WILLIAMS v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 4 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by RONALD WILLIAMS dismissing petition and denying a certificate of appealability. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell on 07/09/2013. (Mitchell, Robert)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD WILLIAMS, EU-8305,
Petitioner,
v.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondent.
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)
)
) 2:13-cv-322
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Mitchell, M.J.
Ronald Williams an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette has presented a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be
dismissed and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for appeal exists, a
certificate of appealability will be denied.
Williams is presently serving a life plus 13 ½ to 27 year sentence imposed following his
conviction, by a jury, of first degree murder, criminal conspiracy and uniform firearms act
violations at Nos. CC 199813431 and CC199814585 in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. This sentence was imposed on October 17, 2001.1
An appeal was taken to the Superior Court in which the questions presented were:
1. Did the lower court err by making a misstatement of fact to the jury during its
instructions regarding the eyewitness testimony of Ms. Green as having seen
Mr. Williams running from the scene of the crime?
2. Did prejudicial error result from the prosecutorial misconduct of the assistance
district attorney displaying the .44 caliber firearm recovered from Mr.
William's residence and misrepresenting this improperly admitted piece of
evidence to the jury as the murder weapon during closing argument?
3. Was the evidence in this case insufficient to support the jury verdict of guilty
on all counts or was the jury verdict against the weight of the evidence?2
1
See: Petition at ¶¶ 1-6.
Because the Commonwealth has been unable to locate the petitioner's appeal brief, it has reconstructed the issues
at pp.3-4 of this answer.
2
1
On February 4, 2004, the judgment of sentence was affirmed.3
Leave to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was sought and the sole issue
raised was:
Whether the prosecutor's remarks representing a .44 caliber firearm to the jury as
being the murder weapon was improper when the .44 caliber firearm was not the
murder weapon?4
On February 18, 2005 leave to appeal was denied.5
On October 17, 2005, Williams filed a post-conviction petition which was
subsequently amended. That petition was granted in part and his right to file a petition for
allowance of appeal was reinstated on May 1, 2007.6 The petition was filed and on
November 17, 2008, leave to appeal was denied.7
On March 3, 2009, a pro se post-conviction petition was filed. That petition was
denied on April 15, 2010. On appeal, petitioner contended that:
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission at trial of a .44
caliber handgun that appellant possessed, and also failed to object when the
prosecutor brandished it during closing. According to appellant, he was
prejudiced because this indicated to the jury that this was the gun used during the
crime when it was not (footnote omitted).8
On June 12, 2012 the denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed.9
In its answer, the respondent relates that on August 9, 2012 Williams filed another postconviction petition in which he contended that the mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional
under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). That petition was denied on October 1, 2012
since petitioner was determined to have been 29 years old at the time of the offense.10
The instant petition was executed on February 26, 2013 and in it, Williams contends he is
entitled to relief solely due to the following:
3
See: Answer at pp. 91-97.
See: ECF 13-1 at p. 8.
5
See: p. 104 of the answer.
6
See: p. 154 of the answer.
7
See: p. 158 of the answer.
8
See: p. 266 of the answer.
9
See: pp. 262-268 of the answer.
10
See: pp.7-8, 275 of the answer.
4
2
The lower court erred in failing to grant a hearing to appellant's claims that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper admission of a weapon
found in appellant's home that had nothing to do with the criminal complaints in
this matter, clearly prejudicing appellant's trial.11
The background to this prosecution is set forth in the February 4, 2004
Memorandum of the Superior Court:
During the early morning hours of October 4, 1998, Appellant, Raj Edge, John
Johnson, and Donald Thomas were at Johnson's apartment when Johnson
informed the other individuals of a burglary which had occurred at the residence
he shared with his girlfriend, Ebony Jordan. Jason Fault, the murder victim, was
identified by Johnson as one of the perpetrators of the burglary. The four men
agreed to kill Faulk in retaliation for the burglary.
Upon leaving the apartment, the four men encountered Faulk. A verbal exchange
between Johnson and Faulk culminated with Johnson, Edge, Thomas and
Appellant shooting Faulk to death. Appellant fired two shots during the execution.
The group then ran back to the front of Johnson's apartment building. Edge and
Thomas gave Johnson their handguns, but Appellant retained the chrome firearm
he claims he used to shoot Faulk. Appellant, Edge and Thomas then fled the scene
in a vehicle driven by Thomas.
Jackie Green, a woman who lived directly across from the crime scene witnessed
the shooting. She recognized Johnson and observed him run into his apartment
building. Ms. Green phoned 911 and directed the police to Johnson's apartment.
