MCIVER et al v. IMANI CHRISTIAN ACADEMY

Filing 38

ORDER denying 30 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 9/24/2015. (lwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAMONA L. MCIVER, ROBIN L. HURT,
SHANNON K. WATSON, JEAN A. SMITH,
HARVEY J. SMITH, JR., GERALD J. LEE, II,
QUINTIN E. JOHNS, and
DARIUS A. BALTRHOP,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
IMANI CHRISTIAN ACADEMY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 13-576

ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30) and memorandum, statement of facts and appendix in
support thereof (Doc. Nos. 31, 32 and 33), filed in the above-captioned matter on September 15,
2014, and upon further consideration of Plaintiffs’ responses thereto (Doc. Nos. 34, 35 and 36),
filed on October 17, 2014, and upon consideration of Defendant’s reply (Doc. No. 37), filed on
October 23, 2014,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED.
I. Background
In this action, Plaintiffs allege religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case as it presents federal questions, and jurisdiction over such actions is
vested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant Imani Christian Academy (hereinafter
“ICA” or “the school”), alleging that they were terminated from employment with ICA in June,
2012, because of their expression of religious beliefs and their affiliation with a religious
institution, Petra International Ministries (hereinafter “Petra”). ICA is a non-profit, private
Christian education institution that was—until sometime in 2012—previously affiliated with
Petra. Plaintiffs assert that, at all relevant times, they were members of Petra and employees of
ICA, and that they were members of Petra when ICA terminated their employment. Plaintiffs
further contend that there was a “clear and distinct divide during the course of [their]
employment” with ICA, and that when the school made the decision to separate from Petra,
Plaintiffs were terminated due to their connection with that organization. (Doc. No. 35, at 2). At
some point after the separation from Petra, ICA became affiliated with Koinonia Church of
Pittsburgh (hereinafter “Koinonia”).
Plaintiffs allege that, as a direct and proximate result of ICA’s violation of Title VII, they
have suffered loss of wages and benefits of employment, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses of
litigation, and mental anguish, humiliation and emotional distress. Accordingly, they seek back
pay and front pay, equitable relief including reinstatement, attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation,
an award for non-economic damages, including compensation for anguish, humiliation and
emotional distress, and all other relief to which they may be entitled under the statute.
On June 24, 2013, ICA filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ICA’s motion was
based on the contention that, as a religious educational institution, it is exempt from Title VII’s
prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. On February 21, 2014, the Honorable

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Cathy Bissoon denied ICA’s motion because the record was insufficient to allow for a
determination of whether the school is a religious educational institution such that it is exempt
under Title VII. The parties subsequently engaged in a period of initial limited discovery on the
issue of the school’s exempt status under Title VII, after which time ICA filed its motion for
summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The parties must support their
position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome
under the substantive law. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). Summary judgment is unwarranted where there is a
genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, one where a reasonable jury, based on the evidence
presented, could return a verdict for the non-moving party with regard to that issue. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence or questioning the

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witnesses’ credibility. See Boyle, 139 F.3d at 393. The movant has the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, while the non-movant must establish the
existence of each element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant has pointed to sufficient evidence of record to
demonstrate that no genuine issues of fact remain, the burden is on the non-movant to search the
record and detail the material controverting the movant’s position. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp.,
942 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1991). Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the
pleadings and show, through the evidence of record, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
III. Discussion
ICA now moves for summary judgment, arguing that it is a religious educational
institution and is therefore exempt from Title VII. Title VII expressly provides that it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII further states, however, that it “shall not apply
to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying
on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) allows a religious educational institution to “hire
and employ employees of a particular religion if such school . . . is, in whole or in substantial
part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular

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religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school . . . is directed
toward the propagation of a particular religion.” It is the schools, however, that bear the burden
of proving they are exempt from the statute’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
religion. See E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schools, 990 F.2d 458 , 460 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. First City Nat’l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967)).
Although the statute does not define what constitutes a “religious organization,” the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issue in LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish
Community Center Association, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007). LeBoon involved an employment
discrimination suit by a former employee of the Lancaster Jewish Community Center (“LJCC”).
In that case, the Third Circuit listed numerous factors to consider in determining whether an
entity can be considered a religious organization under Title VII, including: “(1) whether the
entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity’s
articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, (4) whether it is
owned, affiliated with or financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or
synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious entity participates in the management, for instance
by having representatives on the board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to the
public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of
worship in its activities, (8) whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the
extent it is an educational institution, and (9) whether its membership is made up by
coreligionists.” Id. at 226.
The Court of Appeals further explained that the determination of whether an entity is
“‘religious’ for purposes of the exemption cannot be based on its conformity to some
preconceived notion of what a religious organization should do, but must be measured with

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reference to the particular religion identified by the organization.” Id. at 226-27. The Court also
specified that “not all factors will be relevant in all cases, and the weight given each factor may
vary from case to case.” Id. at 227. The Court of Appeals then proceeded through a fact-specific
analysis in LeBoon and ultimately determined that—during the relevant time period—the
characteristics of the LJCC clearly pointed to the conclusion that it was primarily a religious
organization.1 See id. at 229.
In its summary judgment brief, although ICA discusses the various factors listed in
LeBoon and attempts to explain how the school meets the criteria set forth in that case, ICA fails
to focus on the characteristics of the school during the time period that is relevant in this case.
As noted above, throughout the LeBoon decision, the Court of Appeals repeatedly assessed the
factors in existence during the relevant time period, which was, as the Court specified in that
case, the period of the plaintiff’s employment. See id. at 227. In the present case, the
employment actions at issue occurred in June, 2012, when Plaintiffs’ employment with ICA was
terminated. Facts that have come to light in the course of the parties’ period of initial discovery
indicate that—in addition to the employment terminations—ICA experienced various other
changes at about that same time. Therefore, an analysis of the factors indicating the nature of
ICA as it existed when Plaintiffs were terminated may differ significantly from an analysis of
those same factors in relation to ICA as changes were later made regarding the school. See, e.g.,
E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schools, 990 F.2d at 462 (noting that, in that case, “the purpose and
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The Court of Appeals initially specified that the time period under scrutiny in LeBoon
was the time of the plaintiff’s employment (1998-2002). See 503 F.3d at 221, 227. Thereafter,
in conducting its analysis, the Court of Appeals repeatedly noted that it was examining the
LJCC’s characteristics “during the period under scrutiny,” “[d]uring the relevant period,” or
[d]uring the relevant time.” See id. at 226, 227, 228. The Court further noted that, in 2004 (after
the plaintiff’s employment had ended), the LJCC merged with another organization. See id. at
221 n.1. The Court did not, however, consider the defendant organization’s later status in
determining whether it was a religious organization during the earlier time period under scrutiny.
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emphasis of the Schools have shifted over the years from providing religious instruction to
equipping students with ethical principles that will enable them to make their own moral
judgments”).
Nevertheless, in arguing that it is exempt from Title VII as a religious educational
institution, ICA focuses primarily on the nature of the school after Plaintiffs’ employment was
terminated—when it had clearly become affiliated with Koinonia—rather than on the
characteristics of ICA at the time of Plaintiffs’ terminations, which is the time period properly
under scrutiny here. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, specifically argue that ICA should not be
considered exempt from Title VII as a religious educational institution because, at the time their
employment was terminated, ICA was not affiliated with either Petra or Koinonia. In fact, not
only is it unclear which organization, if either, was affiliated with ICA at the time of the
terminations, but it is difficult to evaluate other relevant characteristics of the school during the
time period properly under consideration.
Although an assessment of certain factors listed in LeBoon indicates that ICA should be
considered a religious educational institution at the time of the terminations (e.g., the school did
not operate for a profit), as to other factors, it is not apparent whether the documentation
produced to support ICA’s contentions existed at the time of the terminations (e.g., the school’s
undated employee handbook, which includes a code of ethics, a mission statement and a list of
employee objectives), and some other factors are only addressed as they existed after Plaintiffs’
employment was terminated and ICA became affiliated with Koinonia. For example, ICA
emphasizes that it is affiliated with Koinonia Church of Pittsburgh, that Koinonia participates in
ICA’s management, and that Koinonia is the “Governing Operating Bona Fide Church that
governs and operates ICA.” (Doc. No. 31, at 8-9, 12). However, the briefs and evidence of

