LAURENZA v. COLVIN

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF COURT denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 9 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum and Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/30/14. (gpr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHERRY MARIE LAURENZA,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)

)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

civil Action No. 13-664

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)

OPINION
AND NOW, this
of the parties'
plaintiff's

3o~ of

September, 2014, upon consideration

cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to

request for review of the decision of

the Acting

Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying
her application for disability insurance benefits

("DIBtI) under

Title II of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Acting
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.9) be,
and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment (Document No.7) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may rej ect

or discount

reasons for doing so.
Cir. 1999).
substantial
findings,

any evidence

if

Plummer v. Apfel,

the ALJ explains

the

186 F.3d 422,

(3d

429

Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,

even if

it

a

reviewing

would have

court

decided

is

bound

by

the

factual

those

inquiry

'l'lt,A072
(Rev. 8182)

differently.

Fargnoli v. Massanari,

247 F.3d 34,

38

(3d Cir.

2001).

Moreover,

it

is

well

settled

that

determined merely by the presence of

disability

impairments,

is

not

but by the

effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
125,

129

(3d

Cir.

1991).

These

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d
well-established principles

preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because
the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s
findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her DIB application on October 26,
alleging

disability

fibromyalgia,

beginning

depression,

dysfunction and arthritis.

on

back

March

5,

injury,

2010,

2010,

due

sacroiliac

to

joint

Plaintiff's application was denied.

At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a video hearing on November 9,
2011,

at which she testified while represented by counsel.

February

21,

2012,

the

plaintiff is not disabled.

ALJ

issued

a

decision

finding

On
that

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's

request for review on March 15, 2013, making the ALJ's decision
the final decision of the Acting Commissioner.

The instant action

followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 40 years old
on her alleged onset date of disability, and is classified as a
younger individual under the regulations.

20 C.F.R. §404.1563 (c)

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a hair stylist and
a

hair salon manager,

but she has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity at any time since her alleged onset date.
After

reviewing

plaintiff's

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medical

records

and

hearing

testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the ALJ

concluded

that

meaning of the Act.

plaintiff

is

not

disabled within the

The ALJ first found that the medical evidence

established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of
right

and

left

ecchymosis,

sacroiliac

migraine

vehicle accident,
fibromyalgia,
impairments,

joint

disorder,

dysfunction,

headaches,

uterine and ovarian cysts,

pain,

post

status

motor

allergy syndrome,

depressive disorder and anxiety;
alone or in combination,

back

however,

those

do not meet or equal the

criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1
of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1").
The

ALJ

next

found

that

plaintiff

retains

the

residual

functional capacity to perform sedentary work with a number of
additional
balancing,

limitations.
stooping,

Plaintiff

kneeling,

is

crouching,

limited

to

occasional

crawling and climbing

ramps and stairs, but she must avoid climbing ladders, ropes and
scaffolds.

In addition, plaintiff must have the option to stand

for five minutes after everyone-half hour of sitting.

Further,

plaintiff must avoid exposure to extreme heat or cold, wetness,
humidity, smoke, fumes, odors, gases, poor ventilation, flashing
lights, more than moderate noise and hazards such as heights or
machinery.

Finally, plaintiff is limited to simple, routine and

repetitive

tasks,

simple

work-related

changes in the work setting

decisions,

infrequent

(defined as no more than once per

week) and only occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors
and the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding") .
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The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform her
past relevant work because it exceeds her residual functional
capacity.

However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert,

the ALJ determined that plaintiff is capable of performing other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,
such

as

an

addresser,

document

preparer

and

table

worker.

Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within
the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A).

The impairment

or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only
unable to do

[her]

previous work but cannot,

considering

[her]

age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....

It

42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A).
The

Social

Security

Regulations

delineate

a

five-step

sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant
is

disabled.

The ALJ must

assess:

(1)

whether

the

currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity;
whether

she

has

a

severe

impairment;

(3)

if

so,

claimant

(2) if not,
whether her

impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4)
if

not,

whether

the

claimant's

impairment

performing her past relevant work;

and

(5)

prevents
if so,

her

from

whether the

claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
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economy,

in light of her age,

residual functional capacity.l

education,

work experience and

20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4).

If the

claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further
inquiry is unnecessary.

Id.

In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5
because:

(1)

treatment

he improperly weighed the opinions of plaintiff's

providers;

(2)

he

improperly

evaluated

plaintiff's

credibility concerning her subjective complaints of pain; and (3)
the hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not account
for plaintiff's limitations in using her hands.

The court finds

that each of these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the
opinions of Dr. Franklin Bizousky, her primary care physician, and
Dr. Frederick Murphy, her treating rheumatologist, as well as the
opinions

of

William

Young,

who

completed

a

psychological

evaluation of plaintiff, and Edward Jarrett, a physical therapist
who performed a

functional

Contrary to

capacity evaluation.

plaintiff's

position,

the ALJ's

thoroughly

considered

providers,

but concluded they were not entitled to controlling

the

decision makes

opinions

rendered

weight for legally sufficient reasons.
First,

the

ALJ

properly

clear

by her

that he
treatment

(R. 43-44).

evaluated

the

opinion

of

Dr.

lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a}(l}.
In assessing a claimant's
residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of
work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a} (4).
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Bizousky, who stated on an employability assessment form for the
Pennsylvania
disabled.

Department

(R. 399).

of

Public

Welfare

that

plaintiff

was

As an initial matter, whether plaintiff was

considered to be disabled for purposes of receiving state welfare
benefi ts

is

irrelevant

because

another

agency/ s

determination

regarding disability is not binding on the Acting Commissioner of
Social Security.

