GINGRAS v. COLVIN et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: 11 13 Parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order follows. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 12/18/2013. (lcb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY FRANCIS GINGRAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 13-541
Electronically Filed

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE:
PARTIES’ CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NOS. 11 AND 13)
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff, Anthony Francis Gingras (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties have submitted Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
on the record developed at the administrative proceedings. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11) will be denied. The Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 13) will be granted and the administrative decision of the
Commissioner will be affirmed.
II.

Procedural History
Plaintiff protectively filed for disability benefits on May 3, 2010, alleging disability as of

March 1, 2002. R. 130-138. The applications were denied by the state agency on September
16, 2010. R. 73-82. Plaintiff responded on November 16, 2010, by filing a timely request for an
administrative hearing. R. 86-87. On November 10, 2011, an administrative hearing was held in
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Seven Fields, Pennsylvania, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) James J. Pileggi. R. 3668. Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. R. 36-68. At the
administrative hearing, Plaintiff amended his alleged onset of disability to July 8, 2004. R. 40.
Ms. Crofton, an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), also testified. R. 63-68.
In a decision dated December 16, 2011, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was “disabled”
within the meaning of the Act as of the protective filing date, May 3, 2010, and awarded Plaintiff
supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. R. 17-35. The ALJ, however, determined that
Plaintiff was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act prior to May 3, 2010, so his claim for
DIB benefits was denied because his date last insured was September 30, 2008. Id. The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on February 22, 2013, thereby making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner in this case. R. 1-3.
Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 15, 2013, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff and the Commissioner filed Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment on October 3, 2013, and November 4, 2013, respectively. Doc. Nos. 11 &
13. These motions are the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
III.

Statement of the Case
In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 2008.
2. The claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since, July 8, 2004, the
alleged onset date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq. and 416.971 et seq.
3. The claimant had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder; anxiety
disorder; bilateral knee condition; right shoulder condition; back condition; obesity; sleep

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apnea; high blood pressure; and left leg fasciitis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c).
4. The claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that prior to the
date the claimant became disabled, May 3, 2010, he had the residual functional capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he
would not be able to engage in the operation of foot controls; he would not be able to
engage in crawling, kneeling, squatting, climbing or balancing on heights; he would not
be able to engage in bending at the waist to more than 45 degrees; he would be limited to
simple and repetitive work, involving routine work processes and settings; and he would
not be able to work at jobs requiring find manipulation with the hands on more than an
occasional basis.
6. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that beginning on
May 3, 2010, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except he would be unable to
sustain work activity on an 8-hour per day 5-day per week basis.
7. The claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work since his alleged onset
of disability, July 8, 2004. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).

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8. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was a younger individual age
18-49, and his age category has not changed since that date. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and
416.963).
9. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English.
(20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1564 and 416.964).
10. Transferability of job skills in not material because when using the Medical-Vocational
Rules as a framework, the claimant is “not disabled” whether or not he has transferable
job skills. (See S.S.R. 82-41 and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
11. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
the claimant could have performed prior to May 3, 2010. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569,
404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
12. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant could have performed beginning on May 3, 2010. (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1560, 404.1560(c), 416.960, and 416.969(c)).
13. The claimant was not disabled prior to May 3, 2010, but became disabled on that date and
continued to be disabled through the date of this decision, December 16, 2011. (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
14. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any
time through the date the claimant was last insured, September 30, 2008. (20 C.F.R. §§
404.315(a) and 404.320(b)).

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IV.

Standard of Review
This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

“supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d
Cir. 1994). The Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or
re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 11901191(3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court “would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). “Overall, the substantial
evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d
Cir. 2004).
In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a “medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any
‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777
(3d Cir. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered to be
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity “only if his [or her] physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or
her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience,

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engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative law judge must do more than
simply state factual conclusions, he or she must make specific findings of fact. Stewart v. Sec’y
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The administrative law judge
must consider all medical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate explanations
for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 961 (3d
Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated
rule making authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose
of determining whether a claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. The United
States Supreme Court has summarized this process as follows:
If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will
not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability
unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find
non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,”
defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the
impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant
qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the
list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the
claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is
determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth,
and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether
the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (footnotes omitted).

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In an action in which review of an administrative determination is sought, the agency’s
decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the agency in
making its decision. In Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the
Supreme Court explained:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with
a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized
to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more
adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized the applicability
of this rule in the Social Security disability context. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7
(3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court’s review is limited to the four corners of the ALJ’s decision. It
is on this standard that the Court has reviewed the Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment.
V.

Discussion
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed

three reversible errors. Doc. No. 12. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1)
improperly determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) prior to May 3, 2010;
(2) disregarding the medical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physicians; and (3) disregarding the
testimony of the vocational expert and relying on an incomplete hypothetical question. Id. The
Commissioner counters that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing functional
limitations and that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Doc. No. 14.

