CITY OF PITTSBURGH v. UPMC
Filing
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ORDER granting 14 Motion to Remand to State Court. As set forth in the accompanying memorandum opinion and order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to remand to state court is GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall be forthwith remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court shall mark this case CLOSED. Signed by Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 8/6/2013. (dmm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CITY OF PITTSBURGH a Pennsylvania
Second Class City and Home Rule
Municipality, by its treasurer,
Plaintiff,
v.
UPMC a Pennsylvania Nonprofit,
Non-Stock Corporation,
Defendants.
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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-565
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CONTI, District Judge.
I.
Background
Pending before the court is the motion to remand to state court (ECF No. 14) and brief in
support (ECF No. 15) filed by plaintiff City of Pittsburgh (the “City”), the response in opposition
(ECF No. 18) filed by defendant UPMC (“defendant” or “UPMC”), the City’s reply (ECF No.
24), and UPMC’s sur-reply. (ECF No. 26.) This case, along with another filed at Civil Action
Number 13-563 by UPMC against the City and others, arises out of a dispute between the City
and UPMC with respect to UPMC’s status as an Institution of Purely Public Charity (“IPPC”)
pursuant to Pennsylvania law.
The present case was filed originally in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania. UPMC filed a notice of removal to this court on April 19, 2013, asserting
that the claims in the complaint arise under federal law, and are thus subject to this court’s
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) The City filed an amended complaint
(ECF No. 17) on May 16, 2013, and now moves to have the case remanded to the state court.
The City’s amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to Pennsylvania law that
defendant is not an IPPC exempt from the City’s payroll tax and an order that defendant must
file quarterly payroll tax returns covering all its operations from March 31, 2007 to the present.
(ECF No. 17 ¶ 18.) The court heard oral argument on the present motion on July 2, 2013, and the
matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.
The Parties’ Arguments
The present motion is extensively briefed, and the court will briefly summarize the
arguments advanced by both sides.
A.
Removal to this court
UPMC argues in support of removal that two substantial questions of federal law are
implicated: first, the City’s claim for relief involves resolution of whether UPMC, as a §
501(c)(3) tax exempt entity, owes taxes pursuant to § 511 of the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”)—thus requiring questions of federal law to be addressed; and second, the City’s claimed
relief requires the dormant Commerce Clause to be addressed because the City is allegedly
discriminating against UPMC by selectively enforcing its payroll tax requirements against
UPMC, but not against similarly situated “local” § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. UPMC
maintains that these issues of federal law are sufficient to cause the City’s claims to “arise under”
federal law as required in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B.
Motion to Remand to State Court
The City’s motion to remand challenges three aspects of UPMC’s arguments in support
of removal. First, the City asserts that UPMC’s removal was not based upon the allegations in
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the complaint, but actually upon UPMC’s potential defenses to those allegations. Pursuant to the
well-pleaded complaint rule, courts must look only to the claims in the complaint, and the City
argues that it seeks only relief pursuant to state law—i.e. UPMC’s status as an IPPC and its duty
to pay a local payroll tax. Second, the City challenges UPMC’s argument that the City’s claims
implicate the dormant Commerce Clause because the party challenging a tax (in this case
UPMC) bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense under dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. To the extent that UPMC bears the burden of proving that a tax violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, the City maintains that its claims do not “arise under” the federal
Constitution. Third, the City maintains that its claims do not “arise under” § 511 of the Internal
Revenue Code because the amount of tax to be paid is irrelevant; the City argues that the
question is whether UPMC is an IPPC under state law and the test set forth by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985) (the
“HUP test”). Because the City’s claims are based solely on questions of state law, the City
argues that this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction.
C.
