HIBBARD v. PENN-TRAFFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: plaintiff Betty Hibbard's Plea for Compensation 41 . Signed by Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 1/23/2015. (mjo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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BETTY HIBBARD,
)
)
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Plaintiff,
)
)
) Civil Action No. 13-622
v.
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PENN-TRAFFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT,
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Defendant,
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CONTI, Chief District Judge.
On December 23, 2014, plaintiff Betty Hibbard (“plaintiff”) filed a document
titled “Plea for Compensation.” (ECF No. 41.) Although plaintiff’s document is difficult to
understand, the court identified two matters raised: (1) plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of the
court’s October 31, 2014 order and (2) plaintiff is alleging a breach of contract claim against
defendant Penn-Trafford School District (“defendant”). Defendant responded in opposition and
moved for the award of litigation costs associated with replying to plaintiff’s Plea for
Compensation. (ECF No. 42 at 7.)

Defendant contends that the court already dismissed

plaintiff’s complaint and denied her previous reconsideration motion and argues that it is
incurring unnecessary costs as a result of plaintiff’s decision to continue to file similar motions
on issues the court has already adjudicated. (Id.) As set forth below, this motion is denied;
however, the court is notifying plaintiff that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), it intends to
preclude her from filing claims against district on subjects that the court has already adjudicated.
Plaintiff has until March 1, 2015, to show cause why the injunction should not issue. If no

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satisfactory response is filed, an injunction will issue precluding plaintiff from filing any further
motions in this case unless prior approval of court is granted.

I. Procedural Background
On May 8, 2014, plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant alleging that
defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, the Americans with Disability Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, as well as violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF
No. 2.) On July 29, 2013, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint and a brief in
support of its motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) Plaintiff filed multiple responses in opposition
to defendant’s motion to dismiss, including a motion to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(ECF Nos. 12, 13, 17.) On February 19, 2014, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss
without prejudice and denied plaintiff’s motion to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss, (ECF No.
20), for the reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum opinion. (ECF No. 19.)
On February 28, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion, accompanied by hundreds of pages
of exhibits, seeking leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 21.) On March 17, 2014,
defendant filed a brief in opposition. (ECF No. 23.)

On April 8, 2014, the court denied

plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint and provided plaintiff the opportunity to move for
leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff was notified she would need to
attach a proposed amended complaint as an exhibit to her motion for leave for an amended
complaint. (Id.) On April 14, 2014, plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to amend her
complaint and attached her proposed amended complaint. (ECF No. 26.) On May 8, 2014,
defendant responded in opposition. (ECF No. 27.) On October 31, 2014, the court issued an

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order denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, (ECF No. 33), for the
reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum, (ECF No. 32), and ordered the case closed.
On November 5, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for proposed ADR mediation and resolution,
(ECF No. 34), which the court denied as moot. (ECF No. 35.) On December 4, 2014, plaintiff
filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s November 12, 2014 order, denying her motion
for proposed ADR mediation and resolution as moot. (ECF No. 36.) On December 17, 2014,
defendant filed a brief in opposition. (ECF No. 37.) On December 22, 2014, the court denied
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, (ECF No. 40), for the reasons set forth in an
accompanying memorandum opinion. (ECF No. 39.) On December 23, 2014, plaintiff filed the
document titled “Plea for compensation,” (ECF No. 41), and defendant filed its response to
plaintiff’s plea for compensation on January 9, 2014. (ECF No. 42.) Having been fully briefed
this issue is ripe for disposition.

II. Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct manifest errors of law
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909
(3d Cir. 1985). A party seeking reconsideration must show at least one of the following: (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677;
North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
By reason of the interest in finality at the district court level, motions for
reconsideration should be granted sparingly; the parties are not free to relitigate issues the court

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already decided. Am. Beverage Corp. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., No. 12-601, 2013 WL 4010825, at
*1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2013); Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D.
Pa. 1992). Stated another way, a motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a
request for a district court to rethink a decision it, rightly or wrongly, already made. Williams v.
Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Just as motions for reconsideration should
not be used to relitigate issues already resolved by the court, they should not be used to advance
additional arguments that could have been made by the movant before judgment. Solis v.
Makozy, No. 09-1265, 2012 WL 1458232, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2012); Reich v. Compton,
834 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Breach of Contract Claim
For the reasons stated in its December 22, 2014 memorandum opinion, (ECF No.
39), the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because plaintiff failed to present
an intervening change in the controlling law, any new evidence that was not available when the
court denied the motion, or a need to correct a clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest
injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999). Because there are no remaining federal claims or other basis for federal jurisdiction, the
court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law breach of contract claim;
however, plaintiff is not precluded from filing her claim for breach of contract against defendant
in state court. Degenes v. Mueller, No. CIV.A. 11-916, 2012 WL 260038, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
27, 2012); see Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here
the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the

