LAURENZA v. COLVIN
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF COURT denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 9 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum and Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/30/14. (gpr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHERRY MARIE LAURENZA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
civil Action No. 13-664
)
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
OPINION
AND NOW, this
of the parties'
plaintiff's
3o~ of
September, 2014, upon consideration
cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to
request for review of the decision of
the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying
her application for disability insurance benefits
("DIBtI) under
Title II of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Acting
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.9) be,
and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment (Document No.7) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may rej ect
or discount
reasons for doing so.
Cir. 1999).
substantial
findings,
any evidence
if
Plummer v. Apfel,
the ALJ explains
the
186 F.3d 422,
(3d
429
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
evidence,
even if
it
a
reviewing
would have
court
decided
is
bound
by
the
factual
those
inquiry
'l'lt,A072
(Rev. 8182)
differently.
Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34,
38
(3d Cir.
2001).
Moreover,
it
is
well
settled
that
determined merely by the presence of
disability
impairments,
is
not
but by the
effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
125,
129
(3d
Cir.
1991).
These
Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d
well-established principles
preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because
the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s
findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her DIB application on October 26,
alleging
disability
fibromyalgia,
beginning
depression,
dysfunction and arthritis.
on
back
March
5,
injury,
2010,
2010,
due
sacroiliac
to
joint
Plaintiff's application was denied.
At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a video hearing on November 9,
2011,
at which she testified while represented by counsel.
February
21,
2012,
the
plaintiff is not disabled.
ALJ
issued
a
decision
finding
On
that
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's
request for review on March 15, 2013, making the ALJ's decision
the final decision of the Acting Commissioner.
The instant action
followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 40 years old
on her alleged onset date of disability, and is classified as a
younger individual under the regulations.
20 C.F.R. §404.1563 (c)
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a hair stylist and
a
hair salon manager,
but she has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity at any time since her alleged onset date.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
'%AO 72
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medical
records
and
hearing
testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the ALJ
concluded
that
meaning of the Act.
plaintiff
is
not
disabled within the
The ALJ first found that the medical evidence
established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of
right
and
left
ecchymosis,
sacroiliac
migraine
vehicle accident,
fibromyalgia,
impairments,
joint
disorder,
dysfunction,
headaches,
uterine and ovarian cysts,
pain,
post
status
motor
allergy syndrome,
depressive disorder and anxiety;
alone or in combination,
back
however,
those
do not meet or equal the
criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1
of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1").
The
ALJ
next
found
that
plaintiff
retains
the
residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work with a number of
additional
balancing,
limitations.
stooping,
Plaintiff
kneeling,
is
crouching,
limited
to
occasional
crawling and climbing
ramps and stairs, but she must avoid climbing ladders, ropes and
scaffolds.
In addition, plaintiff must have the option to stand
for five minutes after everyone-half hour of sitting.
Further,
plaintiff must avoid exposure to extreme heat or cold, wetness,
humidity, smoke, fumes, odors, gases, poor ventilation, flashing
lights, more than moderate noise and hazards such as heights or
machinery.
Finally, plaintiff is limited to simple, routine and
repetitive
tasks,
simple
work-related
changes in the work setting
decisions,
infrequent
(defined as no more than once per
week) and only occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors
and the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding") .
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The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform her
past relevant work because it exceeds her residual functional
capacity.
However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert,
the ALJ determined that plaintiff is capable of performing other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,
such
as
an
addresser,
document
preparer
and
table
worker.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within
the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A).
The impairment
or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only
unable to do
[her]
previous work but cannot,
considering
[her]
age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....
It
42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A).
The
Social
Security
Regulations
delineate
a
five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant
is
disabled.
The ALJ must
assess:
(1)
whether
the
currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity;
whether
she
has
a
severe
impairment;
(3)
if
so,
claimant
(2) if not,
whether her
impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4)
if
not,
whether
the
claimant's
impairment
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
prevents
if so,
her
from
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
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economy,
in light of her age,
residual functional capacity.l
education,
work experience and
20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4).
If the
claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further
inquiry is unnecessary.
Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5
because:
(1)
treatment
he improperly weighed the opinions of plaintiff's
providers;
(2)
he
improperly
evaluated
plaintiff's
credibility concerning her subjective complaints of pain; and (3)
the hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not account
for plaintiff's limitations in using her hands.
The court finds
that each of these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the
opinions of Dr. Franklin Bizousky, her primary care physician, and
Dr. Frederick Murphy, her treating rheumatologist, as well as the
opinions
of
William
Young,
who
completed
a
psychological
evaluation of plaintiff, and Edward Jarrett, a physical therapist
who performed a
functional
Contrary to
capacity evaluation.
plaintiff's
position,
the ALJ's
thoroughly
considered
providers,
but concluded they were not entitled to controlling
the
decision makes
opinions
rendered
weight for legally sufficient reasons.
First,
the
ALJ
properly
clear
by her
that he
treatment
(R. 43-44).
evaluated
the
opinion
of
Dr.
lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments.
20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a}(l}.
In assessing a claimant's
residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her
ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of
work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a} (4).
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Bizousky, who stated on an employability assessment form for the
Pennsylvania
disabled.
Department
(R. 399).
of
Public
Welfare
that
plaintiff
was
As an initial matter, whether plaintiff was
considered to be disabled for purposes of receiving state welfare
benefi ts
is
irrelevant
because
another
agency/ s
determination
regarding disability is not binding on the Acting Commissioner of
Social Security.
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1504.