UPMC’s Response
UPMC responds by arguing that a different standard applies when determining subjectmatter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. Instead of looking to the face of the
complaint, UPMC argues that “federal subject matter jurisdiction exists in declaratory judgment
actions when the facts of a well-pleaded complaint demonstrate that the declaratory judgment
defendant could file an action arising under federal law against the declaratory judgment
plaintiff.” (ECF No. 18 at 5) (citing decisions from several courts of appeals). UPMC maintains
that its suit against the City (which raises dormant Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
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Amendment claims) satisfies this “coercive action” standard and shows that subject-matter
jurisdiction is proper in this court. UPMC reasserts its argument that because the City’s payroll
tax allows the City to collect taxes from IPPCs to the extent that those institutions are required to
pay federal taxes pursuant to § 511 of the Internal Revenue Code, the City’s claims “arise under”
federal law. Specifically, UPMC notes that “[t]he resolution of a nonprofit hospital’s obligations
under the Internal Revenue Code is a federal question that vests removal jurisdiction.” (ECF No.
18 at 11.)
D.
The City’s Reply
The City replied to UPMC’s response to address the coercive action doctrine argument.
The City maintains that the coercive action doctrine does not apply to the present case because it
does not fit the typical scenario where a declaratory judgment plaintiff is acting in such a way
that it could and should be the coercive action defendant. In the present case, the City argues that
the underlying dispute is over a matter of state law—whether UPMC qualifies as an IPPC, and
therefore no federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists. The City notes that if the case were
allowed to remain in this court, it would essentially allow any defendant being sued pursuant to a
state law to assert federal subject-matter jurisdiction merely by claiming that the state law in
question violates the federal constitution.
III.
Standard of Review
“[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[A]ny civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
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United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “[i]t is settled that the
removal statutes . . . are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of remand.” Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d
1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted). Courts “must focus on the plaintiff’s complaint at
the time the petition for removal was filed. . . . It remains the defendant’s burden to show the
existence and continuance of federal jurisdiction.” Id. With respect to suits for declaratory
judgment:
[N]either federal nor state declaratory judgment provisions alter the federal
question jurisdiction of the federal district courts. . . . The same principles govern
whether a declaratory judgment action falls within federal question subject-matter
jurisdiction in removed actions as govern in actions commenced in federal court.
Thus, if a federal contention would have arisen only as a defense in an action for
affirmative relief, a declaratory judgment action raising that issue is not within the
federal court’s jurisdiction, and cannot be removed.
14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3722 (4th ed.).
IV.
Discussion
A.
State Law Basis for the City’s Claims
As an initial matter, it is important to understand the state statutory framework underlying
the City’s claims. At issue is the City’s payroll tax ordinance, which is codified as Chapter 258
of the City of Pittsburgh Code. The payroll tax ordinance was enacted pursuant to the taxing
authority conferred in section 303 of the Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 PA. STAT. § 6924.303. The
Local Tax Enabling Act and the City’s payroll tax ordinance both provide that a payroll tax
ordinance is levied at the rate of fifty-five hundredths (.55) of one percent on the amount of
payroll generated by an employer conducting business activity within the City. Section 258.03(d)
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of the payroll tax ordinance provides that IPPCs must calculate the payroll tax which would
otherwise be attributable to the City, but only requires those institutions to pay tax on that
portion of payroll expenses attributable to business activity for which a tax may be imposed
pursuant to § 511 of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. § 511. Section 511 provides that although generally tax
exempt, § 501(c)(3) entities shall pay taxes on “the unrelated business taxable income” of those
entities. 26 U.S.C. § 511(a)(1).
IPPCs are defined by statute in the Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act, 10 PA. STAT.
§ 371 et seq. The criteria that must be met to be considered an IPPC are set forth in 10 PA. STAT.
§ 375. Among the requirements set forth in section 375 are cross-references to an organization’s
status as a nonprofit organization pursuant to § 501(c)(3). In general, the criteria for IPPCs are:
(1) the institution advance a charitable purpose; (2) it operate entirely free from private profit
motive; (3) it must donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (4) it benefit
a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; and (5) it
relieve the government of some of its burden. 10 PA. STAT. §§ 375(b)-(f); see Hosp. Utilization
Project, 487 A.2d at 1317. The crux of the City’s claim is that UPMC fails to satisfy some or all
of the requirements of an IPPC and should not be exempt from the City’s payroll tax ordinance
with respect to those employees who work in the City.
B.