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1504.

Moreover, a treating

physician/s opinion is entitled to controlling weight only if it
is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic

techniques

and

is

not

substantial evidence of record.
the ALJ explained,

inconsistent

with

the

other

20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) (2).

As

that standard was not met here because Dr.

Bizousky did not provide any explanation on the state welfare form
to support his opinion of disability, and it was inconsistent with
other

record

capabilities.

plaintiff/s

concerning

evidence

functional

For these reasons, the ALJ properly determined that

Dr. Bizousky/s opinion was not entitled to controlling weight. (R.
43) .

The ALJ likewise correctly evaluated Dr. Murphy/s opinion and
concluded that it was not entitled to controlling weight.
Murphy

stated,

fibromyalgia

\\

syndrome

it
will

is

unlikely

respond

to

any

that
other

Dr.

[plaintiff/s]
therapeutic

interventions and therefore it is unlikely that [plaintiff] will
be able to resume her normal activities of daily living at this
juncture."

(R. 420).

The ALJ explained that he discounted Dr.

Murphy/s opinion because not all treatment options were exhausted
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before Dr.

Murphy concluded that plaintiff's

unlikely to improve.

(R.

44).

fibromyalgia was

The ALJ's assessment is well

founded because Dr. Murphy only examined plaintiff twice before
rendering his opinion.

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) (2) (i) and (ii)

(recognizing that the length, nature and extent of the treatment
relationship

are

factors

to

consider

in

weighing

medical

opinions) .
Next,
Young's

the ALJ appropriately considered and weighed William

psychological

evaluation

of

plaintiff.

The

record

reflects that plaintiff met with Mr. Young two times before he
issued an opinion that she would be unable to meet competitive
standards in certain work-related areas and likely would miss work
more than four days per month.
accurately

noted,

controlling

Mr.

weight

Young/s

because

he

(R.

489,

As the ALJ

493-94).

opinion

was

had

established

no

not

entitled

to

treatment

relationship with plaintiff, and it was inconsistent with other
record evidence.
Finally,

43).

plaintiff's contention that the ALJ did not give

appropriate weight
therapist,

(R.

to the opinion of

also is without merit.

Mr.

Jarrett,

a physical

The ALJ must consider all

relevant evidence from "acceptable medical sources

I

II

which include

licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists and podiatrists,
as

well

as

§404 .1513 (a) .
claimant's

qualified

speech

pathologists.

See

20

C.F.R.

The ALJ also may consider other opinions about a

disability

from

individuals

who are not

deemed an

"acceptable medical source," such as a physical therapist like Mr.
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Jarrett.

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1513(d) (1)

Commissioner may use

evidence

from

(stating that the Acting

"other sources"

inter alia, medical sources such as therapists)

including,

Although the ALJ

may consider the opinion of one who is not an acceptable medical
source, that opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1999)

See

(recognizing

that evidence from "other sources" is not entitled to controlling
weight).

Moreover, as the ALJ found here, Mr. Jarrett's opinion

was inconsistent with other record evidence,

including a prior

functional capacity evaluation which indicated that plaintiff did
not put forth maximum or consistent effort during testing.

(R.

303) .
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her
subjective

complaints

of

pain

resulting

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion,
that

plaintiff's

severe

from

fibromyalgia.

the ALJ correctly determined

impairments,

including

fibromyalgia,

caused pain and other limitations, which he accounted for in the
RFC Finding, but concluded that her claim of total debilitating
pain was not entirely credible.

(R. 41).

In evaluating plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ complied with
the appropriate regulations and considered all of the relevant
evidence in the record, including plaintiff's own statements about
her

symptoms,

evidence,

her

activities

the nature of

of

daily

living,

the

medical

her medication and the extent of her

treatment, and opinion evidence from her treatment providers.

See

20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) (1) - (c) (3) ; Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
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The ALJ then considered the extent to which plaintiff's alleged
functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent
with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect her
ability to work.
that

the

20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c) (4).

obj ective

evidence

is

inconsistent

allegation of total disabling limitations.
determined

that

plaintiff's

The ALJ determined

testimony

limitations was not entirely credible.

with

plaintiff's

Accordingly, the ALJ

regarding
(R. 41).

her

pain

and

This court finds

that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility
determination,

(R.

40 44),

and

is

satisfied

that

such

determination is supported by substantial evidence. 2
Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ 1 s

hypothetical

question to the vocational expert did not account for limitations
in using her hands which were identified by Edward Jarrett in his
functional capacity evaluation.

Plaintiff's argument is without

merit.
An ALJ1s hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all
of the claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the
medical evidence.
Cir. 1987).

Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d

As discussed above, the ALJ found that Mr. Jarrett's

opinion was not entitled to controlling weight, thus the ALJ was
not obliged to

incorporate his

findings

into the hypothetical

question.

2An ALJ may reject the claimant's subjective testimony if he does
not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the
testimony.
Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433
(3d Cir. 1999).
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The

ALJ's

hypothetical

did,

however,

incorporate

all

of

plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record
supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the
RFC Finding.
vocational

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the

expert's

testimony to

conclude

that

plaintiff

can

perform work that exists in the national economy.
In

conclusion,

evidence of record,

after

carefully

considering

all

of

the

the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not

disabled within the meaning of the Act.

The ALJ's findings and

conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not
otherwise

erroneous.

Therefore,

the

decision of

the Acting

Commissioner must be affirmed.

/

Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc: Mary L. pothoven, Esq.
Law Office of Querino R. Torretti
600 Main Street
P.O. Box 218

Reynoldsville, PA 15851

Paul Kovac
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

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