Moreover, a treating
physician/s opinion is entitled to controlling weight only if it
is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic
techniques
and
is
not
substantial evidence of record.
the ALJ explained,
inconsistent
with
the
other
20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) (2).
As
that standard was not met here because Dr.
Bizousky did not provide any explanation on the state welfare form
to support his opinion of disability, and it was inconsistent with
other
record
capabilities.
plaintiff/s
concerning
evidence
functional
For these reasons, the ALJ properly determined that
Dr. Bizousky/s opinion was not entitled to controlling weight. (R.
43) .
The ALJ likewise correctly evaluated Dr. Murphy/s opinion and
concluded that it was not entitled to controlling weight.
Murphy
stated,
fibromyalgia
\\
syndrome
it
will
is
unlikely
respond
to
any
that
other
Dr.
[plaintiff/s]
therapeutic
interventions and therefore it is unlikely that [plaintiff] will
be able to resume her normal activities of daily living at this
juncture."
(R. 420).
The ALJ explained that he discounted Dr.
Murphy/s opinion because not all treatment options were exhausted
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before Dr.
Murphy concluded that plaintiff's
unlikely to improve.
(R.
44).
fibromyalgia was
The ALJ's assessment is well
founded because Dr. Murphy only examined plaintiff twice before
rendering his opinion.
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) (2) (i) and (ii)
(recognizing that the length, nature and extent of the treatment
relationship
are
factors
to
consider
in
weighing
medical
opinions) .
Next,
Young's
the ALJ appropriately considered and weighed William
psychological
evaluation
of
plaintiff.
The
record
reflects that plaintiff met with Mr. Young two times before he
issued an opinion that she would be unable to meet competitive
standards in certain work-related areas and likely would miss work
more than four days per month.
accurately
noted,
controlling
Mr.
weight
Young/s
because
he
(R.
489,
As the ALJ
493-94).
opinion
was
had
established
no
not
entitled
to
treatment
relationship with plaintiff, and it was inconsistent with other
record evidence.
Finally,
43).
plaintiff's contention that the ALJ did not give
appropriate weight
therapist,
(R.
to the opinion of
also is without merit.
Mr.
Jarrett,
a physical
The ALJ must consider all
relevant evidence from "acceptable medical sources
I
II
which include
licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists and podiatrists,
as
well
as
§404 .1513 (a) .
claimant's
qualified
speech
pathologists.
See
20
C.F.R.
The ALJ also may consider other opinions about a
disability
from
individuals
who are not
deemed an
"acceptable medical source," such as a physical therapist like Mr.
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Jarrett.
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1513(d) (1)
Commissioner may use
evidence
from
(stating that the Acting
"other sources"
inter alia, medical sources such as therapists)
including,
Although the ALJ
may consider the opinion of one who is not an acceptable medical
source, that opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1999)
See
(recognizing
that evidence from "other sources" is not entitled to controlling
weight).
Moreover, as the ALJ found here, Mr. Jarrett's opinion
was inconsistent with other record evidence,
including a prior
functional capacity evaluation which indicated that plaintiff did
not put forth maximum or consistent effort during testing.
(R.
303) .
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her
subjective
complaints
of
pain
resulting
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion,
that
plaintiff's
severe
from
fibromyalgia.
the ALJ correctly determined
impairments,
including
fibromyalgia,
caused pain and other limitations, which he accounted for in the
RFC Finding, but concluded that her claim of total debilitating
pain was not entirely credible.
(R. 41).
In evaluating plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ complied with
the appropriate regulations and considered all of the relevant
evidence in the record, including plaintiff's own statements about
her
symptoms,
evidence,
her
activities
the nature of
of
daily
living,
the
medical
her medication and the extent of her
treatment, and opinion evidence from her treatment providers.
See
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) (1) - (c) (3) ; Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
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The ALJ then considered the extent to which plaintiff's alleged
functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent
with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect her
ability to work.
that
the
20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c) (4).
obj ective
evidence
is
inconsistent
allegation of total disabling limitations.
determined
that
plaintiff's
The ALJ determined
testimony
limitations was not entirely credible.
with
plaintiff's
Accordingly, the ALJ
regarding
(R. 41).
her
pain
and
This court finds
that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility
determination,
(R.
40 44),
and
is
satisfied
that
such
determination is supported by substantial evidence. 2
Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ 1 s
hypothetical
question to the vocational expert did not account for limitations
in using her hands which were identified by Edward Jarrett in his
functional capacity evaluation.
Plaintiff's argument is without
merit.
An ALJ1s hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all
of the claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the
medical evidence.
Cir. 1987).
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d
As discussed above, the ALJ found that Mr. Jarrett's
opinion was not entitled to controlling weight, thus the ALJ was
not obliged to
incorporate his
findings
into the hypothetical
question.
2An ALJ may reject the claimant's subjective testimony if he does
not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the
testimony.
Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433
(3d Cir. 1999).
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The
ALJ's
hypothetical
did,
however,
incorporate
all
of
plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record
supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the
RFC Finding.
vocational
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the
expert's
testimony to
conclude
that
plaintiff
can
perform work that exists in the national economy.
In
conclusion,
evidence of record,
after
carefully
considering
all
of
the
the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not
disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The ALJ's findings and
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not
otherwise
erroneous.
Therefore,
the
decision of
the Acting
Commissioner must be affirmed.
/
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
cc: Mary L. pothoven, Esq.
Law Office of Querino R. Torretti
600 Main Street
P.O. Box 218
Reynoldsville, PA 15851
Paul Kovac
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
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