Coercive Action Doctrine
The essence of UPMC’s opposition to the present motion is that the coercive action
doctrine establishes federal subject-matter jurisdiction because UPMC could—and in fact did—
file a coercive action based upon the allegations in the City’s complaint. In support of this
argument, UPMC cites several decisions from eight courts of appeals, but none from the Court of
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Appeals for the Third Circuit. Although both sides agree that the coercive action doctrine exists
in federal law, the City maintains that it does not apply to this case.
The Supreme Court first recognized the coercive action doctrine in the context of a
removal action in Franchise Tax Board of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). The Court noted:
Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory
judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question. .
. . For instance, federal courts have consistently adjudicated suits by alleged
patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the theory that an infringement suit
by the declaratory judgment defendant would raise a federal question over which
the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19, n.19.1 UPMC argues that its suit seeking damages pursuant to
alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause constitutes a
coercive action sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction in the present case.
The decisions cited by UPMC in support of its argument, however, are distinguishable
from the present case in that almost all involved plaintiffs asserting declaratory judgment claims
that, on their face, involved questions of federal law. See Fina Oil and Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123
F.3d 1466, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent law); Std. Ins. Co. v. Saklad, 127 F.3d 1179, 1180-81
(9th Cir. 1997) (ERISA benefits); GNB Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 619-20
(7th Cir. 1995) (CERCLA liability); Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never directly addressed the coercive action doctrine, but in a
decision predating Franchise Tax Board, the court appeared to reject the doctrine. See La Chemise Lacoste v.
Alligator Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 339, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1974) (rejecting the district court’s finding that “[t]o determine
whether a declaratory judgment action raises a federal question, the Court must look to the cause of action which the
declaratory defendant threatens to assert; if the threatened action involves a claim under federal law, there exists
federal question jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action.”). Since this court is bound by the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board, the court concludes that, although Lacoste has never been
explicitly overruled, the holding in Franchise Tax Board implicitly calls its holding into question.
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F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1991) (Securities Exchange Act). Only one decision relied upon by
UPMC involved a declaratory judgment claim premised upon state law, and none of the
decisions involved cases that had been removed from state court.2 To the extent that the plaintiff
in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 964-65 (10th Cir.
1996), appeared to raise declaratory judgment claims premised upon state privacy statutes, the
court found that a hypothetical coercive claim could be premised upon the Lanham Act. Id. The
decision cuts against UPMC, however, to the extent that the court explicitly rejected the district
court’s finding that declaratory judgment jurisdiction could be premised upon a First
Amendment defense. Id. at 965. The takeaway from the decisions cited by UPMC is that the
coercive action doctrine requires some degree of congruence between the declaratory judgment
actions and the hypothetical (or real) coercive actions in those cases—they both relied upon an
underlying federal law.
In the present case, there is no congruence between the City’s declaratory judgment
action and UPMC’s alleged coercive action claim. The coercive action claims that UPMC
purports to rely upon—that the HUP test and the Institution of Purely Public Charity Act violate
its rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause—are defenses to
the issues of state law raised by the City in this suit, and are not sufficient to create federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3722 (4th ed.). UPMC’s argument would be more persuasive if the City were
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UPMC includes a footnote in its brief indicating that “[t]he same logic applies in the context of removal;” none of
the decisions UPMC cites were initiated in state court and removed to federal court. (ECF No. 18 at 6 n.2.) This is
not an inconsequential point, because the cases relied upon were initially filed in federal court by plaintiffs who had
to assert a basis for federal jurisdiction. The City’s choice of forum in the present case underscores just the
opposite—that the issues in its suit arise under state law.
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seeking a declaration that the HUP test and the Institution of Purely Public Charity Act do not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. In that hypothetical
situation, UPMC’s coercive action—seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights—
would likely be sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. Notably, UPMC cites no court
decision in which the coercive action doctrine was applied to extend federal question jurisdiction
over a claim premised on state law, where the declaratory judgment defendant merely sought to
challenge the constitutionality of the underlying state law and the defendant sought to remove the
case to federal court. As indicated above, the court in Cardtoons explicitly rejected declaratory
judgment subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon a First Amendment defense. As the City
points out, determining that federal jurisdiction extends to such situations would essentially
allow defendants to create federal jurisdiction over any suit pursuant to state law merely by
asserting the defense that the underlying state law is unconstitutional.