The officers requested and received consent to search Johnson's apartment.
During the search, a number of firearms were recovered under a mattress upon
which Ms. Jordan's children were sleeping.
During the course of the investigation, Appellant was identified as a suspect in the
killing of Faulk and was questioned. After being properly informed of his rights,
Appellant admitted to his participation in the incident. Thereafter a chrome-plated
firearm was recovered from his residence….
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and a
violation of the Uniform Firearms Act…12
It is provided in 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
11
12
See: Petition at ¶ 12.
See: pp.91-93 of the answer.
3
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.
This statute represents a codification of the well-established concept which requires that
before a federal court will review any allegations raised by a state prisoner, those allegations
must first be presented to that state's highest court for consideration. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973);
Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996).
It is only when a petitioner has demonstrated that the available corrective process would
be ineffective or futile that the exhaustion requirement will not be imposed. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
supra.; Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, it appears that the sole issue which the petitioner seeks to raise here
has been raised in the appellate courts of the Commonwealth and is appropriately before this
Court. The respondent concedes this fact and also concedes that the instant petition is timely.13
However, the respondent also notes that the issue as raised in the state courts is the failure of the
post-conviction court to hold a hearing on this issue. Since this matter is a procedural matter in
the scope of a post-conviction proceeding, it is not cognizable here. Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160
F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998) cert. denied 526 U.S. 1065 (1999). Additionally, as a possible state
procedural error it is not subject to remediation here. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859 (2011).
Nevertheless, even if one were to reach the merits of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, it does not provide a basis for relief. In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court explained that there are two components to
demonstrating a violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. First, the
petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing
that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at
13
See: pp.12, 14 of the answer.
4
688; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000). Second, under Strickland,
the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. "This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To
establish prejudice, the defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Id. at 694. The Strickland test is conjunctive and a habeas petitioner must
establish both the deficiency in performance prong and the prejudice prong. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189,197 (3d Cir.2010) cert.
denied 131 S.Ct. 1673 (2011). As a result, if a petitioner fails on either prong, he loses.
Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir.2006).
At trial, testimony was presented that the petitioner had admitted that he
employed a .45 caliber weapon to fire shots at the victim; that he had disposed of the
weapon over a hillside; that the weapon was never located; that Williams stated that
while the murder weapon was never in his house he did have another weapon, a .44
caliber at his home and that weapon was recovered from his home (TT. 7/26/01 pp. 239241, 246, 285-286, 288).
During his closing, the prosecutor stated:
This is the .44, of course, that was found at the defendant's residence, that the
defendant said was his gun…
[T]here's no evidence that his .44 was not used or that the .45 the defendant said
he shot the victim with was used. There's no evidence that those guns were not
used…
The .44 that was recovered from the defendant's residence wouldn't even leave
cartridge cases at the scene. Dr. Levine [ a criminalist in the coroner's office] told
you that a .45 could be an automatic or it could be a revolver that would not leave
cartridge cases at the scene. There's still five gunshot wounds to the victim that
we don't know what the bullet used was, what the caliber was, because they were
through-and-through wounds, they weren't in the body of the victim (TT. 7/26/01
pp. 395-397).
Thus, the record demonstrates that Williams admitted participating in the homicide while
employing a .45 caliber handgun; he further indicated to the police that he possessed a .44 caliber
5
handgun which was located at his home; that the forensic evidence could not distinguish whether
a .44 or a .45 caliber weapon had been utilized and that there was absolutely no evidence
demonstrating that the weapon exhibited from the jury was not the murder weapon. Under
Pennsylvania law, whether the weapon was employed is a matter of the weight of the evidence
and not its admissibility. Com. v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa. Super.) leave to appeal
denied 596 Pa. 705 (2007)("uncertainty whether the weapons evidence was actually used in the
crime goes to the weight of such evidence, not its admissibility."). Additionally, the admissibility
of evidence rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and such a determination is not
reviewable absent a due process violation. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408 (3d Cir.) cert. denied
534 U.S. 973 (2001). No such showing has been made here.
For these reasons, counsel cannot be deemed to have been deficient for failing to raise a
meritless argument, Real v. Shannon, 600 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, because the
petitioner's conviction was not secured in a manner contrary to federal law as interpreted by the
Supreme Court nor involved an unreasonable application of that law his petition here will be
dismissed and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for appeal exists, a
certificate of appealability will be denied.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
6
ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 2013 for the reasons set forth in the foregoing
Memorandum, the petition of Ronald Williams for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF 4) is
DISMISSED, and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for appeal exists a
certificate of appealability is DENIED.
s/ Robert C. Mitchell
United States Magistrate Judge
7
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