CARTER v. WINTRUBA et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER. At least four of the six Poulis factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissal. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed with prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. Out of an abundance of caution, however, this Court will give Plaintiff one final opportunity to respond to the dispositive motions on or before June 23, 2014. Failing to do so, this Court will enter an order dismissing his case with prejudice and without further notice.Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 6/09/2014. (MJL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASON L. CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
POLICE OFFICER WINTRUBA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 13-cv-00806
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On June 13, 2013, Jason L. Carter, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at the Allegheny
County Jail in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, filed this action pro se, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. In his Complaint (ECF No. 7), Plaintiff asserts that various police
officers of the Boroughs of Homestead and West Homestead, Pennsylvania, unlawfully arrested
him in violation of the Fourth Amendment in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment
rights during a vehicle search, illegally detained and strip searched him at the police station
without justification, and denied him due process and equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also claims the police officers conspired to violate his civil
rights, and that the Boroughs are liable for the violations because they failed to train and
supervise their police officers.

Under the Federal Magistrate Judges Act (“the Act), a Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction may be conferred
by consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Under the Act, “[u]pon consent of the parties, a full-time
United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter
and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by
the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Consent of all parties to a case gives the magistrate judge full
“authority over dispositive motions, conduct of trial, and entry of final judgment, all without district
court review.” Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003); In re Search of Scranton Hous. Auth., 487
F.Supp.2d 530, 535 (M.D.Pa. 2007). “[S]o long as consent [to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction] is clear and
unambiguous, it is effective.” In re Search of Scranton Hous. Auth., 487 F.Supp.2d at 535; Roell, 538
U.S. at 591 (consent may be inferred from parties’ actions). All parties have filed election forms
consenting to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge.
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On December 9, 2013, Police Officer James M. Wintruba, Police Officer John Sopcak,
Police Officer Ian Strang and the Borough of Homestead filed a Motion to Dismiss to be Treated
as a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 28), pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and 12(d),
seeking judgment in their favor on the basis of qualified immunity (for the individual officers)
and, on the merits, on the grounds that the Complaint and exhibits attached to their Amended
Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 33) and in their Amended Appendix (ECF No.
34) establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot met his burden of proving the elements of
his civil rights claims.
On January 20, 2014, the Borough of West Homestead and the West Homestead Police
Department filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), or for
summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d), also relying on materials outside the
pleadings.
The remaining defendant, Police Officer Jason Trout, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 40) on February 27, 2014.
Plaintiff was directed to file his responses to each of the defendants’ dispositive motions
by May 30, 2014, and was explicitly instructed that “[f]ailure to file responses or briefs in
opposition shall be deemed an abandonment or failure to prosecute Plaintiff's claims, and will be
grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and without further notice of Court.”
Order of Court dated April 23, 2014 (ECF No. 42). Plaintiff has not responded to any of the
dispositive motions, nor has he sought an enlargement of time within which to respond or
communicated with the Court in any fashion.

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A plaintiff's failure to comply with court orders may constitute a failure to prosecute the
action, rendering the action subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), which states in
pertinent part:
Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move
to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal
order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and
any dismissal not under this rule C except one for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule
19 C operates as adjudication on the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
By its plain terms, a district court has the power to dismiss a claim of a plaintiff pursuant
to Fed R. Civ. P. 41(b) on motion of a defendant, for failure to comply with an order of the court.
A federal court also has the inherent authority to dismiss a proceeding sua sponte based on a
party’s failure to prosecute the action. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962);
Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under
Rule 41(b).”); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissal was appropriate
response to deliberate defiance of court orders where district court judge determined that no other
sanction would adequately insure future compliance). See also Kenney v. Cal. Tanker Co., 381
F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1967) (“authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution
has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.”) (quoting Link 370 U.S. at 630–31).
In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, the court must
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balance the six factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d
Cir. 1994). These factors are:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to
the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and
respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the
claim or defense.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
Poulis does not, however, “provide a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or
not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation easily reviewed” by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. The decision is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 230 (3d
Cir. 1998), and a great deal of deference will be given the district court which is in the best
position to weigh all of the Poulis factors and any other pertinent matters. Mindek, 964 F.2d at
1373 (“the decision must be made in the context of the district court's extended contact with the
litigant. Ultimately, the decision to dismiss constitutes an exercise of the district court judge's
discretion and must be given great deference by this Court - a court which has had no direct
contact with the litigants and whose orders, calendar, docket and authority have not been violated
or disrupted.”).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that “no single
Poulis factor is dispositive,” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003), and
“not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Mindek, 964 F.2d
at 1373. See also Allen v. American Fed. of Gov’t Emp., 317 Fed. App=x 180, 181 (3d Cir. 2009)
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(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaint without explicitly
weighing the Poulis factors when plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint as ordered by the
court).
With the above principles as our guidepost, this Court will review the Poulis factors in
this case, seriatim.
(1)

The extent of the party's personal responsibility. The court notes that the plaintiff

is proceeding pro se. Hence, he bears sole responsibility for the failure to file any response to
three dispositive motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
(2)

Prejudice to the adversary. Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants’ serious

motions for dismissal or for summary judgment obviously prejudices defendants who remain in
limbo and must continue to endure the anxiety associated with this type of litigation. While the
prejudice would not appear to be overwhelming, this factor weighs slightly in Defendants’ favor.
(3)

History of dilatoriness. This case was filed about one year ago, and other than his

failure to respond to the three dispositive motions, there is not much of a history of dilatoriness.
Thus, this factor is not significant, although it is certainly some indication that Plaintiff has lost
interest in his action.
(4)

Whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith. In the

absence of any communication from Plaintiff or response to any of the three dispositive motions,
it is not possible to determine if the failure to respond was willful or in bad faith. Thus, this
factor is a neutral consideration.
(5)

Effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. If Plaintiff has in fact lost interest

in pursuing his case, which would appear to be the case, it seems there is little else to do. His
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civil action has been challenged by three sets of Defendants, and yet he has not responded to the
real threat of dismissal posed by the motions.
(6)

Meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Plaintiff faces some major obstacles in

his lawsuit, including a Heck v. Humphrey bar2 to at least some of his claims, and the Borough of
West Homestead and its Police Department’s argument for summary judgment because the
individual police officers named in the lawsuit are not employed by the Borough of West
Homestead.
At least four of the six Poulis factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissal. Accordingly,
this action should be dismissed with prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
Out of an abundance of caution, however, this Court will give Plaintiff one final
opportunity to respond to the dispositive motions on or before June 23, 2014. Failing to do so,
this Court will enter an order dismissing his case with prejudice and without further notice.

Date: June 9, 2014

s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge

cc:
Jason L. Carter
153 Rosewood Street
Washington, PA 15301

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Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). “Under Heck, a § 1983 action that impugns the validity of the
plaintiff's underlying conviction cannot be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or
impaired by collateral proceedings.” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2005). Under Heck, the court
must dismiss a section 1983 claim if finding in plaintiff’s favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior
criminal conviction.” Lora–Pena v. FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s claims of unlawful arrest (at
least) appear to be on shaky grounds. See, e.g., Rosembert v. Bor. of E. Lansdowne, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2014 WL
1395032, *3 (E.D.Pa. 2014) (because his civil rights claims would call into question the validity of his conviction
under the circumstances, “Plaintiff's claims for illegal search and false arrest are Heck-barred”).

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