In its petition for removal, UPMC cites Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564 (1997), presumably as an example of the type of coercive suit based
upon the dormant Commerce Clause that could be brought in opposition to the City’s claims in
the present case. Town of Harrison, however, is inapposite to the present case. The plaintiff in
Town of Harrison was the operator of a church camp that was required to pay certain taxes under
a state charitable institution statute that it claimed discriminated against camps whose campers
predominantly came from out of state. Id. at 567-70. The plaintiff sought a refund of taxes it had
already paid because it was not eligible for the allegedly unconstitutional exemption. Id. The
Court found that the statute at issue in Town of Harrison violated the dormant Commerce Clause
with respect to those camps where campers came primarily from out of state because the
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heightened tax restricted the camp’s abilities to attract out of state campers. Id. at 575-76. Here,
UPMC is currently subject to the exemption that it seeks to challenge, which makes no
distinction among entities that conduct business both in and outside the state. Indeed, the payroll
tax at issue in the present case actually imposes a burden on those local entities that employ
people within the City by requiring payment of the payroll tax. To the extent UPMC maintains
that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the relief sought in this case, that argument is
actually a defense to the City’s claim that UPMC is not an IPPC.
The City cites City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 384 F.3d 901 (7th
Cir. 2004), in support of its argument that UPMC’s claims are actually defenses. In City of
Chicago, the city brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that cable operators
comply with contracts and city ordinances requiring them to pay remittances to the city for
services the operators provided over city-owned cable. Id. at 902-03. Defendant cable operators
removed the action to federal court pursuant to §§ 1331 and 1441(b), arguing that a federal law
limited the amount of remittances that could be paid, and potentially eliminated any right to
those remittances. Id. The defendants argued that construction of the federal law was the only
issue to be decided in the litigation. Id. at 903. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
finding that the city’s complaint “‘implicate[d] . . . provisions of the [federal law raised by the
defendants].’” Id. The court of appeals concluded the suit did not arise under federal law, and
that any implication of the federal law was merely asserted as a defense. Id. at 904. The court
cited Franchise Tax Board, but did not analyze the issue pursuant to the coercive claim doctrine.
Although not factually identical to the present case, City of Chicago is instructive
because the arguments made by the defendants in that case lacked congruity with respect to the
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declaratory judgment claims asserted by the plaintiff city, much like in the present case.
Specifically, the state law claims at issue in City of Chicago were subject to challenge by the
defendants based upon the asserted federal law, but that assertion amounted to a defense, not an
independent coercive action. As discussed above, UPMC’s claims do not correspond to the state
law claims raised by the City, but instead raise independent constitutional claims that function as
a defense, not as inverse claims to those asserted by the City.
Ultimately, UPMC’s invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment are defenses to the City’s claims that UPMC is no longer an IPPC. Federal subjectmatter jurisdiction is, therefore, not appropriate pursuant to the coercive action doctrine.
C.
“Arising Under” Jurisdiction
UPMC argues that the City’s claims “arise under” federal law based upon the references
to the IRC in the payroll tax ordinance and the IPPC statute. A claim “‘arises under’ federal law
for § 1331 purposes if ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the
cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.’” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
677, 689-90 (2006) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). “The most familiar
definition of the statutory ‘arising under’ limitation is Justice Holmes’ statement, ‘A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action.’” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Am.
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)). In order to satisfy the
arising under requirement, the court must be called upon to resolve “a substantial question of
federal law.” Id. at 13. “‘The fact that a court must apply federal law to a plaintiff’s claims or
construe federal law to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief will not confer federal
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subject matter jurisdiction—the implicated federal issue must be substantial.’” 13D CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3564 (3d ed. 2008) (quoting Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1285, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state
cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). The requirement of a substantial federal
issue is equally relevant to arising under jurisdiction in a removal case. Pursuant to the wellpleaded complaint rule, “a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s
complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law. . . . ‘[A] right or immunity created
by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the
plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10-11 (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l
Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936)).
The City maintains that its claims arise under state law—specifically, the HUP test as
articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Institution of Purely Public Charity Act.
UPMC points out, however, that the local payroll tax ordinance makes reference to § 511 of the
IRC insofar as charitable nonprofit institutions must calculate how much payroll tax is owed.