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record indicate that ICA was actually affiliated with Petra—and not Koinonia—until
approximately the time that Plaintiffs’ employment was terminated in June, 2012. (Doc. No. 37,
at 2; Doc. No. 36-2, at 6-8). It further appears that ICA was not affiliated with Koinonia until
some later point in time, although it is not evident precisely when this new affiliation began.
(Doc. No. 36-2, at 7-8; Doc. No. 33-5). ICA also points out that it has members of Koinonia on
its Board of Directors, along with a Spiritual Advisory Council that includes reverends and
pastors from several churches and ministries. (Doc. No. 31, at 9). The school has failed to
describe, however, the composition of the Board of Directors or the Spiritual Advisory Council
in June, 2012, at the time of the employment actions at issue.
Moreover, to further support the argument that it is a religious organization, ICA asserts
that the school “[r]egularly includes prayer and other forms of worship in its activities.” (Doc.
No. 31, at 8). However, when Dr. Waters, the school’s former principal, was questioned in her
deposition about the religious component in the students’ schooling, defense counsel asked her to
focus—not on the time period leading up to Plaintiffs’ terminations—but rather, to describe the
following 2012-2013 school year and the time during “the transition away from Petra and [when]
the school moved on.” (Doc. No. 36-2, at 10-12). Similarly, ICA asserts that the school
“[i]ncludes religious instruction in its curriculum,” but the curriculum documentation attached to
its brief relates only to the 2013-14 school year, and Dr. Waters testified that the content of the
curriculum was actually “strengthened” after the school separated from Petra. (Doc. No. 31, at 9,
Doc. No. 33-11, Doc. No. 36-2, at 8). The Court is thus unable to evaluate several relevant
factors with regard to ICA’s nature and operations during the relevant time period.2
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ICA argues, alternatively, that it is exempt under the language of § 2000e(2)(e). In
support of this contention, however, Defendant offers the same evidence as presented supra,
namely, that Koinonia “operates ICA” and that “[r]eview of the curriculum demonstrates that it
is directed toward the propagation of Christianity.” (Doc. No. 31, at 12). Here again, ICA’s
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Finally, ICA argues that “the minimal gap between the affiliations with Petra and
Koinonia is immaterial.” (Doc. No. 37, at 2). However, the very employment actions at issue in
this case appear to have occurred during that time of transition, and the period surrounding that
gap was evidently a time when certain changes that are relevant to the Court’s inquiry occurred
at the school. Therefore, because the issue currently before the Court is whether ICA was a
religious educational institution at the time of the employments actions at issue in Plaintiffs’
Complaint—not whether ICA is currently a religious educational institution, and not whether it
was a religious educational institution after it switched church affiliations and made the various
other changes mentioned, supra—ICA has failed to address the relevant factors as they existed
during the time period under scrutiny. Therefore, the Court must find that the school has failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that it is exempt from Title VII as a religious educational
institution.3

assertions concern its characteristics after Koinonia became “the governing bona fide religious
entity that operates” the school, yet ICA does not address the nature of the school during the
relevant time period, i.e., at the time Plaintiffs’ employment was terminated. (Doc. No. 31, at
12).
ICA asserts in its Reply that, because Plaintiffs did not respond to ICA’s summary
judgment motion in accordance with the Local Rules of Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, the Court should deem ICA’s Concise Statement of Material Facts admitted.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs did not comply with Local Rule 56.C.1, despite being
specifically instructed to comply with the form for briefing outlined in Judge Bissoon’s Practices
and Procedures—which clearly state that Local Rule 56 must be followed when responding to
summary judgment motions. (Doc. No. 29). Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion in
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” along with a brief and appendix in
support thereof (which the Court has treated as a response in opposition to ICA’s motion).
Plaintiffs did not, however, file a proper Responsive Concise Statement in accordance with Local
Rule 56.C.1.
Nevertheless, even if the Court construes ICA’s Concise Statement of Material Facts as
true, the school has not established that ICA was a religious educational institution during the
relevant time period.
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IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

s/Alan N. Bloch
Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
cc:

Counsel of Record

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