GUCKER v. U.S. STEEL CORPORATION

Filing 82

ORDER indicating that, for reasons more fully stated within, that both Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 72 and Defendant's Motion in Limine 77 are denied. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 12/11/15. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALBERT E. GUCKER

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Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 13-583
Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This is an employment discrimination case wherein Plaintiff Albert E. Gucker (“Gucker”)
contends that Defendant United States Steel Corporation (“USX”) unlawfully terminated him on
the bases of his age and disability in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Docket No. 1). Presently before the Court are cross-motions in limine
to exclude certain medical evidence at trial. Gucker seeks through his motion, (Docket No.
[72]), to exclude from trial what he describes very generally as “irrelevant outside medical
records and treatment.” (Docket No. [72] at 2). Gucker’s motion, quite frankly, is as broad in
scope as it is thin in specifics. Similarly, the cross-motion of USX in response, (Docket No.
[77]), seeks to exclude from trial “any and all evidence . . . inconsistent with Gucker’s statements
and submissions to the SSA concerning his job duties, medical conditions and restrictions, and/or
ability to work in other than a sedentary position.” (Doc. 77 at 3).
As explained in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion denying the motion of USX for
summary judgment, (Docket No. 56 at 6), Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and its progeny recognize the tension between an individual’s
pursuit of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and the requirements of proof in
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability under the ADA. Cleveland
is particularly instructive here as it states explicitly: “an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore
[his] SSDI contention that [he] was too disabled to work . . . [He] must explain why that SSDI
contention is consistent with [his] ADA claim that [he] could ‘perform’ the essential functions’
of her previous job at least with ‘reasonable accommodation.’” 526 U.S. at 798.

“That

explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth
of, or the plaintiff's good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless
‘perform the essential functions' of [his] job, with or without ‘reasonable accommodation.’” 526
U.S. at 807 (emphasis added). Following the instruction in Cleveland, the Court finds that
Gucker must be afforded the opportunity at trial to explain evidence that conflicts, apparently or
otherwise, with contentions made in his pursuit of SSDI benefits.
Regarding Gucker’s motion, he asserts that medical evidence post-dating his asserted
“expulsion” from USX on December 28, 2011, should be excluded as should any medical
evidence not relating to his lifting restrictions. Gucker’s argument in support is his position that
the reason for his termination is clear and solely based on his lifting restriction and because he
was terminated on December 28, 2011, evidence regarding his abilities beyond that date are
irrelevant. Gucker ignores that discriminatory motive is not the only matter for decision by the
jury--Gucker seeks damages beyond December 28, 2011. Moreover, post December 28, 2011,
there is a dispute as to whether Gucker voluntarily retired effective March 31, 2012 or was
constructively discharged. See (Docket 56 at 11). Further, Gucker’s submissions seeking SSDI
benefits go beyond a lifting restriction and arthritic knees. Consistent with our ruling on USX’s
motion, Gucker will have the opportunity to explain inconsistencies in the evidence raised by
USX regarding his medical condition relevant to the employment position. We note that Gucker

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also has pending a claim under the ADEA, which does not have the “reasonable
accommodation” language or requirements of the ADA, Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., 346
F.3d 109, 117 (2003), a further permeation necessitating leeway in the presentation of evidence
on his ability to perform the job functions. Thus, contrary to Gucker’s urging, the Court cannot
say that the medical evidence prior to and post December 28, 2011 and the evidence beyond the
lifting restrictions would not be relevant to or have any bearing on his damages or his ability at
differing times to perform essential job functions, whether with or without reasonable
accommodation consistent with the requirements of the ADA and ADEA. Finally, the Court is
unconvinced that the prejudice asserted by Gucker, that he would have to expend resources to
address such evidence proffered in defense by USX at trial, is such that it would outweigh its
probative value under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
For these reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that both Plaintiff’s Motion [72] and Defendant’s Motion
[77] in limine are DENIED.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
Date: December 11, 2015
cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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