UPMC also points to several local tax forms that require institutions to identify themselves as §
501(c)(3) organizations as further evidence that the City’s claims arise under federal law.
UPMC’s argument with respect to § 511 is not persuasive because the determination the
City asks the court to make does not involve application of that provision of federal law.
Although the payroll tax exemption does require a calculation based upon § 511, the calculation
is irrelevant to the present case insofar as it is premised on a court finding that the potential
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taxpayer institution is an IPPC. As argued by the City at the hearing on the present motion, the
issue of tax liability pursuant to § 511 is irrelevant to the issues raised in this case, since the
question here is whether UPMC is an IPPC under state law. Thus, the “case starts and ends
before we get to [the state law provision incorporating § 511].” (Hr’g Tr. 7/2/2013 at 5.)
A recent decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court supports this construction. In
Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike County Board of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d 3, 9
(Pa. 2012), the court acknowledged that “if [a potential public charity] do[es] not qualify under
the HUP test, you never get to the statute [which provides for a tax exemption].” Id. An
institution must pass muster as an IPPC under the HUP test before any other statutory tax
ramifications are addressed, and if UPMC does not qualify as an IPPC (as argued by the City
here), then § 511 is irrelevant. Given that the issues in the present case can be resolved without
ever addressing the applicability of § 511, the issue of how much income is subject to taxes
under the payroll tax ordinance does not create a substantial federal question sufficient to create
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Contrary to UPMC’s arguments, its status pursuant to § 501(c)(3) is not challenged in the
present case and is not determinative under either the applicable statutory or judicial test. UPMC
cites Bobo v. Christus Health, 359 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Tex. 2005), for the proposition that
federal law—specifically § 501(c)(3)—is an essential element to the City’s claims. In Bobo, the
plaintiff and the court relied upon the “duties and obligations” imposed upon the defendant
hospital pursuant to § 501(c)(3) in support of the state law claims in the complaint. The court
found that the complaint necessarily required the court to determine “whether Section 501(c)(3)
creates an express or implied contract with the United States government and, moreover, whether
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the plaintiff is entitled to bring suit against the defendant as a third-party beneficiary of the
alleged contract.” Id. at 556. No such inquiry is required here.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Hospital Utilization Project is instructive
in determining whether nonprofit status pursuant to § 501(c)(3) is a necessary element of the
HUP test and thus sufficient to create subject-matter jurisdiction. At oral argument, counsel for
UPMC argued:
if [plaintiff has] their way here and go[es] to state court and ha[s] a state court just
rule on the HUP test, you have a situation where you can have the state saying,
UPMC, you’re not an institute [sic] of purely public charity and the federal
government under 501(c)(3) saying we are. How inconsistent. How totally
inappropriate that you have a state court saying one thing and the federal
government saying you are [a] 501(c)(3).
(Hr’g Tr. 7/2/2013 at 12.) Hospital Utilization Project, however, explicitly rejected this concern,
holding that “the mere fact that an organization is a non-profit corporation does not mandate that
it should be exempt from taxation. . . . Also irrelevant is the argument that HUP was ruled a
nonprofit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.” Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1316 (internal citations omitted). The
HUP test was explicitly created to define charitable organizations pursuant to Pennsylvania
constitutional law—not federal tax law. As such, UPMC’s argument that federal and state law
could be rendered inconsistent is irrelevant under controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court
precedent. Because the issues presented in this case do not require the court to decide a
substantial question of federal law, the City’s claims do not arise under federal law and the case
should be remanded to state court. An appropriate order follows.
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ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of August, 2013, upon consideration of the motion to remand to
state court (ECF No. 14) filed by plaintiff City of Pittsburgh, the response in opposition (ECF
No. 18) filed by defendant UPMC, plaintiff’s reply (ECF No. 24), defendant’s sur-reply (ECF
No. 26), and the arguments of counsel presented at the hearing conducted on July 2, 2013, and
for the reasons stated in the foregoing memorandum opinion, it is HEREBY ORDERED that
plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court is GRANTED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall be forthwith remanded to the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court shall mark this case CLOSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
United States District Judge
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