE
adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s mental limitations as described by Dr. Link in her
evaluation. Moderate limitations such as those described by the Dr. Link are consistent with the
limitation on simple, repetitive tasks. See, e.g., McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941, 94647 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the ALJ otherwise adequately dealt with Plaintiff’s mental
impairments. Remand on that basis is unwarranted.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and
Defendant’s denied. This matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
ORDER
AND NOW, this _10th_ day of January, 2014, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
and DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [7] is GRANTED, and
Defendant’s [9] DENIED. This matter is hereby remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT:
s/Donetta W. Ambrose
______________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court
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