CHRISTIE v. PRESIDENT BAROCK OBAMA

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mark R. Hornak on 5/13/13. (bdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRIAN T. CHRISTIE,

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Plaintiff,

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Civil Action No.2: 13-cv-00596

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v.

PRESIDENT BAROCK OBAMA,
Defendants.

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U.S. District Judge Mark R. Hornak

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge,

Barack Obama is the incumbent President of the United States. The jurisdiction of the
federal courts is limited by Article III of the Constitution of the United States and the statutes
passed by Congress to implement those provisions. The Constitution textually commits the
fundamental policy judgments of the federal government to its elected, political branches, namely
the Congress and the President. These realities put the brakes on this lawsuit, and stop it in its
tracks.
Plaintiff filed this action pro se against President Barack Obama in his capacity as President
of the United States. He complains that the President and "his administration" have not secured our
Nation's borders against drug trafficking, or "illegals invading our Nation", ECF No.1. He claims
that the President has "supplied weapons to the drug cartels", and has, seemingly, committed
treason by "adhering to our Enemies and giving [sic] and comfort to them." Id. He further asserts
that the President has "denied pleas for military help in securing our boarders [sic]." Id. He also
alleges that the President has "refused protection of our Embassy People", and has "worked to

suppress our Border Agents efforts" and has "restricted our DEA and let the drug flow from
Afghanastan [sic]". Id.
As to relief sought, the Plaintiff wants charges of high treason brought against the President
and his Administration, the impeachment of any elected officials that have worked with him, money
damages in an amount the Court deems just, and the "immediate removal" of the President to "save
our Country". Id.
Courts may dismiss a claim sua sponte when the Complaint affords a sufficient basis for the
Court's action, Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 621 F .2d 556, 559 (3d. Cir. 1980). This is
particularly so when any effort at amendment would be legally futile. Cf Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, this Court is duty bound to vigilantly assess its
own subject matter jurisdiction, and dismiss any case as to which both Article III and Congress have
not granted it subject matter jurisdiction.
For a plaintiff to have the standing necessary to bring a civil action within this Court's
Constitutional jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, and that such
injury is particularized to him. Generalized grievances against government action or inaction will
not carry the day. See Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2009). This rule of law has been
authoritatively and recently confirmed by the Supreme Court. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1441-47 (2011); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587, 600 (2007). Read in the light most favorable to him, the Plaintiff's claims are generalized
complaints as a taxpayer against the President's actions (or alleged inactions) in executing the laws
of the United States, and they do not assert any particularized injury-in-fact to him as the Plaintiff,
or a special nexus between the challenged actions and him personally. Thus, he lacks standing to
assert and maintain this action, and this Court therefore lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate them. Berg, 586 F.3d at 242.

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Further, the Court may proceed no further in this case because the Supreme Court has
directed that in cases in which private civil litigation seeks to challenge the incumbent President's
actions in executing the Office of President of the United States, the doctrine of absolute immunity
bars the suit, at least as to damage claims. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-755 (1982). Given
the "singular importance" of the duties of the Office of the President l , this same doctrine obligates
the federal courts to resolve such matters as early as possible in the litigation. Id Further, it has long
been recognized that the federal courts should refrain from injecting themselves into what are
purely and fundamentally policy disagreements as to how the other co-equal branches of the federal
government carry out their policy responsibilities when such responsibilities are textually
committed to them. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 (1997); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
122 (1976); Jackson, 448 F. Supp 2d at 200-01.
Here, the Complaint also seeks the impeachment of various unnamed federal officials, and
the bringing of treason charges against them and the President. The impeachment power and
responsibility is, of course, reserved solely to the House of Representatives, with the trial of all
impeachments conducted by the Senate, pursuant to Article J, Sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution.
See Nixon v. Us.. 506 U.S. 224,228 (1993). Further, there is no Constitutional or statutory basis for
the preference of "high treason" criminal charges against any person by either this Court, or the
Plaintiff, and all of the matters for which the Plaintiff seeks relief relate solely to the performance,
or claimed non-performance, of the Constitutional obligations of the President under Article II of
the Constitution, by an incumbent President. Such matters, in the context of a request for
"impeachment" as a remedy, lie solely with the Congress and not with this Court.

I Of course, these legal principles apply no matter who holds the office of President of the United States. Jackson v.
George W. Bush, et al., 448 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2006).

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Finally, and for the sake of completeness, all of the matters complained of in the Complaint
would appear to boil down to core disagreements by the Plaintiff with how the President is doing
the job that he was elected to do, and more pointedly, general disagreements with the "faithfulness"
with which the President has executed his office. Such matters, involving the discretionary
allocation of Executive Branch resources and the exercise of the President's responsibilities as the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, would appear to be purely political
questions, at least in the specific context of the matters alleged in this lawsuit, and would be nonjusticiable by this, or any other, federal Court. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (case is
non-justiciable when actions challenged are duties textually committed to a co-equal branch, there
are not judicially manageable standards for resolution, the decision requires an inherently nonjudicial initial policy determination, and a court's independent resolution would demonstrate an
inherent lack of respect for separation of powers principles); Akere v. Obama, No. 11-1015,2011
WL 2173195 (D.D.C. May 31, 2011).
For these reasons, the Court holds that no matter the vigor with which the Plaintiff seeks to
assert his claims against the incumbent President of the United States in his official capacity as
President, this Court is without the power to hear or adjudicate them, and the Complaint is therefore
dismissed.
An appropriate Order will enter.

Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge
Dated: May 13,2013
cc:

Mr. Brian T. Christie

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