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district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing
so.”).
B. Defendant’s Motion for Litigation Costs
The court will deny defendant’s request for litigation costs; however, the court is
notifying plaintiff that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), it will preclude her from filing claims
against defendant on subjects that the court has adjudicated. As defendant noted, litigation costs
may be imposed in cases where “abusive litigation practices” are present. Roadway Exp., Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); see In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We
have emphatically stated that federal courts retain the inherent power to sanction errant attorneys
financially both for contempt and for conduct not rising to the level of contempt.”). The court of
appeals stated that a court must (1) “ensure that there is an actual factual predicate for flexing its
substantial muscle under its inherent powers,” (2) “ensure that the sanction is tailored to address
the harm identified,” and (3) “consider the conduct at issue and explain why the conduct
warrants a sanction.” In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 200; see Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev
USA, LLC, No. CIV. 07-1053, 2010 WL 5251304, at *3 (D. N.J. Dec. 14, 2010). The court,
however, must exercise restraint and discretion. Roadway Exp., Inc., 447 U.S. at 765.
In the discretion of the court, it is not appropriate at this juncture to impose
monetary sanctions, but the court is mindful that plaintiff’s recent filings do not raise any new
issues and merely seek to relitigate matters already decided by this court. In these circumstances
an injunction may be appropriate to preclude her from filing repetitive groundless motions.
“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages

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and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). “A District Court has broad power under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 to issue an injunction to restrict the filing of meritless pleadings. But such an injunction is
an extreme measure that must be narrowly tailored and sparingly used.” Robinson v. New Jersey
Mercer Cnty. Vicinage-Family Div., 562 F. App'x 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2014). “The broad scope of
the District Court's power ... is limited by two fundamental tenets of our legal system—the
litigant's rights to due process and access to the courts.” Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038
(3d Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff continues to file motions asserting claims that the court has already
adjudicated. See (ECF Nos. 34, 36, 41.) Each of plaintiff’s filings require the court’s time and
resources. The Supreme Court stated, “ ‘every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter
how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part
of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the
interests of justice.’ ” Day v. Day, 510 U.S. 1, 2 (1993) (citing In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
184 (1989)). “ ‘The goal of fairly dispensing justice ... is compromised when the Court is forced
to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests.’ ” Whitaker
v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 514 U.S. 208, 210 (1995) (citing In re Whitaker, 513 U.S. 1,
2 (1994)).
The court finds that plaintiff’s conduct of seeking to relitigate issues already
adjudicated is abusive. Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., AS, 555 F. App'x 148, 152 (3d Cir.
2014). The court believes this behavior will continue without an injunction limiting her access to
the court. Id. Each of plaintiff’s filings require the court and defendant, to expend time and
resources to respond to and adjudicate. The court should not continue to use its limited resources
on issues or claims it has already resolved. See In re of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d 745, 746

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(3d Cir. 1989) (“This circuit has concluded that district courts may issue an injunction requiring
a litigant who has repeatedly filed complaints alleging claims that have already been fully
litigated to receive court approval before filing further complaints.”).
Plaintiff has until March 1, 2015, to show cause why the proposed injunction
should not issue. If plaintiff fails to provide this court with an reasonable explanation, then the
court will issue an injunction precluding her ability to file motions and submissions in this case
without first obtaining court approval. Robinson, 562 F. App'x at 148; Hickman, 531 F. App'x at
211; Chipps v. U.S. District Court for Middle District of Pa., 882 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1989).

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration and defendant’s request for litigation costs. Plaintiff has until March 1, 2015, to
show cause why the proposed injunction precluding her from filing motions or submissions in
this case without first obtaining court approval should not be issued. The injunction shall not
preclude her from filing or pursuing any appeal. Failure to show cause shall result in the
issuance of the injunction. An appropriate order will follow.

Dated: January 23, 2015

/s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge

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