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A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC
To be eligible for DIB benefits, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that on or before
his last date insured, September 30, 2008, he had a medically determinable impairment that was
so severe it prevented him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity that existed in the
national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905; See Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983). When making an RFC determination, an ALJ must
consider all the evidence before him. Russo v. Astrue, 421 F. App’x 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). An
ALJ must “give some indication of the evidence which he rejects and his reason(s) for
discounting such evidence.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Soc, 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s assessment of his RFC was improper, contending he was
not capable of the standing requirements of light work, which would require him to stand for
approximately six hours of an eight-hour day. Doc. No. 12, 12 citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),
416.967(b); see also S.S.R. 81-10, 1983 WL 31251, *6. In support of this argument, Plaintiff
points to various medical records from his treating physicians. Id. at 11-13. But mere presence
of an impairment is not enough to establish a disability. Walker v. Barnhart, 172 F. App'x 423,
426 (3d Cir. 2006). The Plaintiff must show that his impairment caused functional limitations
that prevented him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Id.
The ALJ reviewed the entire medical record and determined that “the claimant’s
testimony is simply not consistent with the preponderance of the evidence in this case” for the
period in time before May 3, 2010. R. 26-27. Regarding Plaintiff’s reports of pain, limitations,
and diagnoses, the ALJ cited to the following medical records: (1) Plaintiff had an MRI of his
back on July 8, 2004 that revealed severe degenerative disc disease at L5-SI with annular disc
bulge and several neural foraminal encroachment; (2) Plaintiff received no relief from steroid

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epidural injections in his back; (3) Plaintiff went to the Emergency Room on March 20, 2005,
due to back pain, and had a clinical impression of acute sciatica; and (4) Plaintiff was examined
by Dr. Paul Sung, who noted that Plaintiff had sleep apnea, pain and swelling in his left leg, and
a diagnosis of arthritis in his right knee. R. 27. However, the ALJ also noted that the medical
record showed that Plaintiff did not have any acute spasm or trigger points, and he was not
limited with respect to forward bending. Id. The ALJ discussed that on February 14, 2005,
Plaintiff reported that he had no complaints and was generally feeling well at a physical
examination. Id. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was told he would benefit from weight loss, and
Plaintiff was encouraged to do this by walking on a daily basis for exercise. R. 27, 259. Further,
the ALJ discussed that on January 2, 2008, and February 19, 2009, Venous Doppler testing
performed on Plaintiff’s lower extremities displayed no evidence of deep venous thrombosis. Id.
at 27. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s medical records reveal that “the medications had been
relatively effective in controlling his symptoms.” Id.
The ALJ also discussed that Plaintiff “performed a wide range of activities, and had
received treatment for his impairments.” R. 27. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to work
for three months during the relevant period despite having said impairments. Id. An ALJ may
consider that the claimant continued to work after his alleged onset of disability even though that
work did not reach the level of substantial gainful activity. Russo, 421 F. App’x. at 189; see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 (work done during alleged disability period may show that claimant can
work at substantial gainful activity). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his
conditions and limitations, but concluded that “no greater or additional limitations are justified”
than the limitations already set forth in Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ further stated that his
determination of Plaintiff’s RFC “accounts for all reasonably documented restrictions” and

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accommodates all of Plaintiff’s functional limitations prior to May 3, 2010 R. 27. In sum, the
ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC was supported by substantial evidence.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Record
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred by improperly disregarding the medical opinion
of his treating physicians. Doc. No. 12, 13. However, as the ALJ noted, there are no opinions
from any of Plaintiff’s treating physicians that state Plaintiff was functionally limited with
respect to performing light work before May 3, 2010. R. 26-27. Plaintiff asserts that “both the
objective medical tests, including MRI’s and x-rays, along with the treatment records of
Plaintiff’s treating physicians support Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his severe limitations
regarding his ability to stand and his need to lie down during the day due to his impairments.”
Doc. No. 12, 13-14. “The ALJ must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both medical and
non-medical, that support a claimant’s subjective testimony about symptoms and the ability to
work and perform activities.” Ambrosini v. Astrue, 727 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
Allegations of pain must be consistent with the objective medical evidence, and the ALJ must
explain why he is rejecting the Plaintiff’s testimony. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122.
As already discussed in the preceding section, the ALJ satisfactorily discussed Plaintiff’s
objective medical records in relation to his subjective testimony. The ALJ noted that prior to
May 3, 2010, the medical evidence does not support Plaintiff’s testimony that he could not work
due to his numerous alleged conditions. R. 27. Plaintiff does not point to any specific treating
physician or medical record that the ALJ failed to assess, but rather asserts that the ALJ’s
assessment of the whole medical record prior to May 3, 2010, was done in error. However,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that based on Plaintiff’s functional

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limitations contained in the medical record, he was capable of performing the requirements set
out in his RFC assessment.
C. The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert an Appropriate Hypothetical Question
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the testimony of the
vocational expert and relied on an incomplete hypothetical question. Doc. No. 12, 14-15.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ ignored the vocational expert’s responses to several questions that
would have resulted in Plaintiff being found unable to work. Id. at 15. However, the ALJ did
not ignore these responses and instead found them not to be credible to the extent that they were
inconsistent with the assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC. R. 26. “The ALJ must accurately convey to
the vocational expert all of a claimant’s credibly established limitations.” Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing and adding emphasis to Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)). Because the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s
RFC was supported by substantial evidence, there is no error here, and the ALJ’s decision will be
affirmed.
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s administrative decision will be affirmed.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge

cc:

All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties

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